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1. SUMMARY 
In recent years, the concept of ‘strategic research’ has played a prominent role in 
Danish public research policy. This thesis investigates how strategic research 
develops in a pharmaceutical company. Politicians and policy makers have tended 
to see science-industry collaboration as the main strategic tool for stimulating 
national growth and job creation. They have also anticipated that companies and 
politicians in the future will have an increasingly important role in specifying 
societal and industrial problems that can be solved through science-industry 
collaborations. Hence, strategic research is today closely associated with what is 
termed ‘demand-driven innovation’. 
Science-industry collaboration has also attracted interest in industry, for instance, 
in pharmaceutical companies. However, here we find quite different ideas about 
strategic research and science-industry collaboration. Rather than representing a 
tool for providing short-term solutions, pharmaceutical companies have seen 
science-industry collaboration as a device for building long-term platforms of 
innovation. Arising from a curiosity concerning the differences between policy 
and corporate practices of strategic research, this thesis asks the following 
questions: What characterizes strategic research in a private company? Through 
which practices does strategic research (and science-industry collaboration) 
develop? What characterizes the management of strategic research? 
In the field of research policy studies, the main challenge of science-industry 
collaboration is often described as ‘overcoming barriers’ related to separate 
cultures. According to this portrayal, university and industry are seen as two 
separate domains that need to be aligned in order to collaborate. However, the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) approaches this quite differently, 
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arguing that phenomena like science-industry interaction might be understood in 
terms of ‘co-production’ (Jasanoff 2004). 
Drawing on concepts such as ‘trading zones’ (Galison 1997), ‘doable problems’ 
(Fujimura 1987, 1996), and ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer 1989), the 
thesis develops a conceptual framework that focuses in particular on the 
examination of ‘screens’. The thesis suggests that the notion of screens is a 
suitable tool for investigating strategic co-productions that do not presume 
alignment. Analyzing such forms of co-production as dependent on several kinds 
of screens, which categorize, project or occlude relations, the thesis aims to offer 
further insights into the dynamics of science-industry collaboration. 
The empirical focus of the thesis is the Danish pharmaceutical company 
Lundbeck, which specializes in drugs for the treatment of brain disorders. Based 
on a form of interventionist participant observation, the thesis investigates how, 
in recent years, research managers in Lundbeck have developed new strategies 
and approaches to research. Like other pharmaceutical companies, Lundbeck has 
been under pressure due to changes in the market structure and consequently the 
business model of the pharmaceutical industry. Despite increased pressure, 
Lundbeck’s new research strategies have been based on a relatively open and in 
that sense ‘risky’ approach. This approach has implied intensified collaboration 
with external academic research groups. The purpose of these collaborations has 
been to develop deeper insight into the biology of diseases and to base drug 
discovery on more profound knowledge about biological mechanisms relevant to 
human diseases. This context of risk and uncertainty offers a rich case for 
studying practices of strategic research, science-industry collaboration and 
research management. 
The thesis offers three main findings. First, in Lundbeck strategic research is not 
demand-driven but rather ‘strategic-explorative’. Rather than developing in a 
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highly calculated, predefined or predictable process, research is progressing in a 
quite experimental and open process. Second, science-industry collaboration does 
not merely develop from processes of the alignment of unlike, or even inherently 
incommensurable, cultures but also through what might be termed ‘misaligned 
co-production’, which takes place both in external collaboration and within the 
company itself. In Lundbeck, we encounter cases where industrial and academic 
engagements are completely entangled. Consequently, establishing science-
industry collaboration requires not merging but rather making important 
differences explicit, both from the start and during the process of collaboration. 
Third, this means that managing strategic research is not about bridging diverse 
stable worlds but about managing changing conditions and emergent relations. 
This does not imply the absence of structures and strategies but rather an 
anticipation of change. The notion of ‘adaptive frameworks’ (Vedel et al. 2013) 
offers an approach that tries to capture the practical implications of managing 
strategic research. 
This thesis has implications for policy, academic research and practical research 
management. In contrast to the recent focus on demand-driven innovation, the 
thesis suggests that even within companies, demands develop in explorative 
processes. Such demands often emerge from rather loose but prospective ideas 
that also give rise to expectations of change. Accordingly the thesis suggests that 
the somewhat rigid categorizations of research that are currently developing in 
(for example) Danish research policy are not sufficiently nuanced to capture the 
significance of strategic research in companies. Hence, the thesis hopes to 
stimulate debate about policy ideas of strategic research, innovation and 
companies. 
To feed into such a policy discussion based on a ‘serviceable STS’ approach 
(Webster 2007), the thesis suggests further research in continuation of the three 
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main findings. What is the nature of strategic-explorative research if we consider 
more cases, in diverse companies and industries? What are the broader 
implications of thinking about collaboration in terms of misaligned co-
production? What does it take to manage research according to adaptive 
frameworks, both in policy and in industry? 
The thesis is structured in two parts. The first part introduces the empirical case 
and the conceptual framework. The second part contains four empirical chapters. 
Each of these chapters explores a case of science-industry collaboration. The first 
two chapters investigate collaborations between Lundbeck and external academic 
research groups. Based on these chapters, the thesis suggests that external 
collaboration gains strategic value in Lundbeck by being explorative rather than 
solving a precisely defined problem. It also proposes that collaboration 
progresses in an intricate process of explicating differences between science and 
industry. The final two chapters investigate science-industry collaboration within 
Lundbeck. Specifically, they explore how strategic research not only emerges as 
an outcome of external collaboration but also as a result of increased 
collaboration between different internal parts of the company. Within Lundbeck, 
we thus also find examples of misaligned co-production that challenge the idea of 
seeing science-industry collaboration merely as a matter of ‘bridge building’. The 
concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses their 
implications for practitioners and future research. 
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2. DANSK RESUMÉ 
‘Strategisk forskning’ har i de seneste år spillet en central rolle i dansk 
forskningspolitik. Politikere og embedsmænd har præsenteret universitets-
industri samarbejde som det vigtigste strategiske redskab til at stimulere vækst 
og beskæftigelse i Danmark. Det har givet forventning om, at virksomheder og 
politikere i fremtiden vil få en fremtrædende rolle i at identificere essentielle 
samfunds- og erhvervsmæssige problemer, som kan løses via universitets-
industri samarbejde. På denne måde er strategisk forskning i dag tæt forbundet 
med det, som kaldes ‘efterspørgselsdrevet innovation’. Denne afhandling 
undersøger, hvordan strategisk forskning udspiller sig i medicinalvirksomheden 
Lundbeck. 
Universitets-industri samarbejde har også tiltrukket sig interesse fra industrien 
for eksempel fra medicinalvirksomheder. Her finder vi imidlertid nogle meget 
anderledes ideer om, hvad strategisk forskning og universitets-industri 
samarbejde er. Medicinalvirksomheder har eksempelvis set universitets-industri 
samarbejde som et redskab til at opbygge langsigtede platforme for innovation 
snarere end til at løse kortsigtede problemer. Med baggrund i en interesse for at 
forstå disse forskelle mellem forskningspolitiske tilgange til strategisk forskning 
og virksomheders konkrete udvikling deraf undersøger afhandlingen følgende 
spørgsmål: Hvad karakteriserer strategisk forskning i en privat virksomhed? 
Gennem hvilke praksisser bliver strategisk forskning (og universitets-industri 
samarbejde) til? Hvad karakteriserer ledelse af strategisk forskning? 
Inden for studier af forskningspolitik anses nødvendigheden af at ‘overvinde 
barrierer’ relateret til forskningskulturelle forskelle ofte som en af de vigtigste 
udfordringer ved universitets-industri samarbejde. I disse studier anses 
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universiteter og virksomheder således som to separate domæner, der skal 
‘alignes’, for at kunne samarbejde. I forhold til denne analyseramme tilbyder 
forskningsfeltet Science and Technology Studies (STS) en væsentlig anden tilgang. 
I første omgang er præmissen for mange STS tilgange, at fænomener som 
universitets-industri samarbejde bør forstås som ‘co-produced’ (Jasanoff 2004). 
Co-production er også den analytiske præmis for herværende studie. 
Baseret på begreber såsom ‘trading zones’ (Galison 1997), ‘doable problems’ 
(Fujimura 1987, 1996) og ‘boundary objects’ (Star og Griesemer 1989), som alle 
illustrerer ‘co-production’, udvikler afhandlingen et begrebsapparat, som i særlig 
grad fokuserer på en undersøgelse af begrebet ‘screens’. Screens foreslås som et 
begrebsapparat, der er egnet til at undersøge strategiske former for co-
production, som ikke er baseret på adskilte domæner, der skal sammenknyttes. 
Ved at analysere co-production som processer der både bygger på og genererer 
forskellige slags screens, tilbyder afhandlingen ny indsigt i dynamikken i 
universitets-industri samarbejde. 
Det empiriske fokus i afhandlingen er den danske medicinalvirksomhed 
Lundbeck, som er specialiseret i at udvikle og producere lægemidler til 
behandling af neurologiske sygdomme. Baseret på intervenerende deltagende 
observation undersøger afhandlingen, hvordan forskningsledere i Lundbeck i de 
senere år har udviklet nye forskningsstrategier og tilgange til forskning. I lighed 
med andre medicinalvirksomheder har Lundbeck været under stort pres som 
følge af strukturelle og markedsmæssige ændringer i medicinalindustrien. Dette 
til trods har Lundbeck udviklet nye forskningsstrategier baseret på en relativt 
åben og risikobetonet tilgang. Denne tilgang har bl.a. medført intensiveret 
samarbejde med eksterne akademiske forskningsgrupper med det formål at 
basere udviklingen af nye lægemidler på mere grundlæggende viden om 
biologiske mekanismer. Denne kontekst af risiko og usikkerhed udgør en god case 
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for at studere ideer om strategisk forskning, universitets-industri samarbejde og 
forskningsledelse. 
Afhandlingen når frem til tre overordnede konklusioner: For det første er 
strategisk forskning i Lundbeck ikke efterspørgselsdrevet men snarere 
‘strategisk-udforskende’. Forskningen skrider frem i en ganske eksperimentel og 
åben proces frem for at udvikle sig lineært, kontrolleret og forudsigeligt. For det 
andet udvikler universitets-industri samarbejde sig ikke kun på baggrund af 
processer, som skaber forbindelser mellem basalt set forskellige domæner eller 
kulturer. Det udvikler sig også som følge af det som i afhandlingen karakteriseres 
som ‘misaligned co-production’, hvor eksplicitering af forskelle er en del af 
samarbejdets dynamik. Sådanne misaligned co-productions finder sted både i 
eksterne samarbejder og internt i virksomheden. I Lundbeck finder vi 
eksempelvis cases, hvor industrielle og akademiske aktiviteter er fuldstændig 
sammenfiltrede. At etablere universitets-industri samarbejde kræver således ikke 
nødvendigvis en sammenkobling af forskellige kulturer men snarere en løbende 
og gensidig præcisering af de vigtige forskelle, der også driver samarbejdet. For 
det tredje drejer ledelse af strategisk forskning sig ikke primært om ‘brobygning’ 
mellem stabile domæner men om at håndtere relationer, der udvikler sig under 
foranderlige betingelser. Det betyder ikke, at ledelse sker uden struktur eller 
strategier men snarere, at der ledes med en forventning om forandring. Begrebet 
‘adaptive frameworks’ (Vedel et al. 2013) foreslår en tilgang, som forsøger at 
indfange de praktiske aspekter af ledelse af strategisk forskning. 
Afhandlingen har implikationer for forskningspolitik, akademisk forskning og 
praktisk forskningsledelse. Til forskel fra det nuværende forskningspolitiske 
fokus på efterspørgselsdrevet innovation viser denne afhandling, at selv internt i 
virksomheder udvikler efterspørgsel sig ofte i udforskende processer. 
Efterspørgsel udvikler sig ofte på baggrund af temmelig løse ideer som både har 
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et potentiale og en indbygget forventning om muligheden for forandring. Som 
følge heraf foreslår afhandlingen, at de noget rigide kategoriseringer af forskning, 
som i øjeblikket florerer i dansk forskningspolitik, ikke er tilstrækkeligt 
nuancerede til at indfange, hvad der faktisk er kendetegnende ved strategisk 
forskning, som det udfolder sig i praksis i virksomheder. Dermed håber 
afhandlingen at stimulere debat om forskningspolitiske ideer om strategisk 
forskning, innovation og virksomheder. 
For at føde ind i en forskningspolitisk diskussion baseret på en ‘brugbar STS’ 
tilgang (Webster 2007) indikerer afhandlingen endvidere behovet for mere 
forskning i forlængelse af de tre hovedkonklusioner. Presserende spørgsmål 
inkluderer blandt andet: Hvad drejer strategisk-udforskende forskning sig om 
hvis vi ser på flere cases i forskellige virksomheder og industrier? Hvad er de 
bredere implikationer af at tænke samarbejde som misaligned co-production? 
Hvad kræver det at lede forskning ved hjælp af adaptive frameworks både i 
forskningspolitik og i industri? 
Afhandlingen er struktureret i to dele. Den første del introducerer den empiriske 
case og begrebsapparatet. Den anden del indeholder fire empiriske kapitler. Hvert 
af disse kapitler udforsker et eksempel på universitets-industri samarbejde. De 
første to kapitler undersøger samarbejder mellem Lundbeck og eksterne 
akademiske forskningsgrupper. Baseret på disse kapitler foreslår afhandlingen, at 
eksternt samarbejde får strategisk værdi i Lundbeck ved at være udforskende 
snarere end ved at løse præcist definerede problemer. Disse to kapitler viser også, 
at samarbejde skrider frem i en kringlet proces, der både skaber ligheder og 
forskelle mellem forskning og industri. De sidste to kapitler undersøger 
forsknings-industri samarbejde internt i Lundbeck. Kapitlerne undersøger 
specifikt, hvordan strategisk forskning ikke kun udvikler sig på baggrund af 
eksterne samarbejder men også som et resultat af styrket samarbejde mellem 
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forskellige dele af Lundbeck. Inden for Lundbeck finder vi således også eksempler 
på misaligned co-production, hvilket atter udfordrer ideen om at se universitets-
industri samarbejde udelukkende som ‘brobygning’ mellem domæner. I 
konklusionen opsamles hovedkonklusioner samt afhandlingens implikationer for 
videre forskning og praktikere. 
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relevant in a broader societal context. 
Finally, it almost goes without saying that making this thesis would have been 
impossible without the love and support of my husband, Simon Kiilerich Vedel, 
and my lovely children, Siri and Eske. 
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4. PREFACE 
This thesis explores ‘strategic research’ in a Danish pharmaceutical company. 
Since this topic might obviously be assumed to concern public policy discussions 
related to strategic research or industrial strategies related to the current crisis in 
the pharmaceutical industry, it is perhaps worthwhile to say a little about what 
the thesis is not. 
This thesis is not primarily concerned with policy, although it gives insights into 
this area. Certainly, the notion of strategic research gives strong connotations to 
public policy and, in fact, we rarely hear about strategic research outside the 
world of policy. In policy, however, strategic research has in recent years played a 
prominent role. We can see this in both Danish and European research strategies 
in which strategic research is seen as important for stimulating growth and job 
creation.1 Today, Danish and European policy makers are deeply involved in 
defining strategic research and organizing it in the most optimal ways. It would be 
highly relevant to study these current policy interests in strategic research from 
within policy institutions but this is not the main focus of this thesis. 
Likewise, this thesis is not mainly about the pharmaceutical industry, although it 
gives important insights into the strategies and change processes in one company. 
The empirical context of a pharmaceutical company gives connotations to the 
pharmaceutical industry in general. In recent years, the pharmaceutical industry 
has been under significant pressure and consequently new research and business 
models have emerged.2 It would therefore be highly relevant to explore what 
                                               
1 See the Danish “Innovation Strategy” (Regeringen 2012) and the European research 
framework program “Horizon 2020”. 
2 See Vedel et al. 2013 for further discussion. Also, see Munos 2009.  
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characterize these new models and investigate their implications for the 
pharmaceutical industry as such but this has not been the primary concern of this 
thesis. 
The starting point of the thesis is rather the phenomenon that in these years, 
policy makers and industrial research managers share interests in exploring the 
potential of science-industry collaboration, in policy often referred to as 
university-industry collaboration. In a Danish research policy context, 
policymakers see university-industry collaboration almost as identical to strategic 
research. Among pharmaceutical companies, research managers have seen 
collaboration with external academic groups as an important tool for developing 
new insights and overcoming the crisis. But, although we might identify shared 
interests in science-industry collaboration, public policymakers and industrial 
research managers have quite unlike approaches to science-industry 
collaboration. Based on a curiosity concerning these dissimilarities, the thesis 
investigates the following questions: What characterizes strategic research in a 
private company? Through which practices does strategic research (and science-
industry collaboration) develop? What characterizes the management of strategic 
research? I start out by describing how I came into this study since it has 
implications for how I define the field of research of this thesis. 
From the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2008 I was employed at a Danish public 
foundation, the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF), 
established in 2006 to give public funds to research collaborations between 
public research institutions and private companies. The foundation had a board 
and staff, and its administration was independent of the existing research 
advising and funding system. During the first year, the foundation developed what 
it referred to as strategies and instruments. One of the questions raised at this 
time was how to set up the foundation in a way that would make it possible to 
 22 
 
flexibly meet the dynamic market of research applicants. For instance, the board 
of the foundation was concerned that the biannual calls for research proposals 
with which the then current Danish research funding system operated were too 
rigid to support the dynamic development of new research ideas. The board was 
also concerned with how to make sure that the applicants would collaborate 
seriously rather than just split up upon receiving the grant. This question was 
related to the idea that participants from private companies and public research 
institutions came from different worlds and consequently had different interests 
in the projects they developed together. Consequently, it was assumed that public 
private research collaboration would need special facilitation and attention in 
order to succeed. Based on these concerns, the staff developed a close dialogue 
with potential applicants and they carefully followed up on projects that received 
grants. Furthermore, in order to receive funds from the foundation implied 
appointing a project leader that had a special task in mediating between the 
perceived worlds of the participants and in setting a joint direction of the project. 
Working at the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF) made 
me wonder about the nature of science-industry collaboration, public policy 
approaches to strategic research and research management. First, I was 
concerned that the foundation’s instruments and concepts were introduced with 
too little reflexivity concerning their implications or consequences. They were 
working, yes, but the conditions for receiving critical feedback from applicants 
were not good. For instance, the instruments were designed to facilitate a close 
dialogue with applicants allowing timely changes in the organization of project 
plans of the funded research projects when needed. However, in practice the 
applicants’ incentives for dialoguing with the members of the foundation 
concerning specific failures or problems were not good since bringing details 
about failed projects or bad collaboration among the applicants out in the open 
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might give the foundation a good reason to withdraw funding from the project. In 
other words, even though instruments were designed to facilitate an open 
dialogue, the double role of the foundation as at once investor and discussion 
partner was not always optimal. Indeed, it sometimes led to the unintended 
situation of making the applicants and receivers of funding overly strategic in 
their relation to the foundation. 
Second, my encounters with a large number of research collaborations within a 
broad range of research areas and industries raised a number of questions: What 
drives research collaboration forward? In what ways are university and corporate 
research interests different, or similar? What, indeed, does strategic research 
mean in a corporate context? What are the specific challenges of managing 
strategic research? In this way, my interest in research collaboration, strategic 
research and companies arose from working with research policies and managing 
collaborations in a Danish public policy context. 
Along with these experiences from Danish public policy, I entered this PhD with a 
background in Science and Technology studies (STS) from Information and Media 
Studies at University of Aarhus. My interest in STS developed from the late 1990s 
until 2005, and in particular I became interested in what characterizes research 
as a collective practice (Stengers 1997, 2000; Strathern 2004). However, rather 
than being interested in laboratory studies (Cetina 1999; Latour and Woolgar 
1979; Latour 1987; Pickering 1995), I was interested in how researchers 
managed and organized research and how they collaborated with researchers 
with different backgrounds. I continued to have this curiosity as I entered public 
policy, however I gradually became interested in the management of public 
funding. I was particularly interested in the implications of a more dialogue-based 
approach to individual cases of collaboration. At the foundation, managing and 
organizing collaborations implied both continuous discussion with individual 
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projects and general categorizing of the projects to present different trends vis-à-
vis the board. While the dialogue-based approach generated an increasingly deep 
insight into the differences between collaborations the need to communicate both 
publicly and to the board required homogenizing the collaborations and to some 
extent ignoring differences. Of course, such categorization was an inevitable part 
of managing public research and making decisions. However, it was also 
constantly a discussion at the foundation how categorizing collaborations ignored 
or rendered invisible important nuances and differences among them (Bowker 
and Star 1999). 
One of the questions that the board and staff asked was how to develop a way of 
granting money to research that implied more dialogue with applicants and more 
follow up on research projects than previously seen in a Danish research funding 
context. Part of the answer to these questions involved the development of ‘an 
industrial approach’ to managing public research grants. Gradually, research 
grants were seen as akin to investments in a growing portfolio. Thinking of grants 
as investments legitimized following them quite closely because, as investors, we 
were supposed to be interested in their progress and well-being. However, 
although I took part in developing it, this approach also struck me as generating a 
somewhat idealized image of industrial research management. According to this 
image, managing research implied effective management tools and follow up 
routines. These seemed slightly idealized comparing to the sometimes quite 
messy practices that we encountered in dialogues with individual projects. I 
consequently became interested in exploring the management of strategic 
research from within an actual company. I wanted to know what actually 
characterized research management practices in such a context. 
I was particularly curious about research management within a research-based 
company with many research projects and with collaborations with external 
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academic research groups. Also, I was interested in a company whose research 
bore some resemblance to academic research. This mattered since I began to 
think of my project as potentially challenging the idea of university and industry 
as two separate cultures with separate norms and goals that was particularly 
prevalent in Danish research policy around that time. Based on these criteria, the 
pharmaceutical industry came to my attention. This industry is widely known for 
engaging in research that is very basic in nature, yet decided on with the long-
term purpose of developing a marketable drug (Petryna et al. 2006). Also, the 
pharmaceutical industry is relatively strong in Denmark with global well-known 
companies such as Novo Nordisk and Lundbeck. 
Hence, I contacted the then head of research of Lundbeck, a Danish 
pharmaceutical company specializing in drugs for the treatment of brain 
disorders. In August 2008, I presented him with a list of research questions 
concerning the management of science-industry collaboration in an industrial 
context. The proposal was well received and, indeed, seemed in some sense to fit 
with the then current strategies in Lundbeck. For many years, collaboration with 
external research groups had taken place in Lundbeck. However, due to changing 
conditions for research and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, research 
collaboration with externals had become a strategic concern. 
Based on this situation of good timing, I defined my field of research as managing 
strategic research with an empirical focus on the interface between Danish 
research policy and a Danish pharmaceutical company, Lundbeck. However, the 
notion of an ‘interface’ turned out to be a rather crude metaphor for the many 
interlocking processes that both tie together and separate public research policy 
and new collaborative practices in Lundbeck. In this thesis, I analyze these 
processes by developing the notion of different forms of collaborative screens. 
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5. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
In recent years, strategic research has become a ‘matter of concern’ (Latour 2004) 
in Denmark. It has appeared in a number of settings. In research policy, strategic 
research has emerged as a new area with its own policies. It has twice provided 
an occasion for fundamentally reorganizing the Danish research funding and 
advisory system (Ministeriet for Videnskab 2003a; 2003b; 2010a; 2010b; FIVU 
2009; Regeringen 2012; DSF 2013). First, in 2004 when strategic research 
emerged as a distinct domain with the making of two separate public research 
councils: The Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF) and the Danish Council 
for Independent Research (DFF). Second, in 2012, when the Danish minister of 
Research, Innovation and Higher Education proposed an extensive rethinking of 
the field of strategic research in Denmark in a new national “Innovation Strategy” 
(Regeringen 2012). 
Simultaneously, strategic research has been at the center of public debates. In 
these debates, a main (academic) critique of strategic research has been that it 
threatens to compromise classic scientific values and norms and leads to conflicts 
of interests in its efforts to combine the diverse fields of science, society and 
industry.3 In addition, strategic research has emerged as a topic that research 
managers and strategists at universities and in companies have had to tackle 
(ATV 2012). In diverse professional forums, research managers from universities 
and industries have begun discussing various aspects of strategic research, for 
instance, whether the current perception of strategic research as a means to 
change the stagnant Danish economy is correctly perceived and organized. 
                                               
3 For an example and analysis of this debate, see Vedel and Gad 2011. 
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When investigating strategic research in the context of Danish research policy, it 
is immediately noticeable that strategic research is widely perceived to be closer 
to society and industry than independent research (DSF 2013). Often, in 
documents describing Danish research policy, research is arranged on a straight 
line extending from independent research on the left to the market on the right. In 
that sense, strategic research is imagined as more directly addressing societal 
problems than independent research, which, in contrast, is perceived to mainly 
address the academic communities. In fact, I would suggest that this linear 
perception of research has become increasingly prevalent in Danish research 
policy. See diagram below, which was recently presented in the Danish 
“Innovation Strategy” of 2012. 
 
Illustration 1: The linear organization of the Danish public research advisory and funding 
system (Regeringen 2012). 
In the context of Danish research policy, the linear view of public research funds 
is a mobilizing force. For instance, it is used to discuss the specific mandate of 
individual research funding institutions and to determine which kinds of research 
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projects ought to be supported by which institutions. As a consequence of being 
placed in the middle, strategic research is often presented as research that 
“connects” (Regeringen 2012) the diverse domains of science, society and 
industry in contrast to independent research that according to this image is 
slightly more isolated from society. 
In the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), strategic research is 
interesting not least at the level of practice. In its emphasis on practice, STS 
approaches differ from many other perspectives on strategic research (for 
instance, based on economics or political science) that focus on defining its 
conceptual meaning, resulting in general definitions of strategic research 
(Emmeche and Faye 2010). Working within a broadly ‘co-productionist’ 
perspective on STS (Jasanoff 2004), and rather than attempting to give an exact 
definition of what strategic research means, I am interested in how strategic 
research develops at the level of practical research engagements and in which 
diverse forms it takes there. How and through which processes, I ask, does 
strategic research develop in the context of Lundbeck’s pharmaceutical research? 
Accordingly, the present study explores the notion of strategic research in the 
context of Lundbeck. Lundbeck is a Danish global research-based company that 
specializes in drugs for the treatment of disorders in the central nervous system 
(CNS). Like many other pharmaceutical companies, Lundbeck has been affected 
by changing research and market conditions in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Although pharmaceutical companies today make larger investments in research 
and development than ever before, fewer research and development projects 
result in new molecular entities that reach the market in the form of drugs 
(Munos et al. 2009). Many factors contribute to this situation, including changes 
in the regulatory system and in public concerns over risks in various diseases. For 
Lundbeck, the expiration of a number of key patents between 2012 and 2014 has 
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increased the pressure. Research managers in Lundbeck have seen this crisis as 
an occasion for rethinking their research strategies and opening up to the 
surrounding world, for instance, by engaging in strategic collaborations with 
external research groups at universities and in companies. Lundbeck, therefore, 
offers an excellent case for examining the management of strategic research in a 
corporate context. Based on this situation, I am interested in examining the 
following research questions: 
 
Research questions 
What characterizes strategic research in a private company? Through which 
practices does strategic research (and science-industry collaboration) develop? 
What characterizes the management of strategic research? 
Unsurprisingly, these are questions that research managers in Lundbeck also ask 
themselves. In addition, I consider what the fields of public research policy and 
STS might learn about strategic research by studying it empirically in industry. 
This is interesting insofar as industry is precisely what policymakers argue that 
strategic research should connect with. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized in two parts. The first part introduces the empirical field, 
the methodology and the conceptual framework of the thesis. I first give an 
introduction to Lundbeck and describe how I have studied Lundbeck using an 
active form of participant observation. Then I take a step back to explore how the 
notion of strategic research has developed in Danish research policy with 
particular embedded ideas about companies. I use this understanding of the 
setting of Danish national discussions of strategic research as a springboard for 
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exploring prevalent approaches to university-industry interaction in research 
policy literature such as the Triple Helix and Mode 2. These approaches then 
become a platform for investigating alternative ‘co-productionist’ approaches 
(Jasanoff 2004) to research collaboration, in particular ‘boundary objects’ (Star 
and Griesemer 1989), ‘doable problems’ (Fujimura 1987, 1996) and ‘trading 
zones’ (Galison 1997). While these notions generally focus on processes of 
constructing alignment in heterogeneous scientific practices, I argue that it is 
equally interesting to explore the role of difference in research collaboration, and 
hence in strategic research. I show that difference can be elicited by paying 
attention to a number of ‘screens’ that I develop for the purpose of this thesis, 
which I refer to as projecting, categorizing, occluding screens. In various ways, 
these screens are useful for developing a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
of strategic research. 
The second part of the thesis offers an empirical exploration of strategic research 
in Lundbeck based on four empirical chapters. The first two chapters explore 
strategic research as illustrated by science-industry collaboration between 
Lundbeck and external academic groups. The final two chapters look at in-house 
collaboration between different parts of Lundbeck as also illustrative of strategic 
research. 
The first chapter “Managing emergent relations” presents a case in which 
Lundbeck research managers collaborate with academic researchers from a 
university. The participants are all interested in advancing research in the 
biological mechanism neurocell. However, they do this in a somewhat surprising 
way that challenges both the idea of strategic research as a restricted and 
predictable form of research and the general notions of what is academic and 
what is industrial. 
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The second chapter entitled “The first encounter” explores yet another case of 
collaboration between Lundbeck and an external academic group, this time the 
Mayo Clinic, an American not-for-profit research institution. The chapter 
investigates the phenomenon that a failed first meeting between the two groups 
did not prevent the collaboration from eventually becoming a success. I explore 
how this can be understood by describing the differentiating screens that 
characterized the collaboration. 
The third chapter called “Making screens for future research” explores how 
strategic research also develops in-house Lundbeck, in the context of a strategy 
process called Synapse. This strategy seeks to connect diverse parts of Lundbeck 
and develop strategic research areas based on collaboration between preclinical 
and clinical research. The chapter investigates how different screens are involved 
in developing these strategic research areas. 
The forth chapter is entitled “The project leader of the future” and it investigates 
how the notion of project leadership develops in relation to the development of 
new strategic research practices. The project leader is seen as connecting diverse 
parts of Lundbeck but also as particular to research practices in Lundbeck. The 
chapter investigates the project leader notion using an active interventionist 
approach and explores the screens that became visible. 
In conclusion, I present the main findings and discuss the implications of these for 
practitioners and for future research. 
But first, let me introduce the empirical context of Lundbeck. 
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6. INTRODUCTION TO LUNDBECK 
Lundbeck is a Danish global pharmaceutical company that specializes in drugs for 
the treatment of disorders in the central nervous system (CNS), sometimes also 
referred to as brain diseases. The company was founded in 1915 and today it 
employs 6,000 people worldwide out of which 2,000 are employed in Denmark. 
This makes Lundbeck one of the largest companies in Denmark. Lundbeck 
presents itself as “fully integrated”4, which means that it engages in research, 
development, production, marketing and sale of pharmaceuticals. CNS disorders 
include depression, anxiety, psychotic disorders, epilepsy, Huntington, 
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases. However, as a consequence of a new 
research strategy, Lundbeck might expand the number of CNS diseases it engages 
in. Lundbeck is particularly known for Cipralex and Lexapro, both of which are 
based on escitalopram, an antidepressant of the selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor class known as SSRI, for the treatment of depression. 
Today, Lundbeck’s general management consists of the Executive Management 
that has three members. Ulf Wiinberg who is President and CEO of Lundbeck 
heads this group and is responsible for commercial operations. The Executive 
Management also includes the Head of Research and Development, which 
includes the area of Patents and Trademarks, and the Head of Finance, IT, 
Sourcing, Commercial and Investor Relations. In addition to the three areas that 
the Executive Management covers, the organization of Lundbeck is divided into 
six other areas. These are Corporate Business Development and Strategy; 
Corporate Human Resources; Corporate Legal; Corporate Secretariat and Project 
Office; Corporate Public Affairs; and Supply Operations and Engineering. A senior 
                                               
4 www.lundbeck.com. 
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vice president heads each of these areas. The headquarters of Lundbeck are 
located in Valby, part of the Copenhagen Municipality. This short introduction 
portrays how Lundbeck is organized as of 2013, but, as I will show, the formal 
organization of Lundbeck has changed several times in recent years. These 
changes have appeared as a consequence of new ways of perceiving the role of 
research in relation to business. 
Today, research activities in Lundbeck are geographically distributed over three 
sites: the main site in Denmark, and two smaller sites in the US and China. 
Altogether, about 1,200 specialists are employed in Research and Development. 
Since 2011, Research and Development have been grouped as one area in 
Lundbeck. Until then, Research and Development were organized as two separate 
domains, each with their own head. Since this thesis is based on fieldwork in the 
period 2009-2013, it is relevant to note that between 2009 to 2011, Lundbeck 
Research included four quite diverse activities: Drug Discovery, including very 
early identification of unmet needs and definition of research projects; Non-
Clinical Safety Research, covering early tests of toxicity and other safety issues; 
Business Development, involving systematic search for potential research 
partners and business opportunities; and finally Patents and Trademarks, 
including evaluation of patent and license opportunities. My research was 
primarily located in the area of Drug Discovery in the then department of 
Molecular Neurobiology, which, by the employees in that area, was perceived as 
“real research”. 
Drug Discovery was organized into three main divisions: Medicinal Chemistry, 
Neurobiology and Pharmacology. As in a matrix organization, research projects 
cut across these three divisions according to specific diseases referred to as 
‘indication areas’. During my research period, these indication areas were 
Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Psychoses, and Depression and Anxiety. 
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Each of the indications had a strategy, for instance, an Alzheimer’s disease 
strategy, describing how current research activities aimed at developing a drug 
for this specific disease. Besides belonging to specific departments such as the 
Molecular Neurobiology department, employees in the research division were 
organized in groups according to indication areas. The purpose was to build up 
expertise within each of the indications. Each indication group had a chair, usually 
a department manager or section head, responsible for an annually revised 
strategy plan. 
In 2010, this organization of research was revised as an outcome of an extensive 
strategy process, Synapse, to which I return. One consequence of this strategy 
process was that indications were replaced by biological mechanisms as the main 
organizing principle, causing a considerable reorganization of research groups 
and expertise. Where research was previously driven by certainty about the 
specific indication towards which it was directed, the reorganization was based 
on the idea that the same biological mechanism might be relevant for several 
diseases. Accordingly, research into one biological mechanism might lead to 
innovations within a number of indication areas. This implied uncertainty about 
indications but the perceived benefit was that it might lead to potential 
innovations in the longer term. It also implied a strong focus on articulating 
biological hypotheses. This, too, meant a reversal of the research process, since 
previously research had typically been initiated based on newly discovered 
effects in known compounds. Consequently, medicinal chemists had played an 
important role in pointing out these compounds. In contrast, the reorganization 
put the focus on ‘disease biology’, privileging biologists and the development of 
scientific hypothesis based on mechanisms, structures and patterns. As a 
consequence of the strategy process, the departments in Lundbeck’s research 
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division were renamed as Discovery Chemistry, Neurodegeneration, and Synaptic 
Transmission. I explore these changes in detail in Chapter 12. 
The changes to the formal organization of Lundbeck in 2011 were the results of 
an extensive strategy process, named Synapse, which roughly took place between 
2009 and 2011. In the nervous system, ‘a synapse’ is a structure that permits a 
neuron or nerve cell to pass an electrical or chemical signal to another cell, thus 
making a connection or communication. According to a dictionary definition, a 
synapse is “a junction between two nerve cells, consisting of a minute gap, across 
which impulses pass by diffusion of a neurotransmitter”.5 Metaphorically, the 
concept of the synapse suggests both the idea of a gap and a connection. 
Lundbeck’s strategy process, Synapse, took inspiration from this idea by aiming at 
developing new strategies that were based on a sustained effort at making 
connections. In fact, the Lundbeck management already had several specific 
connections in mind.6 
First, there were connections between Lundbeck and the outside world. In the 
research division, such connections implied relating actively to an increasingly 
complex regulatory system and to external research partners. At a general level, 
these connections also involved creating more societal awareness of brain 
diseases, an aim that later developed into a systematic effort to address societal 
agendas as part of Public Affairs. 
Second, there were connections within Lundbeck; that is, between divisions and 
activities that had previously been seen as distinct. Specifically, this included the 
divisions of Research, Development and Clinical Research. By appealing to the 
                                               
5 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
6 During 2005 to 2007, before Synapse was initiated, a strategy process took in Lundbeck 
Research only. It was called “Lundbeck 2020” and was based on similar ideas of connecting 
Lundbeck to an outside world. 
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concept of synapses in the overall vision, the management aimed at integrating 
these divisions and preventing unfortunate misaligned perspectives when 
transferring an activity from one division to another. Thus, by incorporating the 
perspectives of Development and Clinical Research in the prioritization and 
structure of new research projects, the aim was to avoid the potential situation 
where a project was rejected as relevant or useful in the transition from Research 
to Development. In this way, the Synapse strategy process depended on a rather 
intriguing notion of strategic research, which I explore in more detail in Chapters 
12 and 13. 
Before the organizational changes that followed the Synapse strategy process, 
three research groups had primarily managed research in Lundbeck. On a weekly 
basis, the members of these groups discussed a broad range of research related 
issues, including strategic initiatives related to collaboration with external 
research groups. The first was the Research Management Board (RMB), headed 
by the executive vice president of research. This board consisted of each of the 
heads of the research divisions, including the head of Drug Discovery in Denmark, 
the head of Drug Discovery in the United States, the head of Non-Clinical Safety 
Research, the head of Patents and Trademarks, and the head of External Affairs. 
Secondly, the Drug Discovery Management Team (DDMT) headed by the head of 
Drug Discovery in Denmark consisted of the three divisional directors, each 
representing a research area: the Divisional Director of Chemistry, the Divisional 
Director of Pharmacology, and the Divisional Director of Molecular Neurobiology. 
Finally, the Research and Development Management Board (RDMB) consisted of 
the Research Management Board and its equivalent in the Development division. 
This board had the task of coordinating activities between Research and 
Development at a general level, which included ensuring the transition of projects 
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from Research to Development, an effort that in the context of the Synapse 
strategy became a key concern. 
The names of departments and the constitution of these management groups all 
bear witness to the great importance of research in Lundbeck. The shift from a 
focus on diseases to focus on biology also illustrates that a certain kind of research 
has a particularly high status in Lundbeck. Indeed, naming research units after 
biological mechanisms such as “synaptic transmission” suggests that it is 
important that research strategies are reflected in the organizational structure. 
When I first visited Lundbeck, I immediately noticed the strong emphasis on 
science. From looking at organizational diagrams, I also observed that the 
coordination between Research and Development was primarily seen as taking 
place in a joint coordination group at the level of top management. After Synapse, 
however, integration came to be seen as an effort that took place at all levels, as 
representatives of development division and clinical research were included even 
in the early prioritization and organization of research projects. 
Again, by looking at the formal structure of Lundbeck, one might also notice an 
increased focus on certain activities in the years 2009-2013. Especially the areas 
of Alliance Management and Public Affairs were prioritized, resulting in the 
appointment of an Alliance Management Director around 2008-2009 and the 
establishment of a Global Public Affairs department in 2011. Both events 
illustrate an interest in linking to an external world represented by alliance 
partners, patients and regulative authorities, and society in general. They also 
suggest an acknowledgment of the fact that the invention and marketing of new 
drugs is not only a matter of initiating the right or most excellent research 
projects but also relied on preparing the ground for new drugs more generally. In 
Lundbeck, this involved interacting with Danish public research policy, activities 
 38 
 
related to European research initiatives and agendas, and global perceptions and 
priorities related to the focus diseases. 
 
The sense of research in Lundbeck 
Entering the headquarters of Lundbeck, one is greeted by a large modern glass 
building. The building arches over a street that crosses through the Lundbeck site. 
 
Illustration 2: The entrance to Lundbeck headquarters and the building housing general 
management (picture taken from the North Gate, Autumn 2013). 
Inside, you find yourself in a large high-ceiling reception hall with modern 
furniture, screens and a large reception desk. The hall is connected with the 
lecture hall, the canteen and café area, and also with the first, second and third 
floors of the building where management is located. The lecture hall is large and, 
at first glance, it resembles a modern university lecture theatre. It is an 
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amphitheater with chairs in front of a large projection screen. At the stage in front 
of the screen is a stand for speakers. Once a year the lecture hall houses the 
annual Project Review where Lundbeck researchers give scientific presentations 
of their projects and managers evaluate the progress of the research portfolio. 
The reception hall is quiet, yet busy with visitors checking in and out. Going up 
the floors, you notice a change in atmosphere from busy to calm, professional and 
quiet. The hallway with manager offices appears modern with glass walls and 
wooden floors. In each of the vice presidents’ offices there is a desk, a meeting 
table and a large screen on the wall for presentations. In order to get into a 
manager’s office you pass the executive secretary that sits in a smaller adjacent 
office. 
From the reception hall, a third passage takes you to the canteen. The canteen is 
situated in a large open building with high ceilings and light coming in from 
windows above and at the sides. Through the windows, there is a view to a 
pleasant outdoor area with tables and benches. At one end, there is a large buffet 
with food. At the center, there are tables in different shapes, round, long and 
single tables behind partition walls. At the other end, there is a café with high 
tables, soft chairs and a group of industrial espresso machines that people queue 
up behind after lunch. Above the café, there is an indoor terrace overlooking the 
canteen area. This is a more quiet and private place where people sit for meetings 
or department lunches. At the end of the reception hall, opposite to the reception 
desk, in front of the lecture hall entrance, there is a large open space. On the back 
wall there is a big poster of a smiling woman, a patient, who suffers from one the 
diseases that Lundbeck targets. This space is used for receptions and poster 
presentations at the annual Project Review. 
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Illustration 3: The main street crossing through Lundbeck headquarters. The yellow building at 
the center of the picture houses Molecular Neurobiology/Drug Discovery (picture taken from 
the management building in Summer 2013). 
The street that crosses through the Lundbeck site divides a mixture of buildings. 
On the left side, the first building is a brown brick building that houses Finance, 
Legal and Business Development. Three yellow brick buildings housing the three 
main research activities follow: the building housing Chemistry, the building for 
Drug Discovery research, and the building for Non-Clinical Safety Research. On 
the right side, behind the large canteen building there are a number of red brick 
buildings that house the divisions of Patent and Trademarks, Development and 
Human Resources. 
From the outside, the three buildings on the left side of the street that house 
Research look fairly similar. They are all yellow and have four floors. However, 
getting inside one quickly experiences different senses of research. The building 
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housing Chemistry has no main entrance facing the street that crosses through 
the site. Rather the middle of the building where you would expect to find an 
entrance is partly covered behind trees (see illustration 3). Instead you enter in 
the side of the building through a small door. This building is rather closed to the 
outside world. A staircase leads to the upper floors of the building. On the first 
floor, the hallways are narrow, the offices are small and doors are closed. In the 
middle of the hallway, there is an open area with coffee machines, tables and 
chairs. Further ahead on the left there is a crossing hallway with offices with glass 
walls. A laboratory facility is on the right. Here you meet technicians and 
researchers with white coats, reminding you that you are in a research facility. 
The next building houses Drug Discovery and the department of Molecular 
Neurobiology. This building has a main entrance facing the street that leads 
directly into a hallway. This hallway is wider and more open than the hallways in 
the chemistry building. There are offices on both sides. In the middle there is an 
open space with a kitchenette, tables and chairs, an espresso machine and a 
bookshelf with magazines and journals such as Nature, Science, and Nature 
Reviews Drug Discovery. A sign over the entrance door says “The cortex café” 
indicating that this is where the brain researchers stop for coffee. Moving 
upstairs, on the first floor on the right there is another hallway with offices. On 
one wall there is a large Myers Briggs poster with about 20 small pictures of 
employees distributed in four quadrants. This tells you that you are in a place 
where researchers are not only evaluated by their scientific and technical skills 
but also seen as individuals with certain psychological preferences affecting their 
team performance. The divisional director for molecular neurobiology has his 
office here and so does the department manager. Entering into her office, you 
notice that it is rather small with a large desk and a small meeting table with 
chairs. Her desk is covered with papers, journals, diagrams, posters, meeting 
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minutes, and power point presentations. On the walls, there are more posters and 
a child’s drawings. The meeting table is also covered with papers, which she 
pushes aside to make space for sitting. One of the sidewalls is covered with 
bookshelves with ring binders in various colors, books, cassettes with journals 
and piles of papers. The atmosphere is cozy and informal. This office could just as 
well be in a university; there are many signs of science – journals, posters and 
presentations with images and tables. 
At the other end of the hallway is a lab facility. Behind the lab there is an open 
office space. On the right are a number of small desks where a group of PhD 
researchers sit, both those that are employed by Lundbeck and those employed at 
Danish universities but come to Lundbeck’s advanced laboratories to conduct 
experiments. On the left, there is a larger area for technicians. Coming from the 
other end of the hallway, you immediately notice that this is a more lively part of 
the research building. The technicians move around and in and out of the 
laboratory, sit down at their desks, discuss with their colleagues and then move 
up again. In addition to this activity, you notice a significant traffic of researchers 
from the other end of the hallway to and from the espresso machine at the back 
corner of the room, often making this an occasion for making short discussion 
with the PhDs or technicians. 
On the top floor, a large office belongs to the head of Drug Discovery. It overlooks 
a housing area in Valby. His desk is tidy, almost empty, with only a few small piles 
of paper. Opposite to his desk is a meeting table and above the table is a screen 
used for presenting material at meetings. In this office, you get the impression 
that research is to a significant degree about giving presentations on screens and 
discussing their content around a meeting table. The signs of research such as 
journals and posters are completely absent. 
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The third building houses Non-Clinical Safety Research. It is situated close to the 
south gate of the Lundbeck site. This building has a large open entrance facing the 
street with stairs leading up to it. The entrance has a glass front and is open and 
welcoming. Inside you find yourself in an entrance hall and stairs take you to the 
upper floors. On the second floor, where the head of Non-Clinical Safety Research 
sits, there is an open office space. The atmosphere is lively, employees discuss 
across the tables. At the top floor of this building, one finds a large bright 
conference room overlooking the Lundbeck site. The room is named after Vibeke 
Tøjner, a contemporary Danish painter that specializes in abstract paintings of 
landscapes. The room is used for special events as when the three main research 
management groups meet to coordinate conclusions from annual Project Review. 
The different sense of research in the three buildings that house research in 
Lundbeck is noticeable. Especially distinct is the difference in how closed and 
open the buildings and the research activities are to outsiders. In the Chemistry 
building, the research seems mainly to be taking place behind closed doors 
though it is visible in and around the lab facilities. The building for Molecular 
Neurobiology is less architecturally closed and the long hallways with open and 
closed offices indicate that research takes place not only in labs, but also behind 
desks. In the research manager’s offices you get the clear impression that 
research involves presentations on screens. The lab facility again signals 
laboratory research. This space opens up in an otherwise closed building. The 
technicians and students are crammed into a corner but nonetheless the open 
space here is welcoming and attracts researchers from other ends of the building. 
The Non-clinical Safety Research Building is welcoming and less messy. People 
are busy discussing things in open spaces. Here research is about coordinating 
activities and discussing findings and tests. 
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There are also some immediate signs of research that you encounter when 
visiting Lundbeck: the lecture hall in the reception building; the laboratory 
facilities in several of the research buildings some of which you can actually see 
from the street through the windows; physical objects like book shelves with 
journals indicating science; offices with papers and books and signs of activity in 
organizing and presenting knowledge, pictures of molecules on the walls. 
Isolating these observations, Lundbeck reminds you of an academic research 
institution. However, other signs lead your thoughts elsewhere. The large-scale 
canteen, the food that is served, the coffee machines, the quality of the seats in the 
lecture hall, the exclusivity of the reception area, the atmosphere at the 
management floors, and the fact that, except from around lunch time, there is very 
little physical activity on the Lundbeck site, no students walking to and from 
lectures. All of this suggests that you are in a company and that whatever research 
is conducted here has specific purposes, namely producing pharmaceutical drugs. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, Lundbeck potentially offers a rich context for exploring how 
strategic research and science-industry collaboration develops in a company. Not 
only is it interesting to explore how research unfolds in the context of a research 
company, it is also particularly interesting to follow this process in situations, as 
in Lundbeck, where research strategies are being developed. How are particular 
research areas selected? How do research managers take the potential future of 
Lundbeck into account when initiating new research? How do different parts of 
Lundbeck, some research oriented and some more business oriented, work 
together in developing new strategies? These are relevant questions to explore in 
the empirical context of Lundbeck. 
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I now move to discuss how I investigated Lundbeck. This entails discussion of the 
particular set-up of my PhD and the methodological tools I have used to explore 
Lundbeck. 
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7. METHODOLOGY 
This PhD project has occasioned many methodological questions. Some of these 
questions relates to its set-up as an Industrial PhD, a Danish scheme that I return 
to. Others relate to how I have chosen to explore strategic research in Lundbeck in 
a particularly active way. Over a period of five years, I spent on average 2-3 days 
in Lundbeck a week. This has amounted to many hours and, I hope, a deep insight 
in the concerns and activities of the research managers in Lundbeck. This 
involvement also raises a number of questions. How did I investigate strategic 
research in Lundbeck, using which methods and tools? How did particular 
research questions and findings develop? What characterized the role of my 
research in Lundbeck? In this chapter, I discuss these questions. 
 
An Industrial PhD set-up 
My scholarship is an industrial PhD, a particular Danish scheme that requires a 
short explanation. An industrial PhD is a collaboration between a company, a 
university and a PhD researcher. The company employs the PhD student who is 
simultaneously affiliated with a public research institution (in this case, 
Copenhagen Business School). The PhD project is acquired to have “industrial 
relevance”7, which in practice can be interpreted in many ways. In my case, 
industrial relevance was understood as giving relevant input to an on-going 
process of developing best practices for external research collaboration. The 
Danish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education and the company co-
fund the project and the company employs the PhD researcher. The industrial 
                                               
7 www.fivu.dk. 
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PhD scheme was introduced in 2002 to educate doctoral researchers with a 
particular industrial focus and to increase interaction between universities and 
companies.8 Initiating an Industrial PhD project can be done by either a company, 
a university or by the potential PhD candidate. In the present case, I took the 
initiative by formulating initial research questions in collaboration with my 
academic supervisor. These questions concerned the implications for research 
managers of increased strategic research collaboration with universities. I 
presented my proposal to the then head of research in Lundbeck and we 
discussed how it might become interesting to the company. As described in the 
preface, there was, at that time, a more or less immediate match between my 
academic interests and the concerns among research managers at Lundbeck. Or at 
least, at this particular time, the proposed research problem was defined loosely 
enough to make such a match seem plausible. 
 
Fieldwork in Lundbeck 
Over a period of five years, from November 2008 to November 2013, interrupted 
by one year’s maternity leave from July 2011 to August 2012, I studied research 
strategies in Lundbeck. From November 2008 to July 2011, I was actively engaged 
in fieldwork and I continued to spend time in Lundbeck after my return in August 
2012. As a natural consequence of my employment, I was engaged in discussions 
about research strategies also after my return. Throughout the period, I had an 
office. From November 2008 to July 2009, my desk was in an open office space 
with other PhD students. From July 2009 to July 2011, I moved to an office in the 
hallway that housed the head of research and his staff. In 2011, the head of 
research became leader of a new area, Global Public Affairs. When I returned in 
                                               
8 www.fivu.dk. 
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August 2012, I joined this department and moved to an office in the building 
housing the reception and general management (c.f. the description of different 
workspaces in Lundbeck in the previous chapter). 
 
From external collaboration to strategic research 
My research focus and methods changed during the project. To begin with, my 
project was defined as a study of “the implications for research managers of 
increased external research collaboration”. Approaching this quite openly, I 
explored what constituted research management in Lundbeck, who were seen as 
research managers, what external research meant and how collaboration was 
perceived among research managers. I explored these questions using different 
methods. First, I used informal conversations with employees in the Research 
division to get an overview of what kind of concerns and activities was related to 
external collaboration. This involved talking to scientists, research managers, 
technicians, students, and secretaries. In addition, I participated in meetings that 
concerned specific external collaborations and involved, for instance, planning 
and the making of contracts. In Chapters 10-13, I describe the activities that took 
place in these meetings, and below I return to how I negotiated access to them. I 
also conducted formal interviews with the research managers in Lundbeck who 
were particularly involved in making collaborations and developing strategies. 
Further, I eventually came to actively stimulate discussion by hosting seminars 
for project leaders and research managers. Thus I used a variety of methods to 
investigate what the implications for research managers were of the changing 
conditions for research. 
Around midway, the emphasis of my research changed. This was in part a 
consequence of the initiation of the strategy program, Synapse that ran from 
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2009-2011 and created a new orientation to research. Because I had taken an 
active part in discussing research strategies among research managers, I was 
invited to participate in Synapse as a member of a working group. This working 
group had the task of considering the question of what kind of behavior might 
promote collaboration between Research and Development activities in 
Lundbeck. In Chapter 13, I discuss how the working group approached this 
question. At first, I saw participating in a formal working group as an opportunity 
to put my investigation of external collaboration into perspective. It gave me an 
occasion for learning about internal issues, including how employees from other 
parts of Lundbeck saw the role of research and perceived of external 
collaborations that were so central to research managers. I was also interested in 
the in-house implications of the new strategies that I had previously studied and 
of other new overall strategies. I wondered what characterized collaboration 
between researchers and their colleagues from other parts of Lundbeck, both in 
this strategy process and more generally. The purpose of exploring these 
questions was not to develop a comparative research design that would allow me 
to identify the similarities and dissimilarities between internal and external 
collaboration. Rather the purpose was to use this occasion actively as a 
background for interpreting the implications of external collaborations for 
Lundbeck more generally. I decided to take this opportunity, knowing that it 
would open up for a new world of data. 
However, participating in the behavior-working group in fact became more than 
background information and slightly changed the overall focus of my research. 
Managing external research collaboration was clearly related to managing other 
forms of research and other relations than those purely Lundbeck external. By 
studying external collaboration, I had mainly focused on the interface between 
Lundbeck researchers and external collaborators. However, as it turned out, this 
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interface was difficult to isolate from in-house research practices in Lundbeck and 
from broader issues of managing research. I started to notice that when research 
managers in Lundbeck talked about external collaboration during Synapse they 
immediately drew parallels to in-house research, and to the Synapse ambition of 
connecting preclinical and clinical research, and Research and Development more 
effectively.9 Thus, rather than study the specific implications for research 
managers of increased external research, I changed focus to exploring external 
collaboration in the context of Lundbeck. This meant accounting both for relations 
between Lundbeck research managers and external collaborators, and for 
relations between Lundbeck research managers and in-house colleagues. As the 
Synapse process highlighted, although people from Research and Development 
were part of the same company, they were not necessarily obviously, not to say 
optimally, linked. 
Consequently, upon my return in 2012, I changed the general emphasis of the 
project from external collaboration to strategic research. Focusing on strategic 
research had the effect of relating and including several interesting research 
inquiries. First, I was interested in the relation between research managers in 
Lundbeck and external collaborators. This also implied an interest for how 
external collaboration was related to other research activities. Second, I was 
interested in the relation between the divisions of Research and Development in 
Lundbeck. Although they were part of the same company, employees in Research 
and Development clearly saw research in very different ways. Finally, I was 
interested in the relation between Danish public research policy and strategy 
making in Lundbeck. For obvious reasons, strategic research implied quite 
different things in these two contexts. Thus, it was interesting to see how, in 
                                               
9 I Chapter 12, I describe how Synapse developed a new type of concern for external 
collaboration. 
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policy, companies’ interests were embedded in the notion of strategic research, 
whereas research managers in Lundbeck defined relevant and strategic research 
as, to some extent, more similar to independent research. Hence, defining my 
object of study as strategic research had the effect of pulling together a number of 
contexts and interfaces. 
Based on this account of how my focus and object of study developed in the 
process of studying it, how might the general approach be characterized? As 
described, I used a number of methods associated with ethnography. But I was 
also involved in a very active sense, which requires reflection. I now describe how 
my methodology changed during the fieldwork. 
 
Following the actor 
To explore external research strategies in Lundbeck I initially used a method that, 
following Bruno Latour’s early actor network theory, might loosely be referred to 
as ‘following the actor’ (Latour 1987). This method implies following an object or 
problem as it travels between the lab and the outside world. As I saw it at that 
time, I investigated the implications of increased external collaboration in ‘the 
laboratory of Lundbeck’. Using this method of following implied a quite open 
approach to what constituted external collaboration in Lundbeck and to where to 
find it. In principal, although my problem was predefined as studying implications 
for research managers, I might find that external collaboration was an activity 
that rather occupied students and technicians. However, my PhD set-up to an 
extent restrained how open-ended I could be. As the PhD was sponsored by 
research managers and had, at least to some extent, to fit their concerns about 
strategies, making a lab study among students and technicians did not seem an 
obvious thing to do. Thus, rather than follow external collaboration into the labs 
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of Lundbeck I primarily followed it into a ‘managerial lab’. This entailed following 
management discussions of new collaboration, strategies, and visions. 
However, although the method of following the actor provided me with a usefully 
open-ended approach to what might constitute external collaboration, it also 
turned out to be difficult to use in my case. In the end, it did not very precisely 
characterize what I did. I was following to be sure, but I was also participating, 
hosting, leading, making drafts and outlines, participating in teamwork in 
workgroups and actively interfering in discussions. On the one hand, this was due 
to the research managers’ expectations. They asked for my opinion in particular 
cases, for example querying how I saw external collaboration based on my 
experience with public policy and requesting that I drafted recommendations for 
how to govern external collaboration. There was a manifest difference in 
following what research managers did and making recommendations for what 
they should do. I did not have much of a problem with making presentations and 
recommendations. Based on my former experience and my growing familiarity 
with Lundbeck’s management this was relatively easy. The problem was rather 
the methodological questions raised by this engagement. What was the nature of 
what I studied when I was involved to such an extent? Would I be able to distance 
myself from it to the extent that following suggested was necessary? Based on 
this, I continue to discuss my approach in relation to the method of participant 
observation. 
 
Participant observation 
As mentioned, the notion of following the actor was slightly problematic, since it 
suggested something more open and passive than what I actually did. To 
emphasize my role as a participant I started to characterize my main method as 
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participant observation. Participant observation is a qualitative research tool and 
the main ethnographic approach used in a number of social science fields such as, 
for instance, social anthropology. Using this method, the researcher aims at 
getting a close familiarity with a practice or culture over an extended period of 
time (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Ybema et al. 2009; Neyland 2008). 
In many respects, describing my engagement as participant observation makes 
sense. Even so, this characterization also does not fully capture what I did. After 
all, I was not only participating in order to be able to observe action, I was also 
stimulating action. Consequently, if it this was indeed participant observation the 
strong emphasis was on participation. So how might I describe my approach? 
How did specific inquiries develop in the process of studying Lundbeck? What 
guided my selection of empirical material? In the following, I discuss three 
concepts that became important for my answers to these questions. 
 
Ethno-epistemic assemblages 
First, I drew on Alan Irwin and Mike Michael’s notion of ‘ethno-epistemic 
assemblages’ to reflect on my methodology (Irwin and Michael 2003). The term 
requires some explanation. ‘Ethno’ refers to local and situated knowledge. 
‘Epistemic’ highlights the nature of knowledge as truth claims about the world. 
Finally, ‘assemblage’ describes how diverse forms of local knowledge that are sort 
of pulled together constitute a phenomenon. Irwin and Michael introduce the 
notion as a pragmatic, empirical research tool. For them, studying something as 
an ethno-epistemic assemblage implies a focus on the empirical constitution of a 
phenomenon. In contrast, I have found this term useful for reflecting on 
methodological questions. Especially, I have found the term helpful in order to 
explain how my object of study developed in the process of studying it. 
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Thus, I would now suggest that rather than constitute an interface between two 
worlds, Danish public research policy and Lundbeck’s research practices are part 
of the same ethno-epistemic assemblage concerning strategic research. Both have 
particular practices and ways of projecting research and university-industry 
collaboration. Rather than focus on one part of this assemblage, I have focused on 
the relations between several parts such as Danish research policy and Lundbeck. 
This also means that more practices might be seen as part of this assemblage. I 
have noticed how the different parts of the assemblage are embedded in different 
practices and activities related to strategic research but nonetheless also relates 
in quite different ways. For example, the research strategies that developed in 
Lundbeck’s research division before Synapse, in the years 2005-2007, were not 
unaffected by Synapse that aimed at closely connecting different parts of 
Lundbeck, and potentially also different local strategies. Likewise, Danish 
research policy is not unaffected by ideas about research and innovation that 
emerge in the context of industry. 
I have approached this assemblage of strategic research by looking at both the 
constitution and organization of strategic research in Danish research policy; 
prevalent academic discussions in the field of research policy and strategies and 
practices in Lundbeck. First, I focused on how Lundbeck research managers were 
related to external academic researchers. However, spending time in Lundbeck 
opened different kinds of in-house science-industry collaboration that also 
contributed to a description of the assemblage of strategic research. 
How specifically has the notion of ethno-epistemic assemblages guided my 
reflections on my object and role as a researcher? First, I view my object as an 
assemblage, and as something continuously being assembled, rather than as a 
well-defined and clearly delineated object. This has opened up for connecting 
diverse empirical (situated) knowledge about strategic research rather than 
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focusing on one ideal type. While being an excellent tool for opening up and 
making connections, approaching something as an ethno-epistemic assemblage 
also, of course, requires making certain decisions about what to take analytically 
into account. In the next section, I return to how I made these decisions in 
collaboration with people from Lundbeck. 
Second, the notion of ethno-epistemic assemblage has guided how I have seen my 
own role as a researcher. Rather than conceiving of myself as an observer of a 
strictly defined research object, I have adopted a pragmatic approach and made 
decisions according to what has been interesting and feasible within the set-up of 
my research. Being employed by Lundbeck made certain things possible and 
other things impossible. It would probably have been quite inappropriate, and 
also quite irrelevant, to come with a strong critique of the research management 
in Lundbeck since I was working with them. Thus, deciding what was interesting 
research was not a completely open matter but also related to what research 
managers in Lundbeck found interesting. Therefore, I have not seen my role as 
enforcing a particular research scheme into a set-up that was not geared for this. 
Rather, I have seen my role as exploring an ethno-epistemic assemblage 
consisting of many potentially interesting practices and relations. I have also 
brought a particular knowledge into this, while investigating it. 
In the beginning of this chapter, I described how my research focus developed in 
the process of studying Lundbeck. I now see this development as the outcome of a 
particular methodological approach that is different from following the actor and 
participant observation. To describe this approach, I draw on Joan Fujimura’s 
(Fujimura 1987, 1996) notion of constructing ‘doable problems’. Fujimura 
originally developed this notion to describe how researchers with different 
backgrounds managed to work together. Besides its value for the analysis of 
scientific collaboration, which I return to in Chapter 9, I also see this notion as 
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relevant for reflecting on methodological issues. In particular, I have found it 
useful for describing how my research developed in a collaboration that took 
place between myself and the research managers at Lundbeck. Indeed, I think that 
this collaboration can be reasonably characterized in terms of developing doable 
problems within the company. 
 
Constructing strategic research in Lundbeck as a doable problem 
According to Fujimura, doable problems are socio-technical achievements 
(Fujimura 1996: 10). They are the outcome of particular events and conditions, 
some of which researchers control and others they do not. Fujimura highlights the 
often invisible ‘articulation work’ that is related to making research feasible. She 
describes this as the “the amorphous and ambiguous work of planning, 
organizing, monitoring, evaluating, adjusting, coordinating and integrating 
activities” (ibid. 11). We often see such activities as administrative rather than 
scientific and they are often not viewed as creative and important for research. 
However, in the process of constructing a doable problem content and context are 
not separate but begin to merge. So how does the notion of doable problems 
potentially shed light on methodological questions and on how the focus on my 
research developed? What characterized the way my research project developed 
as a doable problem in the context of Lundbeck? What kind of merging of context 
and content took place? 
The way in which my research focus gradually changed illustrates the ongoing 
construction of the do-ability of my project. Particular events and circumstances 
were important for rendering my project feasible. My project was initiated based 
on an initial discussion of what would be relevant and interesting research 
questions. As mentioned, I presented my academic interests at a first meeting in 
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Lundbeck. Initiating the project became possible because my questions were 
quite open. For instance, I asked: what are the implications of increased external 
research for research managers? Because the questions were quite loosely 
defined they relatively easily connected with emerging interests among research 
managers in Lundbeck. In this phase, making my PhD project doable involved 
developing a research proposal that would be peer reviewed by social scientists 
and at the same time make sense to research managers in Lundbeck. Thus the 
project did not initially become doable as a consequence of posing an excellent 
research question but rather by posing a quite open question that could be 
interpreted in diverse ways. 
Then the fact that I was employed in Lundbeck made certain inquiries and 
approaches possible that would have been very difficult to pursue under other 
circumstances. It became possible to ask questions that required entering the 
intricate processes of managing research in Lundbeck. In addition, it became 
possible to develop an open-ended approach in which specific inquiries 
developed in the process rather than up-front. Had I not been employed in 
Lundbeck, I would have had to negotiate access to Lundbeck based on a more 
precisely defined initial research interest and research design. Of course, access 
would also have been more restricted. 
Although my employment in Lundbeck implied certain favorable conditions in 
terms of access, access was in practice a matter of negotiation. Often access was 
negotiated in relation to meeting participation. Since I was spending a lot of time 
in Lundbeck, it was possible at the last minute to decide whether I should 
participate in an upcoming meeting or not. A decision was often made based on a 
quick conversation with the head of research about whether participating in the 
meeting would benefit my research or benefit the participants because I could 
provide inputs on matters of concern. Sometimes we agreed on the relevance of 
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participating and at other times we simply disagreed. This could go both ways, I 
could resist participating in a meeting because it was not sufficiently relevant and 
took up too much time. Or they, usually the head of research, would argue that a 
meeting that I was otherwise interested in was not relevant, thus implicitly also 
making an argument for what my research mainly concerned. Thus although I 
was employed and this gave some favorable conditions negotiation continued to 
be necessary. 
Developing the focus and content of my research was thus related to different 
kinds of articulation work. In particular, such work was important in relation to 
meetings, as which meetings I participated in and how, indicated what my 
research concerned. Also, articulation work concerned the nature of my research 
and how it contributed to Lundbeck. 
 
Articulation work and access to meetings 
As mentioned, much of my fieldwork consisted in attending meetings. In Chapters 
10-13, I describe a number of meetings and particular events that took place 
during meetings. In the next section, I describe how these events became crucial 
to my analysis. The first meetings in which I participated concerned collaboration 
with external partners. What took place at these meetings might in fact be seen as 
a kind of articulation work that made particular collaborations doable. These 
meetings involved, for instance, discussion of plans, presentations of purpose and 
strategies, financial structure, and contracts. To begin with, I was invited to 
participate in meetings in the Research division that concerned particular 
ongoing external collaborations. These collaborations were all in different ways 
seen as challenging and so my research came to concern external collaborations 
that were viewed as particularly surprising or difficult to handle. 
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As Synapse was initiated, it was a little unclear how this strategy process related 
to my research. This again involved intensified articulation work on my part. I 
described how my research related to Synapse and how I planned to use 
participating in Synapse as important background information. My articulation 
work was particularly concerned with integrating my research and ongoing 
events at Lundbeck by making strong relations between my research interests 
and developing activities in Lundbeck. 
The process of discussing my participation in Synapse also involved articulation 
work on research managers’ part. One research manager suggested that my 
involvement in Synapse implied a significant change in research focus as he saw 
my research as primarily concerning external collaboration in Research. Another 
research manager argued that participating in Synapse would, in fact, strengthen 
my research, since any form of additional insights into Lundbeck would be 
valuable for my education. Another research manager suggested that 
participating in Synapse would be an opportunity to contribute directly to the 
strategy work, based on my insights from studying research in Lundbeck. In spite 
of these different ways of articulating my research, developing an interest for 
Synapse also involved new issues in terms of access. Getting access to meetings 
and people had not previously been an issue. However, since Synapse involved 
many different divisions of Lundbeck getting access was a little more complicated. 
It required having a quite clear contribution and a clear reason for being there, 
which in part was up to me to develop. 
In the beginning of 2010, I made a number of interviews with research managers 
about the implications of Synapse for external collaboration in research. Towards 
the end of 2010, the discussions about my potential participation in Synapse 
resulted in an invitation to participate in a working group on project leader 
competencies. Chapter 13 describes this process in detail. Being a member of this 
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project leader-working group became a platform for subsequently participating 
as a member of a formal Synapse working group concerned with collaborative 
behavior of leaders. In this process, my research focus developed in a negotiation 
process in which external collaboration became increasingly linked with project 
leadership. For now I simply highlight that making my research project a doable 
problem in the context of Lundbeck involved articulation work that was 
particular intense in relation to meeting participation. Negotiating access to 
meetings required far more articulation work than making interviews. In these 
negotiations, it became clear that it was possible to see the purpose of my 
research in different ways. 
  
Articulation work and the nature of my research 
I also engaged in intense articulation work in relation to the role or impact of my 
research. In particular, there were two ways in which the role of my research was 
negotiated. As noted, I started out with the intention of simply exploring, 
describing, and analyzing how external collaboration developed in Lundbeck. 
However, at several occasions I was also asked to give specific recommendations. 
I illustrate this with a quick example and return to a more elaborate discussion of 
my role in Chapter 13. In May 2009, I hosted a seminar for the Research 
Management Board (RMB) on external collaboration. It was called “Future Models 
of Collaboration”. Hosting this seminar involved stimulating discussion about the 
challenges of external collaboration. In this seminar, individual members of the 
RMB gave presentations about the challenges they saw, specifically in relation to 
the governance of external collaboration. After the seminar, the head of research 
invited me to make a white paper that outlined best practices for external 
collaboration in Lundbeck. Making this white paper involved integrating a 
number of things such as the RMB members’ observations and discussions, my 
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observations from the seminar, my own ideas based on my research and my 
former experiences with governance and management of research from public 
policy, and transforming all this into recommendations. However, although the 
head of research had an interest in presenting this white paper as an outcome of 
my research, I wanted to play down my role because the white paper also 
contained a mixture of the RMB members’ experiences that were not exactly a 
result of my research. However, downplaying my role was not uncomplicated. In 
the process, it became obvious that presenting this white paper as a result of my 
research had the important function of legitimizing my role as a researcher in 
Lundbeck. My research was seen as leading to different things, some of which 
were early operational recommendations. This was but one of several situations 
in which I produced lists of recommendations or described models that were seen 
as part of my research results. As I saw it, these were indeed results of my 
research; however, they were not the end results, but rather necessary 
intermediary points that would enable me to retain the doability of the project. 
Towards the end of my PhD, I experienced a different form of articulation work 
about the outcomes of my research. This articulation work was related to the 
event of making a joint paper with my academic supervisor, Alan Irwin, and Peter 
Høngaard Andersen, a Lundbeck research manager (see appendix A). The paper 
was published in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, a journal that is widely read 
among research managers in Lundbeck. In Lundbeck, the comment was received 
well. Within the first week after its publication, several research managers 
contacted me with congratulations. When I asked them what they thought about 
the comment, several of them said, “it describes very well how we work”. This was 
of course a positive response; however, I was curious about this idea about 
description and how more precisely they viewed the specific impact of my 
research. I discussed this question in detail with one senior research manager. As 
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I had expected, he argued that it was difficult to pinpoint the exact impact of my 
research. This led to an interesting discussion of whether I had, in fact, merely 
described how they worked in Lundbeck and thus had acquired an industrial 
perspective. Or whether I had in fact helped to shape or change particular 
strategic discussions. Without being able to answer this question unequivocally, it 
is noteworthy that in some situations making my research doable required 
making it very operational and instructional, while at other times it was doable 
because it was merely descriptive and not in fact changing anything.10 This topic 
also feeds into the potential role STS research, to which I return in conclusion. 
The notion of constructing doable problems opens up important questions 
concerning the articulation work it takes to define and develop a research 
projects and research agendas. At times, it has indeed made more sense to 
understand my research in terms of research collaboration rather than a 
researcher/informant relationship. The content of my project has developed 
according to the present conditions and while I have been quite an active 
researcher, so too have research managers in Lundbeck also actively given input 
to my research and indeed to my role as a researcher. I end this chapter by 
introducing a third notion, ‘disconcertment’ that I have used as a data-selecting 
tool. This notion helps me to explain my way of focusing in the many meetings 
and discussions that make up my data material. 
 
Disconcertment 
The notion of ‘disconcertment’ relates to classic methodological problems of 
encountering and analyzing the field. In STS, Helen Verran has developed 
                                               
10 None of the research managers argued that my research had no impact but it was rather 
difficult, also for me, to pinpoint what exactly it had changed and produced. 
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disconcertment (Verran 1999; 2001) and recently others have taken it up. Thus, 
in “Cultivating Disconcertment”, John Law and Wen-yuan Lin argue that 
disconcertment is a valuable methodological tool for exploring the intersections of 
different knowledge forms (Law and Lin 2011). According to dictionary 
definition, to disconcert means, “to upset the progress of”.11 It comes from 
desconcerter, which means des- (expressing reversal) + concerter “bring together”, 
hence the connotations of disharmony or deconstruction. 
Verran discusses the notion of disconcertment in relation to fieldwork in Africa, 
where she studied diverse ways of teaching mathematics. During fieldwork, she 
observed teaching based on completely different conceptions of number, which 
disconcerted her Western, mathematical understanding. According to Verran, 
disconcertment marks moments of “double seeing”, such as seeing the “normal” 
notion of length, presented and performed in a strange way in an African math 
class (Verran 2001: 5). Thus disconcerting “double seeing” occurs in consequence 
of a comparative moment, where one experiences both sameness and difference. 
Verran argues that such odd moments can be deployed strategically. “This 
disconcertment, source of both clear delight and confused misery, must be 
privileged and nurtured, valued and expanded upon.” (Verran 2001: 5). Even if 
one’s first intuition is to try to “explain” (away) these moments by searching for a 
sense of underlying coherence, Verran encourages sustained exploration of just 
what makes them disturbing. “It is easy to ignore and pass by these moments—
part of the problem is their fleeting subtlety—yet it is possible to become acutely 
sensitized to them” (ibid.). Using a terminology, which I develop further on in this 
thesis, I propose that disconcertment is produced where different forms of 
                                               
11 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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screening collide, which will make much more sense when I introduce the notion 
of screens in Chapter 9. 
Verran presents disconcertment as a tool that can be used by analysts to study 
somewhat awkward or embarrassing situations. As she argues, disconcertment is 
something that the analyst can gradually become sensitive to and become able to 
use analytically. Thus, Verran encourages the analyst to develop a sensitivity to 
one’s own discomfort, using “bodily disconcertment” as an expression of what 
might be called metaphysical disjuncture (Law and Lin 2011: 137). That 
disconcertment is located in the body obviously troubles any easy aspiration to 
deploy it strategically or rationally. Its usefulness depends on articulating 
experiences that are per definition unforeseeable, caused by particular 
encounters in the field. But even so one might also think that different research 
conditions might create more or less optimal circumstances for both perceiving 
and experiencing disconcertment. Since disconcertment is produced not only by 
great differences but also by subtle dissimilarities of presumptions and 
expectations, we can also assume that it requires quite close relations with the 
people and things one wants to investigate. 
In the following analyses, however, I attend to disconcertment in a somewhat 
different way than Verran recommends. Rather than only using my own 
disconcertment, I am also interested in public moments of disconcertment, sensed 
both by the analyst and people in the field. One might see this emphasis as 
focused on a collective, even epistemic form of disconcertment in which a group 
of people has a shared experience that something is out of order. Verran argues 
that a disconcerted laughter should be taken seriously as an indicator of tensions 
brought to light by particular situations, and she refers to her own “visceral 
laughter” (Verran 1999; 2001: 5). But one might also observe situations of 
collective laughter. Moments of awkward laughter, I suggest, offer an entry point 
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for understanding the collective sense of what is normal and straightforward in a 
situation, since it indicates a disruption of the normal. A focus on collective 
disconcertment also assumes that the analyst is not entirely or alone responsible 
for creating or registering these moments but that they might be present in 
situations where the unusual appears and is dealt with by a group. 
It is in this sense that I use disconcertment as a methodological selecting and 
organizing device. The empirical situations that I discuss in the Chapters 10-13 all 
have in common that they elicit moments of disjuncture: at various times, 
managing external collaboration, collaborating with in-house colleagues, and 
defining new strategies presented generated such moments of disconcertment. 
Whereas STS analyses often focus on the mundane and normal (Woolgar and 
Neyland 2013), I suggest that focusing on instances of misalignment is also a way 
of opening up for an understanding of what constitutes the normal. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described the methods and tools that I used to explore 
strategic research in Lundbeck. The Industrial PhD set-up has given me an 
opportunity to get close to the thesis’ matters of concern. To further take 
advantage of this opportunity, I have deployed an open-ended approach with a 
strong emphasis on participation. Rather than primarily observing, I have taken 
active part in discussions at Lundbeck. As a consequence of deploying such an 
approach, my object of study changed in the process from external collaboration 
in the research division of Lundbeck to strategic research in Lundbeck at large. I 
think of this object of study as an ethno-epistemic assemblage. By defining this 
assemblage broadly as strategic research I have been able to pull together a 
number of diverse practices of strategic research. Consequently, I have not only 
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looked at contrasts between Danish public research policy and research practices 
in Lundbeck, but also explored contrasting research practices in Lundbeck related 
to collaboration with external academic research groups and in-house colleagues. 
Rather than implement a predefined research agenda, my main methodology is 
inspired by the idea of constructing a doable problem. I have participated in a 
research collaboration that developed pragmatically according to what was 
interesting and doable for diverse collaborators. Perhaps this sounds easy 
enough, but it involved significant articulation work related both to access and to 
the role of my research as simultaneously highly instructive and merely 
descriptive. I suggest further that part of what made the project doable was my 
willingness to let it adapt to such different outcomes and purposes. Finally, I use 
the notion of disconcertment as a selecting and organizing device. Because of the 
nature of my fieldwork, I not only use my own disconcertment but also draw on 
public and shared experiences of disconcertment. I want to take forms of 
disconcertment seriously as valuable sources for developing new understandings 
of strategic research. 
I now take a step back to explore how strategic research and ideas about science-
industry collaboration have developed in the context of Danish research policy. 
The purpose of this is to provide an understanding of the Danish national 
discussions of strategic research that both relate to concerns in Lundbeck and 
suggest quite different categorizations of research than what we have seen in 
Lundbeck. So how is strategic research defined and organized in Danish research 
policy? 
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8. STRATEGIC RESEARCH IN DENMARK 
In Danish public research policy, ‘strategic research’ has a taken on a particular 
meaning. Not only is it seen as a particular form of research that can be 
distinguished from basic, independent research. Presently, strategic research also 
has a separate organization with its own councils, program committees and 
secretariats. So what characterizes strategic research in a Danish research policy 
context? Which practices and considerations are related to the current 
organization of strategic research as separate from basic, independent research? 
What is the background for this particular Danish construction in which strategic 
research has developed as a distinct domain? These are the questions explored in 
this chapter. Its aim is to clarify how I see the relation between the Danish 
national context of research policy and Lundbeck, a global pharmaceutical 
company.  
From one perspective, Danish research policy and Lundbeck inhabit two separate 
worlds. Managing research is obviously a quite different task depending on 
whether it takes place in public institutions or in a private company. Emphasizing 
the different worlds of Danish research policy and Lundbeck is useful because it 
immediately requires that we make explicit what is particular about each of these 
worlds. Being able to shift back and forth between Danish research policy and 
Lundbeck is analytically helpful in terms of pinpointing particular traits and 
differences. Even so, my main emphasis is on the research management practices 
of Lundbeck. Thus, the world of Danish public policy serves as an important 
background for this exploration. Yet, the key notion of strategic research comes 
from public policy. It is not a widely used term in Lundbeck where managers 
rather talk about “research strategies” or specific “strategic research areas”. The 
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structure of the thesis reflects this difference as policy is mainly described in this 
chapter and separated from discussions of Lundbeck practices introduced before 
this chapter and in the following empirical analyses. 
Even so, as mentioned, I also see Danish public policy and Lundbeck as part of the 
same field, or ethno-epistemic assemblage (Irwin and Michael 2003). In Danish 
public research policy, we find very specific ideas about companies and what they 
want from the public sector, for example in terms of educated candidates and 
relevant research. In Lundbeck, too, we find research managers that are deeply 
engaged in public research policy. For instance, in Lundbeck I noticed that two 
members of the Research Management Board (RMB) were in fact also members of 
specific councils and thus also dealt with public policies in a quite direct sense. 
Not least, I see Danish research policy and Lundbeck as connected in relation to 
one particular idea. This is the key idea that university-industry collaboration is a 
key tool for creating innovation and growth. In public policy, university-industry 
collaboration has been introduced as a main driver of national economic growth 
and as a tool for addressing particular societal or industrial problems. Research 
managers in Lundbeck agree that university-industry collaboration is an 
important part of research strategies but emphasize a different main purpose of 
research collaboration. They propose that academic collaboration is important for 
developing new platforms for innovation with long-term effects. Building 
platforms is quite different from solving problems.  In this way, a shared interest 
in strategic use of university-industry collaboration paves the way for a 
potentially intriguing difference in how the main purpose of these collaborations 
is imagined. These similarities and differences are central to the exploration of 
this thesis. 
To elucidate the current Danish research policy situation, I draw on official 
documents, law materials and background discussions that illustrate the current 
   69 
 
Danish construction. In particular, I focus on the law of 2004 that established the 
Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF) and on a set of comments to the 2004 
law that describes the purpose of particular elements in the law. I also draw on 
website material from the councils and foundations that govern strategic research 
in Denmark. This material shows how strategic research is administered and 
which elements of strategic research are given special attentions. In addition, I 
draw on public debates about strategic research in media and at conferences. 
Finally, I draw on my knowledge as a former employee at the Danish National 
Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF) established in 2005-2006 as part of a 
new organization of public research funds that gave strategic research a 
particular importance. As noted in the introduction, the DNATF was established to 
rethink and renew existing ways of managing publicly funded research. Being 
part of this process implied constant articulation of the differences between 
managing public research in the context of the DNATF and existing practices of 
administering research developed in the context of the Danish Agency for Science, 
Technology and Innovation (DASTI). 
Drawing on this material, I explore the current organization of Danish public 
research funding. This organization is currently changing in important ways as 
the Danish political parties have just (this autumn 2013) agreed on a new reform 
of strategic research in Denmark. Although apparently radical, however, the new 
reform is based on some of the same principles that have characterized the 
Danish research advisory and funding system since 2004. Thus, it remains 
relevant to explore the emergence of the idea of introducing strategic research as 
a separate field in Danish research policy. I do so by analyzing the basic models of 
research that have characterized Danish research policy making in recent years. 
Finally, I explore how managing strategic research became a concern in Danish 
research policy. How, then, do current policy ideas about research management 
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characterize strategic research? And how is research management presented 
from the perspective of policy? But, first of all, what actually is meant by strategic 
research? 
 
Strategic research and free research 
In Denmark, the current public research advisory and funding system is based on 
a distinction between ‘strategic’ and what is often termed ‘independent’ 
research.12 In fact, in Denmark, the term ‘free’ is often used interchangeably with 
independent, hence the Danish construction “Det Fri Forskningsråd”.13 The 
distinction between strategic and free research was introduced and formalized by 
law in 2004 (Ministeriet for Videnskab 2003a). Since then, the Danish research 
advisory and funding system has been organized according to this distinction 
(DSF 2013). I start out by considering the present system and its main councils 
and committees. 
Today, the core of the Danish research advisory and funding system consists of 
the Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF) and the Danish Council for 
Independent Research (DFF), both of which were introduced with the 2004 law. 
The DSF has seven program commissions, each of which defines a field of 
strategic concern: ‘Education and Creativity’; ‘Health, Food and Welfare’; 
‘Individuals, Disease and Society’; ‘Peace and Conflict’; ‘Strategic Growth 
Technologies’; ‘Sustainable Energy and Environment’; and ‘Transport and 
Infrastructure’. Similarly, the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) has 
five sub-councils covering ‘The Humanities’; ‘Natural Sciences’; ‘Social Sciences’; 
                                               
12 www.fivu.dk. 
13 The official English translation is “The Danish Council for Independent Research”. But in 
Danish, the term “free” (“fri”) is used instead of independent; hence a more precise translation 
would be “The Danish Council of Free Research”. 
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‘Medical Sciences’, and ‘Technology and Production Sciences’. In addition to the 
DSF and the DFF, there is the Danish Council for Technology and Innovation (RTI), 
which has an advisory function and administers a number of strategic initiatives, 
including the Industrial PhD scheme. In addition to DSF, DFF and RTI, the Danish 
system has two public foundations. The Danish National Research Foundation 
(DNRF), which was established in 1991 and funds centers of excellence, and the 
Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF) that was established 
by a separate law in 2004 to fund research collaborations between companies 
and universities. It is also relevant to mention the Danish Council for Research 
Policy (DCRP) that advises the minister on research related topics and the Danish 
Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD), which makes decisions in cases of 
potential fraud. Finally, the 2004 law established a coordination committee with 
the task of coordinating the diverse research funding bodies, offering advice on 
activities and, in general, attempting to keep the entire system working together. 
Before 2004, the organization of the Danish research advisory and funding system 
followed a traditional university faculty structure (Ministeriet for Videnskab 
2003b: 13). Thus, there were five national research councils, representing the 
‘Humanities’; ‘Natural Sciences’; ‘Social Sciences’; ‘Medical Sciences’, and the 
‘Technology and Production Sciences’. The individual research councils were 
responsible for funding research as well as defining strategic initiatives. Thus, 
each council had a strategy function that identified areas of strategic interests and 
developed strategy plans (ibid. 10). Accordingly, strategic research was an 
integrated responsibility of the scientific councils, rather than a distinct unit. 
Which concerns and notions of research then led to the reorganization of strategic 
research around 2004-2005? According to the notes and comments 
accompanying the 2004 law proposal, the reorganization of the Danish research 
system was based on a number of emerging concerns. One important issue was 
 72 
 
that the existing system, in which strategic research was an integral part of a 
research field, did not support strategic research “on its own terms” (ibid. 11). 
This was a problem because strategic research was seen as unique form of 
research that thrived under particular conditions. To promote and nurture such 
conditions, the solution was to separate strategic research entirely from non-
strategic research. 
Another concern had to do with the question of how to coordinate the increasing 
number of councils and committees that had separate purposes and covered 
different types of research (ibid. 9). As a separate area of research, strategic 
research had emerged as something of an umbrella concept that held together 
“strategic, applied as well as industrial research” (ibid. 12-14). Danish policy 
makers suggested that to simplify the system, while still facilitating the making of 
relevant categories, the number of program committees should be kept as low as 
possible. For this reason, a coordination committee was established to deal with 
the question of how to align the individual councils. In particular, the issue was 
that within the areas of strategic research, several councils and funds had 
overlapping mandates so that the need for clarifying individual missions was 
growing. These two concerns – how to treat strategic research on its own terms 
and how to maintain alignment in an increasingly diversifying system – 
materialized into the invention of the Danish Council for Strategic Research and a 
coordination committee. 
In December 2012, the new Danish government of 2011 announced a new 
innovation strategy called “Denmark – a nation of solutions” (Regeringen 2012), 
also referred to as the “Innovation Strategy”. This strategy proposed an extensive 
reform of the Danish research advisory and funding system, focusing in particular 
on strengthening strategic research in various ways. It mainly did this by 
collapsing several councils and funding bodies dealing with strategic research 
   73 
 
into a new entity named the Danish Innovation Foundation. The Innovation 
Strategy stated that international comparison showed the Danish research 
advisory and funding system to be functioning well. However, taking into account 
the small size of the country, the system was still too complicated with too many 
councils and foundations (ibid. 12). According to the Innovation Strategy, the 
existence of several overlapping research councils and foundations was the 
results of gradually introduced changes. Each council and foundation had been 
designed to solve a particular problem without considering the implications for 
the system as a whole. Although the existing councils and funding bodies had each 
played an important role in the system, it was presently difficult to the make 
coherent strategic prioritizations across the system due to its complexities. In 
particular, it had become difficult to coordinate and integrate activities within 
strategic research. Consequently, the Innovation Strategy suggested merging the 
councils and foundations supporting strategic research into one entity, the Danish 
Innovation Foundation (ibid. 13).14 
Based on this short exploration of how strategic research has become a significant 
notion in Danish research policy, I would like to emphasize how the definition of 
strategic research developed from contrasting it with a particular idea of 
academic research. First, strategic research was associated with topics of current 
political interest: a certain research set-up that implied collaboration between 
universities and companies and a problem-oriented approach that aimed to solve 
particular problems (DSF 2013). In contrast, academic research was defined as 
taking place exclusively at universities (ibid.). As noted, the comments to the 2004 
law emphasized that strategic research should be attended to “on its own terms”, 
even as the requirements of free research should also be met (Ministeriet for 
Videnskab 2003b: 11). This formulation suggested a distinction between strategic 
                                               
14 Danish politicians are currently negotiating the specific terms of this new fund. 
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and free research in which the two forms of research were imagined to succeed 
under quite different conditions. The assumption was that these conditions were 
most effectively protected if kept apart. 
Further, the then existing system of public research was based on an on-going 
effort to define strategic research by cutting it into smaller and smaller pieces. For 
instance, the comments to the 2004 law made use of a differentiation between 
strategic, applied and industrial research, while also emphasizing that these were, 
in some sense, similar forms of research. We might thus say that the new 
Innovation Strategy took a new approach to this by merging all former 
subcategories of strategic research into one. 
Another notable tendency that has continued between 2004 and 2013 is a strong 
interest in coordinating strategic research by making the system flexible and 
coherent. Overall, the Innovation Strategy suggested that coordination improves 
the system as a whole and makes it easier for the government, researchers and 
companies to interact with the public funding system. However, based on both 
public debates and internal discussions among policy makers in Denmark, it also 
appears that coordination is not all that easy. Despite numerous attempts to get 
strategic research right, it remains rather unclear what strategic research implies. 
Illustrative of this, the current reorganizations of the public research system are 
mainly dealing with strategic research while it is somewhat taken for granted that 
we know what basic, independent research is. In spite of the ambivalences of 
strategic research, however, several important characteristics are recurrent, and I 
now turn to a description of these traits. 
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Relevance and strategic quality 
Strategic research is generally associated with the criteria of relevance (DSF 
2013). For instance, the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation 
(DNATF), one of the councils and funds that cover strategic research in Denmark, 
has three main selection criteria for funding research projects. One is “obvious 
industrial potential” which means that the research is seen as appropriate to an 
industrial end goal.15 The Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF) defines 
relevance more broadly as “the relevance of the research project for the societal 
challenges that founds it” (DSF 2013: 3). In contrast, Danish independent research 
is associated with researchers’ freedom to choose topic, methods and theories, 
hence the particular notion of free research. Independent research is associated 
with excellence in contrast to relevance. The notion of relevance sometimes 
occurs in descriptions of independent research but then it addresses the 
relevance of the researcher for carrying out a certain research project (DFF 
2013). 
In a Danish policy context, the distinction between relevance (to society or 
industry) and excellence of the research (and relevance of the applicant to the 
research) has raised the question of whether strategic research implies less 
scientific quality than basic independent research. Sometimes raising this 
question assumed that research relating to society or industry somehow 
compromises quality. The question of the quality of strategic research tells us a 
lot about the basic assumptions at play in Danish research policy. For instance, 
questioning the scientific quality of strategic research seems to suggest that 
quality is not a relational matter but rather an inherent quality that can be 
predicted, identified and measured. In recent years, these discussions have been 
                                               
15 www.hoejteknologifonden.dk/ansoeger/udvaelgelseskriterier. 
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reflected in the way councils and foundations covering strategic research in 
Denmark have defined their selection criteria. One of the criteria for selection 
suggested by the DNATF is defined as “research and innovation of high 
international standard”,16 suggesting that strategic problem solving requires high 
quality research. In a similar manner, and even more explicitly, the DSF has 
introduced a new concept in Danish research policy, which they call ‘strategic 
quality’ (DSF 2013). According to the DSF, strategic quality is composed by “the 
relevance of the research”, “the potential effect of the research” and “the research 
standard” (ibid. 3ff.). In this definition, as in the DNATF’s definition of related 
criteria, quality is folded into the idea of strategic research as a component at the 
same level as societal and industrial relevance. 
Concepts such as strategic quality illustrate what we might think of as the 
fundamental ambiguity of the concept of strategic research. On the one hand, the 
organization of Danish public research is based on a clear separation of strategic 
and basic research, and of relevant and excellent research. Public discourses, 
events and debates often refer to this separation as a natural given.17 On the other 
hand, in recent years, we have initiatives and new definitions such as strategic 
quality that clearly questions the separation of strategic and essential qualities of 
science. These tensions inherent in the notion of strategic research raise a 
number of questions of key importance for this thesis. Can strategic research not 
be excellent? And can excellent research not be strategic? Further, what is the role 
of companies in such research? A recent report published by the European 
Science Foundation, “Science in society: caring for our futures in turbulent times” 
addresses this matter directly and argues for “linking excellence to relevance and 
responsibility” (Felt et al. 2013: 4). However, although there are these initiatives 
                                               
16 www.hoejteknologifonden.dk. 
17 See Vedel and Gad 2011. 
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that somewhat soften the terminology and link domains otherwise assumed to be 
distinct in new ways, it is characteristic of the Danish situation that excellence and 
relevance are generally seen as separated and descriptive of different research 
practices. 
 
Linear models of research 
In Danish research policy, strategic research is often presented using a linear 
model. An example of such a linear model was recently used in the recent Danish 
Innovation Strategy of December 2012 to explain the reorganization of the Danish 
research system. See diagram below that I also showed in the introduction. 
 
Illustration 4: The linear organization of the Danish public research advisory and funding 
system (Regeringen 2012) 
What does this model illustrate? The model shows a spectrum of research types 
ranging from basic research on the left to market maturation on the right. The 
model then suggests that the market, exemplified by “consumers, companies, the 
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public sector and other nations”, represents a demand and that “knowledge 
institutions and companies” supply knowledge to meet this demand. It proposes a 
dynamic that is constituted by a science and technology push and a market pull, 
illustrated by the red arrows. In the model, the main public councils and 
foundations are located from left to right. On the far left is the Danish National 
Research Foundation (DNRF) that funds centers of excellence. Here, we also find 
the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) that operates in the same 
field. The three councils and foundations that support strategic research follow: 
the Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF), the Danish National Advanced 
Technology Foundation (DNATF) and the Danish Council for Technology and 
Innovation (RTI). At the far right closest to the market we find the Growth 
Foundation, a state investment fund18. Although the model differentiates between 
different forms of research using a scale from basic research to market it also 
illustrates potential overlaps between adjacent research councils and 
foundations. However, because the model is linear it does not facilitate discussion 
of overlaps or shared practices between forms of research that are situated far 
from each other on the scale. Certainly, the policy notion of quality potentially 
cuts across the basic categories of the model. But, as I will explore in this thesis, 
there are also other important research practices to which such linear policy 
models render us blind. For instance, in this model basic research is placed far 
from the market, suggesting both that basic research and markets are different 
worlds and that basic research has to transform or mature into something else in 
order to become market relevant. However, the specific constitution of both 
markets and basic research varies, and therefore it is obvious that this model only 
describes one type of relationship whereas we might think of others. 
                                               
18 Vækstfonden. 
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Although the linear model of research has been important in the Danish research 
policy context, its limitations have also been debated. Whereas the model has 
been useful for overall policy discussions of the prioritization of public funds, it 
usefulness as a tool for categorizing individual research projects has been 
considerably more ambiguous. Here, I draw on my experience from working in 
the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF), since talk of 
these ambiguities have rarely been part of the Danish public debate. As noted, the 
linear model facilitates broad differentiations between basic and strategic 
research without accounting for subtle differences or exceptions to the rule. 
However, this inability to account for subtleties becomes a problem within the 
individual councils where the boundaries between different research practices 
are often recognized to be much more blurry. 
As the DNATF was established in 2006, we often discussed the basic 
characteristics of a project funded by us in comparison with projects funded by 
other councils and foundations. In the selection process, how could we identify a 
suitable project that obviously lived up to our funding criteria? While looking for 
such distinctive characteristics, we worked from the experience that projects 
funded by DNATF were quite diverse and distributed across different industries 
and research areas. They had different risk profiles. The possibility of succeeding 
seemed good for some projects and less good for others. In order to evaluate the 
developing funding profile of DNATF, we started to categorize projects that had 
received funding. However, categorizing individual projects was not easy. For 
instance, most of the time, evaluating whether a certain research activity 
exemplified basic research and high risk was impossible, even for the participants 
in the project. Consequently, identifying a clear profile within the area of strategic 
research proved to be highly challenging in practice. Indeed, it seemed that 
DNATF projects were primarily characterized by drawing on quite different forms 
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of research practices. Thus, even though the linear research policy model made 
sense as a tool for differentiating the mandates of public councils and foundation 
it was relatively useless as a tool for categorizing research proposals, not to 
mention describing the growing portfolio of projects that had received grants 
from DNATF. 
As I have shown, the Danish policy notions of strategic and independent research 
draw on a linear model of research. Now, simultaneously with the emergence of 
strategic research institutions in Danish research policy another model gained 
influence, which spoke to the question of how to conceive strategic research. This 
was Donald Stokes’ model of Pasteur’s quadrant (Stokes 1997). In contrast to the 
linear model, Stokes’ model suggested a potential alignment of research 
ambitions that was usually seen as apart. Let us therefore consider the basic idea 
of this model and how it affected the Danish policy construction of strategic 
research. 
 
Strategic research as Pasteur’s quadrant 
Donald Stokes originally proposed the model of Pasteur’s quadrant to challenge 
Vannevar Bush’s distinction between basic research and applied research, 
suggested in his book Science: The Endless Frontier (Stokes 1997; Bush 1945). 
Instead of existing in separate categories, Stokes suggests that research develops 
from the interplay between different motivations. He identifies two main 
ambitions for research, which are ‘a drive towards fundamental understanding’ 
and ‘a drive towards applied use’ (Stokes 1997). By focusing on drives rather than 
stable domains, Stokes emphasizes the dynamic of different research forms. He 
goes on to propose that understanding the interplay between the different 
motivating forces of research has important implications for research policy and 
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the organization of research funding. Rather than think only in basic or applied 
science policy should consider other mixed forms. In Denmark, Stokes’ model has 
not been used in official strategies although it has often been used in public 
discussions of policy. 
 
 
Illustration 5: Donald Stokes’ model of Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes 1997). 
In Stokes’ model, the y-axis represents an increasing drive towards fundamental 
understanding and the x-axis an increasing drive towards applied use. In the 
lower quadrant on the left side, according to Stokes, one finds the knowledge of 
“common man”.19 On the lower right, we find research in which the drive towards 
applied use is significant. Edison’s light bulb offers an example. At the top left, 
Bohr’s quadrant covers research with a drive towards fundamental 
understanding. Finally, at the top right, Pasteur’s quadrant combines a drive 
towards fundamental understanding with considerations of use. Based on this 
                                               
19 STS approaches this very differently. See Irwin 1995 and Irwin and Wynne 1996. 
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model, Stokes argued that some research is capable of integrating more than one 
drive or direction. 
In discussions of Danish research policy, Pasteur’s quadrant model has been used 
to challenge a linear model of research. In particular, the quadrant enables policy 
makers to go beyond the limited notion that areas of research are always clearly 
delineated and either applied or basic. Thus, the main attraction of this model is 
its potential for creating a new form of policy conceptualization in which it is 
possible for basic research and commercialization to meet and overlap. In a 
Danish context, the model has allowed councils and foundations to argue that 
strategic research is not a narrow field but one that expands in many directions. 
In the DNATF, in particular, the model was also used in a number of ways. The 
secretariat used it to stimulate discussion in the board about the main field and 
scope of the foundation. Eventually it was agreed that a majority of the 
foundation’s funded research should fall within Pasteur’s quadrant. Further, it 
was used in the secretariat as a tool for categorizing research projects. Here, it 
influenced discussion of incoming applications, for instance by using Pasteur’s 
quadrant as a yardstick with which to measure their strategic qualities. In 
addition, it was used for public communication about the purpose of the 
foundation, which was described as a connecting high quality research with 
perspectives of commercialization. Finally, the model was used to think about the 
challenges of strategic research for research managers. As noted, the model 
focused on bringing together potentially different motivations for research. 
Although Pasteur’s quadrant was seen as a distinct research form, the 
construction of the model made it clear that it was composed by different drives. 
In the context of DNATF, the specific challenges for research managers were 
consequently seen as related to bringing together and managing these drives. The 
model was thus used as a tool for discussing research management. This leads me 
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to ask: how has research management developed as a particular concern, closely 
related to the overall ambition of strategic research? 
 
The role of research management in Danish policy 
Around 2005, with the new organization of the Danish research advisory and 
funding system, the role of research managers began to emerge as an important 
question in Danish research policy. Since then it has had a prominent role in 
Danish research policy. Several examples can be used to illustrate this trend. In 
2011, the Danish Academy of Technical Sciences (ATV) initiated a project called 
‘The Value Creating University’.20 This project aimed to stimulate a debate about 
the role of universities in Danish society. One of the main themes was research 
management. Although the debate illustrated a wide spectrum of ideas about 
ideal university research management, there seemed to be a general agreement 
about the value of an increased focus on research management. In the debate, 
some argued that good research management should always be based on 
advanced technical skills, implying that ideal research managers are scientists 
that have advanced to become leaders. Others argued that research managers 
should rather be professional managers with specific training in leadership as 
scientists often make bad leaders (ATV 2012: 37), which I return to below.21 
Similarly, in the autumn of 2012, research management was a key topic at yearly 
networking event of the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation 
(DNATF).22 Here, the Danish Minister for Science, Innovation and Higher 
Education presented the Pasteur Award, given annually to a project leader that 
had excelled in ‘bridge building’ between universities and companies in a 
                                               
20 www.atv.dk. 
21 Amanda Goodall: “Expert Knowledge and university leadership” at www.atv.dk. 
22 www.hoejteknologifonden.dk/netvaerksdag. 
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research project funded by DNATF. As a third example, consider that the Danish 
Council for Strategic Research (DSF) gives special attention to research 
management in its 2013 strategy document. In this document, we read that 
“strategic research activities are to be performed with due emphasis on skilled 
research management” (DSF 2013: 10). In this way, research management has 
indeed become a criterion for receiving research funds. 
Thus, research management ideas crop up in public seminars, conferences, in 
relation to discussion of the future of universities and as a basic requirement for 
receiving funds. Talk of research management reflects diverse ideas about 
research and vice versa; ideas about the dynamics of research management also 
illustrate what is seen as constituting research practices. We might then ask what 
is it about the nature of strategic research in particular that makes research 
management appear so crucial for successful outcomes. 
As noted, the Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation (DNATF) and the 
Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF) have included specific demands for 
research management in their criteria for selecting and funding research projects. 
Similarly, as noted above, in 2008 DNATF established an award for exemplary 
research project leadership.23 In both contexts, the specific nature of strategic 
research as connecting several aims and perspectives (Stokes 1997) has been 
used to explain an increased need for research management. The DNATF has 
specifically attempted to specify the kinds of problems that good research 
management is meant to solve. According to a DNATF project guide, companies 
and universities bring different values and norms to a project. In order for 
successful collaboration to take place, these norms and values do not need to 
                                               
23 www.hoejteknologifonden.dk (opslag). 
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merge but an initial alignment of expectations is required.24 This alignment is 
important because otherwise the different interests and goals of the participants 
will start to diverge and eventually create chaos. The task of the project leader is 
thus to ensure a continuous alignment of expectations and to prevent chaotic 
divergence. According to DNATF, it is thus the inherently diverging nature of 
strategic research that makes research management crucial and thus the main 
accomplishment of the project leader is to set a joint direction. Here, project 
managers are not seen as administrative managers but rather as leaders that are 
capable of connecting different perspectives. In Chapter 13, I return to a 
discussion of how this is seen in Lundbeck. 
As mentioned, there is an interesting tension in the idea of research management 
that recent policy initiatives such as awards and renewed selection criteria give 
attention to. On the one hand, such initiatives advance the idea of a scientific 
research manager who has a background in research. In Denmark, institutions 
such as the Danish Academy of Technical Sciences (ATV) highlight this idea of the 
technically skilled research manager. Also key contributors to debates on Danish 
research policy have advanced this idea of a science-manager based on their 
backgrounds in science and corporate research management.25 According to these 
proponents of scientific research management, the ideal manager is a scientist 
with deep insight into the scientific content of the project. On the other hand, 
others cultivate just the opposite idea, namely, that ideal research management 
requires professional leadership. This form of research management has been 
promoted in Denmark with the institution of professional university 
management. Where university management used to be constituted by university 
                                               
24 See www.hoejteknologifonden.dk. 
25 Examples of contributors are Professor and Chairman Flemming Besenbacher from The 
Carlsberg Foundation and Jens Rostrup-Nielsen, former senior research manager at Haldor 
Topsøe. 
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researchers it is increasingly also composed by managers with professional 
leadership training. To some degree, we see these two trends combine in the 
context of DNATF, as project leaders that are rewarded with the Pasteur’ prize is 
given professional management training at Harvard Business School.26 All of this 
suggests that the notion of research management is rather ambiguous, and 
contain within itself multiple conflicting tendencies. However, it is obvious that 
ideas like strategic research, research collaboration and research management 
are deeply entangled in the context of Danish policy. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered an introduction to how strategic research has 
developed in the context of Danish public research policy. About ten years ago, 
strategic research emerged through a particular structure of several separate 
councils and foundations. Presently, strategic research is developing as an even 
more separate domain in Danish policy with its own organization. In particular, 
strategic research has merged into one more or less coherent area to be governed 
by the Danish Innovation Foundation. The ideas behind this recent reorganization 
illustrate certain key concerns related to strategic research. Strategic research is 
seen as a main national driver for economic growth in Denmark, one that thrives 
best in a separate yet coherent system for strategic research. Since strategic 
research combines different ambitions and inputs defined by universities, 
politicians and companies, the question of research management becomes a 
particular important theme. The main role of research managers in relation to 
strategic research is to align expectations and set a direction given the potential 
risk of divergence. In the views of strategic research we have encountered, we 
                                               
26 http://hoejteknologifonden.dk/pasteurprogram. 
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also get the sense that basic research is, in fact, a much more uniform area of 
research than strategic research because it is somehow governed by coherent 
disciplines and scientific interests. In comparison, in these policy accounts, 
strategic research emerges as a much more heterogeneous practice that would 
develop chaotically if it was not properly governed. 
In this overview, I have touched upon the practical and conceptual limitations of 
what I referred to as a linear model. In spite of this criticism, it is also clear that 
bureaucracies have an urgent need for relevant categories and structures. Rather 
than see efforts of categorization as misguided and reductive, we might use them 
as entry-points for coming to terms with the creative processes of administration 
(Jensen 2011). Since the main focus of my thesis is a detailed investigation of 
Lundbeck’s research management practices, the world of public policy inevitably 
looks less vibrant and lively compared to what will follow. However, this is an 
artifact of the thesis structure and does not at all correspond to my own 
experiences of having worked with creating these bureaucratic structures. Thus, I 
share Paul du Gay’s view that bureaucracies and the arrangements they produce 
are fascinating as well as immensely important (du Gay 2000). With this proviso 
in mind, I now move to explore how university-industry collaboration has been 
conceptualized in academic research in the field of research policy and also in 
Science and Technology Studies. As we shall see, there are quite significant 
overlaps between the models that we have seen in Danish research policy and the 
academic descriptions of science-industry interaction. So what characterizes 
some of the main ideas of university-industry collaboration in research policy 
studies? 
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9. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis is concerned with university-industry relations, research 
collaboration, research management, and categorizations of research such as 
strategic research. Both in Danish public policy and in Lundbeck, these topics are 
closely related. In both of these worlds, we are witness to a particular promotion 
of university-industry interaction, which raises certain questions: What makes 
university-industry collaboration work? And what is the role of research 
managers in connecting universities and industries? Unsurprisingly, these 
questions have also been widely discussed in the academic field of research 
policy. Here I explore the arguments that emerge in these discussions about the 
significance of university-industry interaction, research collaboration and 
research management. As we will see, certain ways of presenting these arguments 
recur, each of which rely on particular metaphors and assumptions concerning 
the domains of science and industry. I proceed to discuss some prevalent ways of 
presenting university-industry interaction in research policy literature including 
The Triple Helix model (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1996) and Mode 2 research 
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001). I use this initial investigation as a 
starting point for developing a conceptual framework drawing on analytical 
resources from STS. 
 
Bridging gaps and breaking barriers 
Perhaps the most prevalent way of presenting university-industry interaction is 
by using the metaphor of a ‘gap’. This metaphor is widely used in policy talk and 
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documents.27 It is also widespread in academic studies that look at research 
collaboration and science-industry interaction in the context of research policy 
(Jones-Evans et al. 1999; Luna and Velasco 2003; Sapsed et al. 2007; Kotha et al. 
2013; Garud et al. 2013). A recent example is “Bridging the mutual knowledge 
gap: Coordination and the commercialization of university science” (Kotha et al. 
2013). In this paper, Reddi Kotha et al. look at gaps that hinder effective 
commercialization of university research. They argue that there are several 
knowledge gaps worth considering when studying processes of 
commercialization. First, there is a ‘gap’ between the involved research 
disciplines that constitute “inventor teams” (ibid. 499). In these teams, there 
might be different “science distances” (bid. 506) between the involved 
researchers. Such distances can be shorter or wider, depending on which 
disciplines are involved and whether they share methods and theories. Second, 
the authors argue that there is a gap between university research and users 
involved in commercialization, corresponding to a gap between “inventor teams” 
and “licensee teams” (ibid. 517). In this case, rather than a disciplinary difference, 
the difference between participants with or without know-how of 
commercialization constitutes the ‘gap’. 
Both kinds of knowledge gap cause “coordination problems” (ibid. 500). In order 
to collaborate effectively, the participants need to align and coordinate their 
different forms of knowledge. As participants collaborate based on different 
backgrounds, collaboration, according to the authors, invariably has certain 
“costs” (ibid.). Thus, they take an interest in what might reduce these 
collaboration costs. They conclude that the smaller the “science distance” among 
the collaborators the lower the costs of collaborating. They also claim that “prior 
                                               
27 See the Danish “Innovation Strategy” (Regeringen 2012) and the European research 
framework “Horizon 2020”.  
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collaboration experience” both related to interdisciplinary collaboration and to 
commercialization also effectively reduce collaboration problems (ibid. 505). 
As the title of Kotha et al.’s paper illustrates, the terminology of gaps is closely 
related to language of ‘bridges’. Usually, the expression ‘bridging a gap’ implies 
overcoming a difference, especially an unfortunate one. In Kotha et al. this 
difference is seen as both a disciplinary difference and a difference between 
inventors and users of research. However, both in policy and in research policy 
studies, the idea of ‘bridging a gap’ is also often used to describe interaction 
between the different domains of science and society. An example of using this 
terminology to describe interaction between scientists and non-scientists is found 
in Garud et al.’s “Boundaries, breaches, and bridges: The case of Climategate” 
(Garud et al. 2013). In this study, the authors focus on the boundaries of scientific 
enterprise in relation to a case in which climate scientists’ work was illegitimately 
posted on the Internet. The authors develop the notion of “boundary bridging 
work” to describe “efforts required by scientists to connect with downstream 
stakeholders, especially when the science/non-science boundary has been 
breached” (ibid.).28 I return to the notion of the notion of “boundary work” (Star 
and Griesemer 1989; Gieryn 1999). Here, I simply pause to note that the idea of 
‘bridging a gap’ is a prevalent way of framing studies of university-industry 
interaction. 
Investigating ‘barriers’ that hinder university-industry interaction is another 
widespread way of presenting research in this field. Johan Bruneel et al.’s paper 
“Investigating the factors that diminish the barriers to university-industry 
collaboration” (Bruneel et al. 2010) offers an illustration. These authors argue, 
“although the literature on university-industry links has begun to uncover the 
                                               
28 Forthcoming paper in Research Policy 2013. 
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reasons for, and types of, collaboration between universities and businesses, it 
offers relatively little explanation of ways to reduce the barriers to these 
collaborations” (ibid. 858 my italics). Hence, they propose to “unpack the nature 
of the obstacles to collaboration between universities and industries” (ibid. my 
italics). In particular, they suggest that there are two different types of barriers: 
“orientation-related barriers” related to the specific interests of the involved 
university and industry representatives in the collaboration, and “transaction-
related barriers” (ibid.) related to conflicts over immaterial property (IP) and 
university administration. Consequently, the authors identify different factors 
that reduce these various barriers (ibid. 860). They find three main mechanisms 
that diminish them: “experience of collaboration”, “breadth of interaction 
channels”, and “inter-organizational trust” (ibid.). 
It is interesting that although the notions of ‘bridges’ and ‘barriers’ often appear 
in studies that describe university-industry interaction in quite concrete terms 
using notions such as ‘cost’, ‘distance’ and ‘transaction’, their conclusions suggest 
something much more intangible. Kotha et al. and Bruneel et al., for instance, both 
conclude that ‘experience’ and ‘trust’ reduce ‘distance’ and ‘costs’, which seems 
like quite abstract answers to offer to quite specific questions (Kotha et al. 2013: 
509-510; Bruneel et al. 2010: 860-861). For one thing, it raises questions about 
the specific, empirical relation between collaboration ‘cost’ and ‘trust’ in the cases 
under discussion. More generally, it illustrates the difficulty of pinpointing 
precisely what are the mechanisms of university-industry interaction. 
I would further point to another interesting tendency and tension: although the 
terms of gaps and barriers present university and industry as distinct domains, 
they imply remarkably different notions of how these domains are separated. 
According to a dictionary definition, a gap is “a break or hole in an object or 
between two objects, an unfilled space or interval” and “a break in continuity, a 
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difference, especially an undesirable one, between two views or situations”.29 In 
comparison, a bridge is “a structure carrying a road, path, railroad, or canal across 
a river, ravine, road, railroad, or other obstacle”.30 Set side by side, the idea of 
‘bridging a gap’ suggests that the domains of university and industry are 
disconnected and that it is the disconnection that is undesirable. Accordingly, a 
bridge is constructed to allow traffic from one side of the bridge to the other. But 
the bridge is a construction and does not become an integrated part of either of 
the two domains. 
In contrast, a barrier is, again by dictionary definition, “a fence or other obstacle 
that prevents movement or access”.31 Here we do not have an unfilled space 
between two objects but rather a situation of adjacent objects separated by 
something like a wall that can be removed to allow interaction. Although the 
metaphors of bridges and barriers are not proposed as coherent theories or 
models, they significantly influence the kind of research questions that are 
pursued in the literature on university-industry interaction. In particular, many 
research policy studies develop questions based on a framework of separated 
domains, which lead them to address the misalignment or disconnection between 
these domains by investigating factors and mechanisms that make interaction 
smooth and effective. If barriers and gaps were not taken for granted, research 
questions would have to be posed differently. If the starting point were not 
separate domains research question would not automatically address activities 
that connect and align. Rather they would have to ask more broadly, who or what 
interacts and in what ways? 
 
                                               
29 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
30 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
31 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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Finding the right partners and means of interaction 
Yet another prevalent way of presenting university-industry interaction is related 
to identifying an ideal match of universities and companies, or some optimal 
means of interaction. For instance, in “Finding the right partners: Institutional and 
personal modes of governance of university-industry relations” (Freitas et al. 
2013) Isabel Maria Bodas Freitas et al. investigate different ways of approaching 
university-industry interaction, which they refer to as distinct “governance 
modes” (ibid. 51). The authors focus particularly on the effectiveness of different 
ways of governing university-industry relations. They suggest that there are two 
general modes of governance. First, an “institutional mode of governance” in 
which interaction is mediated by the administrative structures at the university 
such as technology transfer offices. Second, a “personal contractual mode of 
governance” in which interaction involves formal and binding contractual 
agreements between companies and academics researchers without the direct 
involvement of a university. The authors argue that, often, the personal 
contractual mode is overlooked in the literature on university-industry 
interaction, resulting in a too strong focus on the role of technology transfer 
offices. They advocate more detailed investigation of other governance forms, and 
they argue that the right choice of governance model depends on a number of 
factors, including, the size of a company and its tendency to adapt to “an open 
approach to technology and innovation development” (ibid. 60). Accordingly, they 
find that “personal modes” are more effective than “institutional modes” for 
making the best arrangements with external research partners (ibid.). As the title 
“Finding the right partners,” indicates, the authors also believe that there is such a 
thing as ‘a right partner’ that can be identified in advance of collaboration. 
Successfully identifying this partner is primarily a matter of choosing the correct 
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governance model and acknowledging that personal relationships are sometimes 
more effective than institutional governance. 
Other studies are more concerned with finding the best means of interaction, 
often referred to as channels. As an example of this type of study, consider Claudia 
De Fuentes et al. “Best channels of academia-industry interaction for long-term 
benefit” (Fuentes and Dutrénit 2012). According to theses authors, university-
industry connections can be conceptualized as a three-stage process relating to 
“drivers of interaction”, “channels of interaction” and “perceived benefits of 
collaboration”. They proposes a process where successful interaction initially 
depends on the collaborators’ motivation to collaboration, subsequently on how 
their interaction is mediated, and finally on how they benefit from collaborating 
(ibid. 1669). 
These authors further argue that there is a particular pattern between initial 
motivation, interaction channels and benefits: “different drivers to collaborate 
determine specific types of knowledge flows through certain channels, and these 
channels also have an impact on the specific benefits that agents perceive from 
interaction” (ibid.). Accordingly, the authors define best channels as the means 
that give companies long-term benefits of interacting with public research 
institutions. Interpreted this way, they argue that there are generally speaking 
three kinds of best channels: joint or contract R&D, intellectual property rights 
(IPR), and human resources. Rather than interpreting channels in a narrow sense 
as means of communication, the authors consider the overall definition of joint 
projects, IPR and the engagement of people with different backgrounds as the 
most promising ways of ensuring long-term results. As in previous examples, we 
find an interesting relation between the research questions in this study and the 
findings. While the title “Best channels of academic-industry interaction for long-
term benefit” produces the expectation of being presented with very specific and 
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concrete mechanisms, the authors find that the best channels are in fact 
composed by a number of things. These include defining a joint project, 
developing intellectual property rights and experience, which are activities that 
together seem to cover practically all forms of interaction rather than point to one 
optimal channel. 
Studying the governance models that lead to finding optimal collaboration 
partners and exploring the best channels of interaction for long-term results 
illustrate a similar concern for optimizing strategies and forms of organizing 
university-industry interaction. This concern entails an interesting embedded 
assumption about collaboration. The purpose, drivers and expected outcome of 
collaboration are assumed, at least to some extent, to be known in advance of its 
initiation. From this follows the idea that optimizing is possible according to a 
predefined (stable) purpose and expected outcome. As a consequence, we also 
find a strong focus on the organization of university-industry interaction that in 
various ways support the interaction. Shahid Yusuf’s study “Intermediating 
knowledge exchange between universities and businesses” (Yusuf 2008) 
illustrates this concern for supporting organizations. Yusuf argues that “achieving 
effective knowledge exchange requires the midwifery of different kinds of 
intermediaries often working in concert” (ibid. 1167) and he identifies four types 
of intermediaries: “the general purpose intermediary”, which is the research 
institution, “the specialized intermediary” exemplified by the university 
technology licensing office (TLO), “the financial intermediary” for instance, a 
venture capitalist and, finally, “the institutional intermediary” often a public 
agency (ibid. 1170). Using this typology, the author argues that the different 
intermediating parties play different, sometimes overlapping, roles, but together 
they aim to make the knowledge exchange smooth and effective. One might notice 
the distinction in studies such as this between the main parties involved in 
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collaboration, referred to in general terms as universities and businesses, and 
parties that act to merely support the main interaction. To talk about 
intermediary organizations as separate from the main parties requires certain 
assumptions about research activities as being quite separate from administrative 
and funding activates. This involves an implicit categorization of research, to 
which I will now attend. 
 
Pasteur scientists and Mode 2 activities 
According to research policy studies university-industry interactions thus come in 
multiple different forms. Such studies thus generally offer various ways of 
categorizing these forms and types. For an example, consider the article “How do 
collaborations with universities affect firms’ innovative performance? The role of 
“Pasteur scientists” in the advanced materials field” (Baba et al. 2009). Here, 
Yasunori Baba et al. draw on Donald Stokes’ categorization of research with 
different drives (see Chapter 8). Drawing on Stokes’ model of Pasteur’s quadrants, 
Baba et al. define two different researcher types, arguing that “Pasteur scientists” 
are people “who never lose sight of the desire to advance scientific understanding, 
but whose research has potential real-world utility” (ibid. 757). In comparison, 
they define “star scientists” as “scientists who conduct pure basic research, 
oriented to the scientific discovery, having little interest in the potential uses of 
the research findings for the real world (such as Niels Bohr)” (ibid.). 
Based on this classification, the authors explore the roles that researchers with 
different experiences typically play in collaborations and they examine how 
researchers’ experiences affect the innovative performance of the companies they 
collaborate with. They conclude that ““Pasteur scientists” increase firms’ R&D 
productivity, measured as number of registered patents”, whereas “star 
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scientists” exert little effect on their [companies’] innovative output” (ibid. 756). 
The endeavor to distinguish between different types of researchers rather than 
different research practices has some particular effects. In particular, we can 
observe a shift from considering orientations at an overall level to characterizing 
the behavior of individuals with the purpose of evaluating their effect on 
industrial innovation. This focus requires the stabilization of a number of factors 
related to both research collaboration and industrial innovation. For example, it 
requires stabilizing the type of researcher and the impact that one researcher has 
on an innovation process. In the particular case of Baba et al., it also requires the 
assumption that patents can be seen isolated as illustrations of innovation. Using 
Stokes’ model to discuss different research activities rather than researcher types, 
however, suggests that the same researcher might in fact be involved in various 
practices, which would not lead to a uniform set of researcher behaviors. 
For another example of the endeavor to classify researcher types, we can consult 
Carole Estabrooks et al.’s “Knowledge translation and research careers: Mode l 
and Mode ll activity among health researchers” (Estabrooks et al. 2008). This 
paper draws on the conceptual framework of Mode 2 research, introduced by 
Michael Gibbons, Helga Nowotny et al., in order to characterize the activities of 
individual researchers. I return to a more detailed discussion of the Mode 2 
framework below. Here I note that the authors put particular emphasis on 
characterizing the individual researcher by distinguishing between “applied 
researchers” and “basic researchers”, which they render equivalent to Mode 2 and 
Mode 1 knowledge production (Estabrooks et al. 2008: 1066). Using this 
terminology, the authors compare the general characteristics of health 
researchers with the specific “knowledge translation activities” of these 
researchers. They propose, for instance, that ‘applied researchers’ who engage in 
more ‘Mode 2 activities’ also report more impact of their work and “higher 
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relational capital” than basic researchers (ibid.). The authors then use these 
findings to discuss potential tensions between Mode 1 and Mode 2 activities, 
proposing that Mode 2 might take place at the cost of promotion, tenure, grants 
and awards. 
Other analyses are premised not on the introduction of novel schemes of 
classification but on more traditional categories. Thus, Markus Perkmann et al.’s 
“Engaging excellence? Effects of faculty quality on university engagement with 
industry” (Perkmann et al. 2011) offers the notion of ‘excellence’ as significant of 
classic university research and proceeds to explore how excellent research 
engages with industry. Accordingly, the emphasis is on how the quality of 
university research shapes engagements with industry. They ask, for instance, 
whether it is always the case that there is a positive relationship between the 
research quality produced by individual academics and the subsequent 
commercialization of that research. They also insist that the relationship between 
research quality and commercial activity varies from discipline to discipline: in 
technology oriented disciplines such as the medical and biological sciences 
faculty, quality is positively related to industrial involvement, whereas in the 
social sciences they find this not to be the case (ibid. 756). 
This study thus illustrates a concern with links between excellent basic research 
and industrial innovation based on the idea that basic research and industrial 
innovation constitute two extremes in a linear spectrum akin to the one we have 
previously encountered in the context of Danish policy. Because of the imagined 
distance between these extremes, the idea of connecting them again becomes a 
matter of concern. Again, we encounter an idea of a ‘gap’ and a notion of 
‘disciplinary distance’ to be ‘bridged’. In this argument, however, the excellence of 
technology-oriented disciplines is more easily used or applied in industry than 
excellent research from social science. In other words, aside from the distinction 
   99 
 
between basic research and industrial innovation, it also introduces a 
classification of scientific disciplines according to how well their basic research 
activities match the demands of industry. 
While Perkmann et al. discuss the impact of scientific disciplines on industry, 
other studies address the interface between public and private research more 
directly. An example of this is Andrew Toole’s study “The impact of public basic 
research on industrial innovation: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry” 
(Toole 2012). Toole is concerned with the complex relationship between public 
research and pharmaceutical innovation and, in particular, with the relation 
between public clinical research and innovation of new molecular entities (NME). 
Toole argues that industries are often assumed to benefit from publicly supported 
university research. Based on his study of pharmaceutical industry, he questions 
whether this is the case. He argues that factors that are usually seen as external to 
research, such as market size and the regulatory structure imposed by for 
instance, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), play a much more 
significant role than the involvement of university research. This study suggests 
that public university research does not have direct impact on industrial 
innovation and it thus questions prevalent ideas about innovation as being merely 
a matter of a disconnection of public and private research spheres. Perhaps even 
more intriguingly, Toole discusses the broader context for university-industry 
interaction. Rather than focusing exclusively on universities, industries and their 
interactions, he concludes that the innovation of companies in the pharmaceutical 
industry is mainly affected by mundane and traditional factors such as market 
size. Thus, even if this analysis is based on a traditional separation of public and 
private activities, it ends up insisting on the need to take other factors into 
consideration. 
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The various studies of Pasteur scientists, Mode 2 activities, excellent research, and 
industrial innovation that I have examined exemplify different categorizations of 
research that structure the analysis of university-industry interaction within the 
field of research policy studies. According to Perkmann et al. we are presently 
witness to a strong focus on the researcher as an individual, which has opened up 
for new insights in what drives collaboration. In “Academic engagement and 
commercialization: A review of the literature on university–industry relations” 
(Perkmann et al. 2013), Perkmann et al. first note the increasing prevalence of 
studies focusing on academic scientists’ involvement in research collaboration. As 
they argue, academic researchers are involved in various forms of collaboration, 
including “collaborative research, contract research, consulting and informal 
relationships for university-industry knowledge transfer” (ibid. 423). 
Subsequently, the authors argue that these activities should be seen as “academic 
engagements” rather than “commercialization” activities. These “academic 
engagements” they argue are not in contrast to traditional academic activities but 
rather “closely aligned” with them and “pursued by academics to access resources 
supporting their research agendas” (ibid.). So we see here a form categorization of 
research and researchers that potentially questions the relevance of initiating 
analysis of university-industry interaction based on only considering the 
alignment of fundamentally misaligned interests and activities. Instead, they 
suggest that individual researchers are already engaging in diverse activities with 
companies without compromising their own research agenda. Thus, although 
many prevalent categorizations of research support the idea of universities and 
industries as separate domains, there are also categorizations, such as academic 
engagements, that seem to allow for a different perspective on interaction. 
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A stable image of interaction 
So what characterizes some of these prevalent ways of presenting and studying 
university-industry interaction? First, I have identified a recurrent tendency to 
analyze university-industry interaction in terms of ‘bridging gaps’ and ‘breaking 
barriers’. Although gaps and barriers take on different meanings in the literature, 
both terms assume that university and industry operate as distinct domains, 
either separated by a space or by an obstacle. Consequently, using these 
metaphors generates studies of the multitude of mechanisms, organizations and 
strategies that might be imagined to connect these severed domains. 
Second, I have observed a widely shared interest in what we might call 
optimization, focused on how to make the best and most effective use of 
university-industry interaction, for instance, in the form of industrial innovation. 
As we have seen, authors suggest that interaction can be improved through focus 
on diverse forms of governance, means of collaborating and communicating, and 
support mechanisms in the form of intermediary organizations. Finally, I have 
commented on both traditional and novel ways of classifying research and 
researchers. Among the traditional categorization schemes, we find those that 
juxtapose excellent research and industrial innovation. Newer schemes separate 
Star scientist from Pasteur scientists or Mode 1 from Mode 2 activities. Like the 
metaphors of gaps and barriers these categorizations of research have 
implications for how university-industry interaction is approached. Rather than 
investigate categorizations as they develop in practice, drawing on theoretical 
models these categorizations are applied to explore particular assumed forms of 
behavior and activities among researchers. 
Considering these findings together, which kind of image do we get of university-
industry interaction, the nature of research management, research collaboration, 
and different forms of research? I suggest we get an image of relatively stable 
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interaction, which is a contradiction in terms. Certain institutions such as 
universities and companies appear as figures of stability and endurance. Even 
when we begin exploring interaction between these institutions, we get the 
impression that the institutions remain relatively unaffected of this. Largely, they 
continue to have the same characteristics that make them readily recognizable as 
companies and universities. Thus, universities remain focused on scientific 
quality and publications, and companies on markets and commercial outcomes. 
We will continue to easily identify a university and a company regardless of its 
new collaborations and relations. The widespread notion of alignment illustrates 
this, as it presumes that arranging universities and industries on a straight line 
can be done without changing their internal components or considering their 
possible transformations. In this sense, the image of university and industry stays 
rather two-dimensional. It is this image I aim to complicate through my empirical 
studies. 
But what are the available alternatives to this image? One model that has been 
highly influential is the model of the Triple Helix of university-industry-
government relations that investigates university-industry interaction in what 
seems to be more dynamic and fluid terms. In the next section, I look more closely 
at this alternative and its assumptions. 
 
The dynamics of interaction: The Triple Helix  
For almost two decades, the Triple Helix of university-industry-government 
relations has been a prevalent model for analyzing university-industry interaction 
in a societal context. It was introduced in 1996 by the sociologists Loet 
Leydesdorff and Henry Etzkowitz in “Emergence of a Triple Helix of university-
industry-governance relations” (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1996). Today, the 
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Triple Helix model has its own research field with associated discussions, 
institutes and conferences.32 Here I examine what characterizes this analytical 
model and what kind of research has it generated. 
The model takes visual inspiration from the image of triple stranded DNA, 
characterized by a repeated structure in which three oligonucleotides wind 
around each other to form a triple helix. Adopting this idea, Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff want to show that university, industry and government are 
interrelated rather than separate worlds. Furthermore, they use this metaphor to 
argue that not only are university, industry and government interrelated; they 
become related in a dynamic process. In this view, the world is thus changeable 
and neither science nor society has any absolutely fixed characteristics. The 
Triple Helix model is sophisticated, not only because it enables a direct and clear 
identification of policy as a component in innovation, which is often more 
indirectly present in the above-mentioned studies. It also facilitates a rather fluid 
and dynamic idea of interaction. As Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff write: “In contrast 
to a double helix (or a co-evolution of two dynamics), a Triple Helix is not 
expected to be stable” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 112). Hence, innovation 
depends on continuous hybridization of university, industry and government 
elements, which suggests something quite different than the metaphors of ‘gaps’ 
and ‘bridges’. Let us therefore look more closely at the premises of this model. 
First, the Triple Helix model assumes that the university plays a key role in 
innovation in the knowledge society. By emphasizing the role of the university, 
the authors challenge traditional models of innovation that consider either 
                                               
32 See www.triplehelixassociation.org and the Triple Helix International Conference at 
tha2013.org. 
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industry or the state as the main drivers of innovation processes33 (ibid. 109). 
Today, proponents of the Triple Helix suggest that the potential for innovation 
and societal, economic development lies in a more (rather than less) prominent 
role for the university. This idea sometimes referred to as the emergence of ‘the 
entrepreneurial university’ “envisions an academic structure and function that is 
revised through the alignment of economic development with research and 
teaching as academic missions” (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 314, my italics). Rather 
than radically changing its fundamental tasks and purposes, the entrepreneurial 
university embraces a third mission by contributing directly to developing the 
national economy. The university does this by both providing human capital in 
the form of educated researchers and by acting as an incubator for new firms 
(Ibid. 315). The Triple Helix thus opens for a rather fundamental reconsideration 
of the role of the university that used to be seen as more isolated from society. 
Hence, the kinds of questions that take on urgency include whether academia can 
“encompass a third mission of economic development in addition to research and 
teaching?” and how “each of these various tasks” can “contribute to the mission of 
the university?” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 110). 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s ambition in advocating the Triple Helix model goes 
considerably beyond an academic clarification. Indeed, they want to use the 
model to stimulate a number of important policy discussions. As they argue, the 
Triple Helix is useful for studying how “different possible resolutions of the 
relations among the institutional spheres of university, industry and government 
can help to generate alternative strategies for economic growth and social 
transformation” (ibid.). To clarify this claim, the authors discuss different 
                                               
33 Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff contrast their theory to models such as “the national system of 
innovation” (NSI) that privileges companies and the “triangle model” that privileges the state in 
innovation processes (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 109). 
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generations of the Triple Helix model, both historically and across nations. They 
suggest that one might identify a Triple Helix l model at the time when the State 
was in charge and directed the relations between academia and industry. They 
associate this model with the former Soviet Union and socialist Eastern European 
countries. In contrast, strong institutional borders that separated universities 
from both industry and government characterized a Triple Helix ll model. This 
version, they suggest, can be identified in public policy debates, for instance, in 
Sweden in the Research 2000 Report, which recommended that universities 
should withdraw from direct contributions to industry (ibid. 109-110). Finally, 
they argue for a Triple helix lll model in which there are overlaps between the 
three institutions, where they even have shifting roles and where hybrid 
organizations emerge at the interfaces between them (ibid.). Thus the Triple Helix 
model is potentially useful for addressing quite different situations of interaction. 
The Triple Helix model has generated a broad range of research concerned with 
different issues, contexts and using diverse research method, mainly quantitative 
survey studies but also qualitative research. Within this tradition, we find studies 
of science policy, industrial innovation, and university norms alongside meta-
studies concerned with the validation of the Triple Helix model itself. In spite of 
this variety, the application of the model is noticeable for its comparative use. For 
instance, we find a large number of studies that investigate the status of Triple 
Helix interaction in different nations. Casas et al.’s study “The building of 
knowledge spaces in Mexico: a regional approach to networking” (Casas et al. 
2000: 225-241) and Judith Sutz’s “The university-industry-government relations 
in Latin America (Sutz 2000: 279-290) exemplify such comparative use. In other 
studies, comparison has led to reflections on the usefulness of the model when 
transported from its origin in developed countries to developing countries. 
However, in many instances the model is applied more or less directly, which 
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seems to generate less interesting studies than the ones that reflect on implication 
of the model itself. 
Aside from national comparisons, other studies investigate innovation within 
different industries. Examples of these are Michael Nowak and Charles Grantham 
study “The virtual incubator: managing human capital in the software industry” 
(Nowak et. al. 2000) and Susanne Giesecke’s study “The contrasting roles of 
government in the development of biotechnology industry in the US and 
Germany” (Giesecke 2000). In these two cases, the authors focus on the specificity 
of a particular industry and how it affects the overall dynamic of Triple Helix 
interaction. Like studies that apply the model to compare the status of interaction 
in nations, these studies of interaction within different industries mainly operate 
at a macro-level of analysis. It seems that the potential of the model to describe 
interaction in fluid terms is challenged when the model is more or less applied in 
these macro studies. The categories of university, industry and government are 
used to identify the interacting parties rather than more openly analyze the nature 
of the interaction. The result is a somewhat stable impression of what 
collaboration and interrelatedness implies. 
In addition to these empirical studies, the Triple Helix model has given rise to an 
ongoing discussion about the extent to which it facilitates a deeper and more 
complex understanding of the dynamics of university-industry-government 
relations. In this vein, Etzkowitz et al. propose that the model opens up for 
exploring the “sub-processes” of university-industry-government interaction 
(Etzkowitz et al. 2000). They point attention to four such sub-processes: first, the 
“internal transformation in each of the helices” that covers studies of how 
companies work together or how universities develop missions within their own 
institutional borders (ibid. 315). Second, the “influence of one institutional sphere 
upon another in bringing about transformation” including studies of the way the 
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revision of rules and regulation by governments affects researchers and 
institutions (ibid.). Third, “the creation of a new overlay of trilateral linkages, 
networks and organizations among the three helices”, that have the purpose of 
serving to maintain the interface and also to stimulate creativity (ibid.). Finally, 
the authors point to “the recursive effect of these inter-institutional networks 
representing academia, industry and government on their originating spheres and 
the larger society” (ibid.). In this way, the Triple Helix model continues to 
generate investigations that both explore something new (a sub process) and 
draw on the original framework of the Triple Helix. 
Although the Triple Helix model has provided important and interesting studies 
of the dynamics of university-industry-government relations, it also takes certain 
institutional categories for granted. To some extent, this has to do with the 
metaphor of a triple helix and the image of three strings entwined in a structure. 
This image is important for illustrating the interrelatedness of universities, 
companies and government, both as an empirical focus and a theoretical concern. 
However, while describing a relationship, this image also provides an idea of 
three clearly distinct strings that are related in the same way in the same 
repeated distance and structure. It offers a picture of complex yet also quite 
determinate components and relations. This conceptualization raises certain 
empirical and methodological questions. Are we meant to assume that the three 
helices or institutions are always present in the same way and to the same degree? 
Are the institutions always identically entwined? It seems clear that the Triple 
Helix must be understood in rather loose terms in other to assist studies of 
dynamic and fluid relations. When understood and used in a too literal sense the 
dynamics it describes becomes less clear. While it highlights the flexible and 
complex relations between university, government and industry it provides less 
help in terms of pinpointing the specific qualities of their changing relations. 
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Shortly after the emergence of the Triple Helix, however, another model 
appeared, which has gained prominence and which seems to provide a slightly 
more nuanced framework for dealing with these issues. Thus, I continue to 
consider the framework of Mode 2 or ‘the new production of knowledge’ as it is 
also called. This framework is developed by Michael Gibbons et al. in The New 
Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary 
Societies (Gibbons et al. 1994) and by Helga Nowotny et al. in Re-Thinking Science. 
Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (Nowotny et al. 2001). Rather 
than look at university-industry-government relations specifically, this model 
considers the relationship between science and society more broadly. Like the 
Triple Helix, the Mode 2 model argues that the institution of science is presently 
undergoing rapid change and that it is strongly affected by a variety of societal 
agendas. Considering the extent to which national and European research 
strategies emphasize, for instance, research as “societal partnerships” 
(Regeringen 2012) this, to say the least, seems to be a relevant perspective today. 
So what are the elements of this model? 
 
Science and society in partnership 
In The New production of Knowledge, Gibbons et al. argued that we have 
experienced a shift in the way knowledge is produced and a changing relationship 
between science and society (Gibbons et al. 1994). Nowotny et al. further 
developed the framework in 2001 with the book Re-thinking Science. Knowledge 
and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (Nowotny et al. 2001). Like Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, Gibbons and Nowotny et al. propose an open dynamic framework for 
re-thinking science and its relation to society; one that differs from previous 
sociological models in which science and society are seen as separate domains 
(Merton 1973). However, rather than arguing that previous models were wrong, 
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the authors argue that today we are witness to a change in science-society 
relations so that the Mertonian model requires adaptation. 
The Mode 2 framework is characterized by much closer interactions between 
science and society than those previous generations of sociologists of science 
encountered. Specifically, in Mode 2 science has become “context-sensitive” and 
even started to merge with society (Nowotny et al. 2001). Consequently, we are 
also witness to a new form of society, referred to as Mode 2 society that has 
started to “speak back” to science (ibid.). In a gestalt switch, society has become 
an agent influencing science, rather than a stable background supporting it. It is 
readily apparent that this framework differs radically from some of the studies 
previously discussed that look at universities and industry as separate domains 
connected mainly by ‘bridges’ (Kotha et al. 2013; Bruneel et al. 2010; Freitas et al. 
2013; Yusuf 2008). For Gibbons and Nowotny et al., the relevant change that is 
occurring between science and society concerns not only the ‘bridge’ between 
science and society but also the very constitution of science and society. Science 
and society are equally affected and transformed by their mutual interactions. 
Gibbons and Nowotny et al. argue that the context-sensitivity of science is a 
strength rather than a weakness. For example, today, good science is not only 
evaluated by standards only developed within science but also defined by societal 
interests, needs and practices. We might see the idea of research based on 
demand-driven innovation as illustrating context-sensitivity. 
The Mode 2 model has been widely adopted, both in academic discussions and 
among policy makers. For instance, today, it is widely assumed among policy 
makers that we need to know how knowledge is produced before we can 
distribute public funds optimally. One might even see this framework as self-
exemplifying, developing at the intersection of academic discussion and policy 
making, since one of its main developers, Helga Nowotny, is both president of the 
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European Research Council and Professor emeritus of Social Studies of Science, 
ETH Zurich. However, as we see in Danish research policy (see Chapter 8), more 
linear models also constantly challenge this dynamic framework. It seems that 
while the overall public research strategies draw on Mode 2 thinking,34 the 
specific organization of public funds turn to more linear models. This suggests 
that while it is easy to account for science and society relations at an overall 
strategic level, it is much harder to organize and manage according to them. 
 
Asymmetrical descriptions of science and society 
Although the Mode 2 framework has been widely adopted in research policy, it 
has also been criticized. One important criticism comes from the anthropologist 
Marilyn Strathern whose article “Re-describing Society” discusses the 
implications of the metaphor of a “partnership” between science and society 
(Strathern 2003a). Strathern suggests that while the Mode 2 model generally 
argues against a separation of science and society, the metaphors of “co-
evolution” and “co-mingling” that it draws on nonetheless implies just such a 
separation. After all, the pre-fix “co-” means ‘jointly’, ‘mutually’ or ‘together with 
another’. Even if this terminology is used to describe closely intermingled, even 
potentially merging, relations it also continues to maintain an image of two 
components. Consequently, “every attempt to show how science and society are 
implicated in one another also renews each as distinct objects” (ibid. 268). In the 
framework of Mode 2, science and society appears as each other’s rhetorical 
reference point, which according to Strathern has problematic analytical 
consequences: society is consequently always constituted in relation to science 
                                               
34 See the Danish “Innovation Strategy” (Regeringen 2012) and the European research 
framework program “Horizon 2020”. 
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and never considered on its own terms. Strathern does not argue for a separation 
of domains but rather for a more flexible approach what science and society 
might mean. The fact that the idea of separate domains continues to haunt the 
Mode 2 framework becomes clearer when we consider that the notion of a 
partnership. According to Strathern, the notion of a partnership is closely related 
to the idea of a ‘transaction space’ between science and society. 
Nowotny et al. borrow the idea of “transaction” from the historian of science Peter 
Galison whose notion of the trading zone (itself adopted from an anthropological 
literature) illustrates how scientists representing “different cultures” work 
together (Galison 1997). Later in this chapter, I discuss the notion of the trading 
zone. Nowotny et al. uses the notion of a transaction space to argue that when 
interacting, science and society might have different interests: “each targets what 
it wants” (Strathern 2003a: 268). However, Strathern suggests, even though the 
Mode 2 model sees science and society as having potentially different interests, 
the very idea that they have entered a transaction space creates the expectation 
that they are nonetheless part of a mutual communication. In this way, Strathern 
argues that the Mode 2 framework entails not only a normatively imposed 
necessity of interaction but also a drive towards consensus: “The epistemology can 
be varied, but communication has to take place” (ibid.). Again, as we have seen 
before, interaction implies some kind of alignment because science and society 
“appear to be consonant with one another” (ibid. 274-275). What alternative does 
Strathern propose? 
According to Strathern, we do not need to imagine science and society as 
interacting partners. Drawing on ethnography from Papua New Guinea, she 
describes a controversy between a group of local miners and governmental 
representatives. In this situation, no appeal was made to a common language or to 
any necessary relationship between science and society. Science and society were 
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not named as distinct spheres and therefore there was no need to facilitate “co-
mingling”. Instead the miners and governmental representatives made what 
Strathern terms a settlement in which they each subscribed to an accountability 
that did not require agreement or consensus. Each side simply had its own 
agenda. Contrary to Nowotny et al.’s framework, the interacting parties in 
Strathern’s example did not see alignment as a basic condition of their interaction 
but wanted instead to make their lack of agreement explicit: “In short, they were 
ready to enter into a social arrangement on the basis of difference, not consensus.” 
(ibid. 272) 
Strathern’s critique of the Mode 2 framework is partly driven by the idea that any 
general categorization of the components of science-society interaction misses 
the point: it never becomes completely clear what constitutes it and what it 
produces. Even so, something akin to the notion of a ‘transaction space’ can be 
extremely relevant when used to explore particular cases. For instance, according 
to Strathern, the Papua New Guinean example illustrates a situation in which two 
groups enter a social arrangement on the basis of difference and not consensus 
and transacts based on that recognition. What can transact however, are not 
abstractions, like science or government, but rather specific people with particular 
problems, issues and agendas (Strathern 2003a: 272). In this way, Strathern 
argues for an analytical sensitivity to the contexts of transactions and for 
substantiating what Gibbons, Nowotny et al. abstractly call Mode 2. Below, I 
return to what such an empirically oriented framework might look like. 
The models of Triple Helix and Mode 2 describe dynamic relations between the 
institutions of universities, industries and governments and science and society. 
These models both highlight the complex and dynamic relationships between 
science, society and business. From the perspective of these models, we clearly 
see entangled relations rather than separated domains. According to the models 
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of Triple Helix and Mode 2 interaction is a condition rather than an achievement 
created by ‘bridging gaps’ or ‘breaking barriers’. The main question they raises 
therefore concern the qualities of the interaction. 
But as Strathern notes, the image of interaction remain rather harmonious. What 
if science, government and business continuously interact but without any 
premise of consensus? In fact, other models argue specifically for such more 
antagonistic forms of convergence and for the prevalence of asymmetrical 
relations. For instance, the sociologists Steven Peter Vallas and Daniel Lee 
Kleinman propose that the outcome of increasingly closer relations between 
universities and industries is what they term “asymmetrical convergence” 
(Kleinman and Vallas 2006: 37; Vallas and Kleinman 2008). They note that 
universities and companies are certainly converging as a result of increasingly 
tight collaborative relations and develop increasingly similar characteristics, 
practices and norms. Thus, universities become focused on commercial outcomes 
and companies become interested in basic knowledge production. But this 
convergence is somewhat imbalanced, they suggest. For by focusing on 
commercialization, the overall purpose of universities is, in fact, changing while 
industry only focuses on basic knowledge production as a means to maintain their 
overall purpose of commercialization. The authors conclude that this interaction 
often results in some kind of industrial domination, a possibility that neither the 
Triple Helix nor Mode 2 affords. 35 
 
                                               
35 In Denmark, the discussion of “imbalance” in university-industry collaboration has been 
prevalent in both academic and public debates (Emmeche and Faye 2010). See also Vedel and 
Gad 2011.  
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From interaction to co-production 
Until now, I have explored some of the prevalent ways in which university-
industry relations are conceptualized in academic literature related to research 
policy matters. As I have indicated, these studies open up for different 
perspectives on interaction between science, society and industry. But even so, 
we also see certain terminology, embedding particular metaphors and 
assumptions, shared by studies of university-industry relations. Implicitly or 
explicitly, university and industry are seen as separate domains that are somehow 
misaligned or disconnected. Accordingly, collaboration requires alignment and 
reconnection, which takes place as concern for ‘bridge building’. 
I have also identified a particular language of optimization. In order to collaborate, 
there are certain things that can and ought to be done such as finding an ideal 
partner or identifying the ideal means of communication. All of this presupposes 
that in advance of the actual interactions certain kinds of relations can be 
identified as particularly promising. In contrast, the perspective of optimization 
shows rather little attention to the actual dynamics of particular instances of 
university-industry interaction. There are, however, some models, such as the 
Triple Helix and Mode 2, which specifically address such dynamics. These models 
view the interrelations between universities, industry and government, and 
science and society, as an already existing condition. However, they imply rather 
harmonious relationships among the interrelating parties. Correspondingly, they 
are less adequate for analyzing the kinds of asymmetries such interrelations can 
imply, in the form of divergences in interests and agendas. As Strathern argues, it 
is therefore important to be empirically attentive to the different forms of 
interrelations that actually occur, and to their specific implications. Strathern 
develops what we might see as a ‘third’ position that involves neither separate 
domains nor harmonious consensus but approaches science-society interaction as 
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an empirical question. This approach implies describing actual empirical relations, 
as the title “Re-describing Society” indicates. 
Inspired by Strathern, I am interested in developing a framework suitable for 
studying strategic research in Lundbeck from such as third position. Rather than 
claiming to know in advance the general features of science-industry 
collaborations, I am interested in investigating them empirically. But although I 
insist on an empirical investigation this does not diminish my need for a 
conceptual framework to support, guide and focus my investigation. To develop 
this, I now look at how in the field of STS science-society interaction has also been 
conceptualized in terms of ‘co-production’ (Jasanoff 2004). First, I look at co-
production more generally and subsequently I discuss co-productionist concepts 
that have been developed specifically to analyze research collaboration. 
  
A co-production framework 
In discussions of science and policy, Sheila Jasanoff has introduced the concept of 
co-production to describe relations between science and society (Jasanoff 2004). 
One of the merits of co-production is that it offers an alternative to the analytical 
models surveyed above, which focus either on partnerships or maintaining a 
disconnection between science and industry. According to Jasanoff, “the dominant 
discourses of economics, sociology and political science lack vocabularies to make 
sense of the untidy, uneven processes through which the production of science 
and technology becomes entangled with social norms and hierarchies” (ibid. 2). 
Thus, co-production is premised on a critique of models that separate science 
from society, or the domain of “science, nature, facts, objectivity, reason, and 
policy” from the domain of “culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics” 
(ibid. 3). Co-production is in line with Strathern’s proposal to remain committed 
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to investigating and accounting for complex phenomena empirically, while 
avoiding the strategic deletions of particular contexts that facilitate a clear 
picture. 
In STS, analyses in the idiom of co-production have covered a number of themes 
that Jasanoff refers to as “the emergence of new phenomena” (Daston 2000; 
Pickering 1995: Latour 1993), “the resolution of controversy” (Richards and 
Martin 1995; Shapin and Shaffer 1985; Collins 1985), “the standardization of 
knowledge and technology” (Bowker and Star 1999; Jasanoff 1995; Shapin 1994; 
Porter 1992; Latour 1987; Kuhn 1962), and “the enculturation of scientific 
practices” (Knorr Cetina 1999; Rabinow 1996; Traweek 1988) (Jasanoff 2004: 5-
6). Viewing co-production as something of an umbrella approach rather than an 
integrated theoretical framework, I move on to consider a number of concepts 
each of which might be seen to exemplify co-production. All of these concepts 
have been developed to analyze research collaboration but, as we shall see, they 
engage in this task from different angles and with somewhat different results. 
One main question that has been asked in STS is what characterizes the 
boundaries of science (Galison and Stump 1996; Gieryn 1999). According to the 
sociology of science affiliated with Robert Merton (Merton 1973), the institution 
of science has a number of unique features, which make its norms and practices 
distinct from other social domains. Not least, Merton argued, the institution of 
science is characterized by the obligation to set aside private interest and address 
scientific questions in a disinterested manner (ibid.). This idea has been widely 
contested. For instance, the Belgian philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers has 
argued that far from being “dis-interested” scientists are linked through interest 
(Stengers 1997). New findings, technologies and hypotheses attract interest, 
while the very process of “becoming interested” can be life changing for scientists 
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required to rethink their theories, projects, methods and technologies (ibid. 83-
84). 
Among STS scholars, interest has also been a key notion in understanding how 
laboratory findings become scientific facts (Latour 1983; 1988). In Laboratory 
Life (Latour and Woolgar 1979), Latour and Woolgar showed how facts gain 
credibility and gradually become harder to contest as they are taken up in societal 
practices outside of laboratory. One famous example is Louis Pasteur’s invention 
of microbes that gradually was adopted for antibiotic vaccination across France 
(Latour 1988). Here, there is no strong boundary between the scientific lab and 
the outside world. Instead, the inside and the outside were, in Jasanoff’s term, co-
produced. The sociologist Thomas Gieryn summarizes this view with his 
observation that the boundaries of science are cultural and “permeable” (Gieryn 
1999: 27). 
If the boundaries between science and society are permeable and there are 
usually many interests at stake then how to understand the phenomenon of 
research collaboration? Several studies of scientific collaboration, which broadly 
align with the notion of co-production, have dealt specifically with the question of 
how scientists with different backgrounds and viewpoints work together and 
come to define shared objects of collaboration. I now look at some of these 
concepts that have been developed specifically to describe research collaboration. 
First I present them and then I comment on the relevance of these concepts for 
my case and research questions. 
  
Boundary objects 
Most famous among these concepts is Star and Griesemer’s notion of the 
boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989). Star and Griesemer defined their 
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interest in terms of the following dilemma: “Scientific work is heterogeneous, 
requiring many different actors and viewpoints. It also requires cooperation. The 
two create tension between divergent viewpoints and the need for generalized 
findings” (ibid. 387). Actors can manage this tension, they suggest, by 
collaborating via boundary objects (ibid.). Boundary objects are produced when 
actors (both scientists and non-scientists) work together to make representations 
of nature such as “specimens, field notes, museums and maps of particular 
territories” (ibid. 408). These objects have a boundary nature as they are at the 
same time “concrete and abstract, specific and general, conventionalized and 
customized” (ibid.). 
In practice, boundary objects mean that participants in a collaboration can agree 
on an “overall purpose” or idea, in Star and Griesemer’s case, the collection of 
animals in California and their delivery to the Zoological Museum. But for 
different social groups this overall purpose or idea may imply entirely different 
specific things. It might mean income for hunters and trappers, devoted hobby 
activities for others, and professional science for the curators. Because actors 
belong to different social worlds, boundary objects thus help to ensure that 
“shared goals are lined up in such a way that everybody has satisfying work to 
perform in each world” (ibid. 409 my italic). When collaborators work together 
via boundary objects they are thus enabled to have different relations to the 
objects that brought them together, yet this implies only a provisional alignment 
of goals. 
As we see, the notion of boundary objects addresses the question of how 
participants in a collaboration work together. It suggests that it is possible to have 
a temporary, local alignment without thinking in terms general alignment 
between domains. Boundary objects have relevance to my case as we might think 
of strategic research collaboration in terms of co-production via boundary 
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objects. Boundary objects propose something quite different from both ‘bridge 
building’ and Mode 2 interaction that, in different ways, propose alignment in 
general terms, either as an accomplishment or a condition. With boundary objects 
we can study specifically how participants in a collaboration connect despite the 
different backgrounds they have. 
The concept of boundary objects is excellent for exploring what comes to be 
shared among the parties. In contrast, the concept focuses less on how 
collaborations might develop from the gradual explication and elicitation of 
differences among the participants. As we shall see, however, such attentiveness 
to difference is important. For it is by no means always the case that the starting 
point for collaboration is radical difference to be gradually surmounted. In some 
situations, it is rather the case that collaborators are guided and shaped precisely 
by the elicitation, rather than erasure, of relevant differences. This leads to an 
interest in how we can study settlements without assuming the priority of 
alignment processes. While boundary objects offer an important framework for 
analyzing research collaboration it needs to be supplemented with other concepts 
that make it possible to address asymmetries and difference in collaboration. 
 
Doable problems 
In a series of analyses, the sociologist of science Joan Fujimura has looked closely 
at what producing a shared problem requires. The empirical focus of her early 
research was the crafting of cancer research, and in particular Fujimura argues 
that to craft science, researchers construct doable problems (Fujimura 1987; 
1996). The construction of a doable problem entails not just defining an 
interesting research question but solving a problem from beginning to end. This 
entails, for instance, defining a problem, receiving funding, making plans, doing 
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experiments, and potentially restating the problem. To characterize a problem as 
“doable” can thus not be done in advance of the research. Rather, as mentioned in 
Chapter 7, it is a socio-technical achievement than can only be evaluated post-hoc, 
that is, after the research has been done (Fujimura 1996). 
Fujimura centers her analytical attention on how scientists craft doable problems 
by articulating various work activities, gradually aligning them and rendering 
them increasingly doable. Articulation here means the “amorphous and 
ambiguous work of planning, organizing, monitoring, evaluating, adjusting, 
coordinating and integrating activities usually considered administrative rather 
than scientific (ibid. 11). In Fujimura’s study of oncogene research, for example, 
doable problems emerged as oncogene protocols involving various standards of 
methods and theory were adopted and recreated across laboratories. Gradually, a 
network solidified around oncogene research, involving “laboratories, funding 
agencies, materials and their suppliers, journals, and scientists working in and 
around oncogenes” (ibid.). Thus, ‘doability’ was not achieved inside the walls of 
the laboratory but rather in the process of stabilizing a larger network around the 
research. 
As already illustrated in Chapter 7, I find describing the processes of research 
collaboration in terms of constructing doable problems highly relevant. The 
concept focuses the attention on all the practical things that matter in order to 
make a collaboration work. Successful collaboration does not automatically 
develop from posing excellent research questions but involves continuous 
articulation work in order to become doable. In particular, the notion of doable 
problems addresses the question of how scientists collaborate together despite 
quite different backgrounds. Fujimura proposes that this is possible due to 
‘standardized packages’ of theory and methods. Consequently, the work that 
explicates differences among the participants automatically becomes more 
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invisible and uninteresting from the perspective of doable problems. Since I am 
developing an interest for the role of difference (as well as sameness) in 
collaboration, doable problems, too, needs supplementation with other concepts, 
which I introduce below. 
 
Trading zones 
As a final exemplification of what collaboration might entail in a co-production 
idiom, I turn to the historian of science Peter Galison who introduces the 
metaphor of the trading zone in his analysis of physicists’ collaborations (Galison 
1997). As mentioned, Galison’s trading zone is itself imported from 
anthropological studies of arenas where different cultures meet and exchange 
goods (ibid.). As one might recall, it is also the concept that inspired Nowotny et 
al. to develop their notion of a transaction space between Mode 2 science and 
society. Galison, however, develops the notion of trading zones in a quite different 
context, arguing that the extensive and difficult collaborations between sub-
disciplines of physics can be understood in terms of a trade. Like traders that 
arrive at a foreign city, scientists enter a trading zone in which they define local 
and highly specific “rules of exchange” that govern their interaction (ibid.). Similar 
to Star and Griesemer’s insistence on collaboration across heterogeneous 
practices, Galison writes that: “Two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if 
they ascribe utterly different significance to the objects being exchanged; they 
may even disagree on the meaning of the exchange process itself.” (ibid. 783). 
Like anthropological studies of creole languages, scientists can communicate by 
means of languages that they invent for the purpose of temporary collaboration. 
Although Galison paints a picture of collaboration as akin to the meeting of 
different cultures, he also insists that trading zones do not simply homogenize 
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differences. “Far from melting into a homogeneous entity”, he writes, “the 
different groups often maintain their distinctness, whether they are electrical 
engineers and mechanical engineers, or theorists and engineers, or theorists and 
experimenters” (ibid. 805-806). 
Galison’s trading zone concept is highly relevant for studying research 
collaboration, in particular for addressing the question of what collaboration 
requires. Where Fujimura’s answer to this question is ongoing articulation work 
and the development of standardized packages, Galison’s answer is trading zones 
constituted by rules of exchange and creole/pidgin languages. Although Galison 
looks at collaborations among academics, we might use his terminology for 
considering collaboration between academic and industrial participants more 
generally. However, transferring the concept to my material the metaphor of 
trade becomes less useful. Contrary to Galison’s case, actual trade is an element of 
the collaborations I study. In these collaborations, Lundbeck participates in a 
trade in the form of an exchange of money for research that is inscribed in 
contractual arrangements. However, even if actual trade is what takes place 
according to the contract, one might wonder about the “non-trade” aspects of the 
collaboration. In fact, one might hypothesize that if collaboration between 
industrial and academic researchers were only trade, based on clearly defined 
roles and accountabilities, it would not today be such a prevalent matter of 
concern. 
Again, like boundary objects and doable problems, trading zones are particularly 
relevant for addressing the question of what makes collaboration work despite 
the unlike participants it often involves. For that purpose, trading zones highlights 
how participants connect, not only by handling shared material objects but also at 
a discursive level. They develop common languages for addressing shared 
concerns. Again, the implication of posing a question that concerns the making of 
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connections in collaboration is that the notion of trading zones does not directly 
address the role of difference in collaboration. Differences between the 
collaborators are addressed indirectly and as the starting point of the analysis 
rather than as what collaboration produces in order to work. As already indicated 
I have a slightly different interest and want to consider collaboration as a form of 
co-production that might be constituted by both constructions of difference and 
sameness. I now explore how such an approach to co-production might look. 
 
Constructing alignment and misaligned co-production 
The concepts boundary objects, doable problems and trading zones are quite 
different and have emerged from somewhat different investigations. Thus, Star 
and Griesemer investigated collaboration between scientists and non-scientists in 
the context of a Zoological Museum; Galison explored collaboration between 
different kinds of physicists in large scientific experiments; and Fujimura studied 
collaboration between researchers with different backgrounds, theories and 
methods in cancer research. In spite of these different circumstances, all three 
concepts draw attention to how collaboration might take place in spite of 
differences between the participants. In each of the cases, collaboration takes 
some kind of alignment, even if it is only provisional and temporary. For instance, 
Fujimura specifically argues that “doability can be conceptualized as the 
alignment of the three levels of work organization: experiment, laboratory, and the 
social world” (Fujimura 1987: 261 original italic). 
This alignment, however, takes quite a different form from the one we have 
encountered in Danish research policy documents and previously described 
academic discussions of university-industry collaboration. For these STS scholars 
do not presume a general disconnection of the domains of science and society that 
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is preventing effective research. Rather, they argue that scientific practice is 
heterogeneous and, therefore, the fact that nonetheless researchers do collaborate 
is considered an interesting research problem. Against all odds, the participants 
somehow manage to collaborate; so how is this practically possible? Addressing 
this question, these scholars show how co-production takes place in terms of 
provisional alignment via boundary objects, doable problems and trading zones. 
Even if, within a co-productionist imaginary, this alignment is only a temporary 
construction, it is still worthwhile to look further into what is presumed by this 
mode of analysis concerning collaborative sameness and difference. In general, the 
starting point for all three concepts is that something needs to be done, whether it 
is constructing shared goals, common languages, standardized packages, or rules of 
exchange. Each of these terms directs the attention to construction of sameness 
rather than difference. Analyzing university-industry collaboration in terms of 
constructing trading zone entails focusing on how the collaborating parties 
connect by establishing a kind of mutual understanding through a shared 
language. Focusing on how such trading zones become constructed has the 
implication that differences between the participants become less distinct. The 
awareness of the analyst is on how alignment takes place. But perhaps, as 
Strathern suggests, some arrangements might be based on explicating and 
keeping in view these differences? 
Whereas the notions of boundary objects, trading zones and doable problems 
might see the construction of temporary homogeneity as the main driver of 
collaboration, I am interested in a conceptual framework that is also suitable for 
analyzing collaboration as a process of explicating difference. It seems possible to 
think of situations where the participants in a science-industry collaboration do 
not merge but rather develop relations based on differentiating constructions of 
their relation. I am wondering if it might not be relevant and useful to develop a 
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co-production framework that gives attention to both the construction of 
sameness and difference. Not predictable, stable or general differences between 
science and industry but subtle and ongoing differentiations that emerge and 
dissolve in the course of a collaboration. Might we even think of the doability of a 
research project as the result of explicating such differences? What kind of 
framework would make it possible to explore such explication? Drawing on 
Fujimura’s terminology, might we not expect to see articulation work related to 
developing differences? 
Thus drawing on Star and Griesemer, Fujimura, and Galison, I raise a slightly 
different question. Are there collaborations that work in spite of very little 
alignment? What is the role of explicating difference in collaborations? How are 
the actions of the collaborating participants related, or not related, to institutional 
affiliations? In order to explore these questions, I introduce and develop the 
concept of the screen in the remaining parts of this chapter. The notion is to be 
seen as a further development of co-productionist studies of research 
collaboration. I think of my research interest in terms of what I call ‘misaligned 
co-production’, suggesting that co-production sometimes also takes the form of 
misalignment. In Chapters 10-13, it will be clearer what this means in practice 
when I explore science-industry collaboration in the context of Lundbeck. 
 
Introducing screens 
When I started to explore strategic research and science-industry collaboration in 
Lundbeck, I noticed that research managers spoke a lot about something they 
called screening. Screening appeared in many forms. In the laboratory, screening 
seemed to involve the design of assays to test various hypotheses. In scientific 
journals and at conferences, screening for new ideas involved evaluating the state 
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of the art of research fields. Then there were screening activities related to 
evaluating the quality and suitability of potential external partners. Such 
screening involved search tours and meetings with external researchers and 
companies. Finally, I noticed a form of screening related to identifying new 
markets or defining unmet needs in the landscape of patients, competitors and 
regulatory institutions. It seemed obvious that these forms of screening were 
quite different. Where some forms, such as screening in the lab, seemed a very 
purposeful activity, other forms, such as screening of new partners, involved 
more experimentation. But although they entailed different activities, forms of 
screening also seemed to share something important. They implied ways of 
categorizing and ordering research in Lundbeck. 
Upon this realization, I noticed that the notion of screens has also been discussed 
in the field of STS. In STS, screens are used to analyze forms of categorizing and 
ordering. Of particular relevance is the work of the philosopher and ethnographer 
Helen Verran who has argued that analytical attentiveness to screens holds the 
promise of facilitating novel accounts of science and technology (Winthereik et al. 
2011). As Verran notes, and in line with my empirical observations, screens can 
be many things and they can take many forms. Different screens, she suggests, 
surround us. There are the obvious physical screens of computers, cameras or 
phones. There are also entities that we might not immediately think of as screens 
but nonetheless imply screening, in the sense of categorizing, like diagrams, lists, 
and maps. Finally, we might think of screens in a more analytical sense as specific 
conceptual, discursive or material framings of what matters for a practice (Latour 
2004).  
Due to this empirical and conceptual convergence, I gradually became curious 
about the potential value of using screens as an analytical device for describing 
research collaboration and management. In particular, I wondered whether the 
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notion of screens could be used as a resource for addressing how strategic 
research unfolded in the empirical context of Lundbeck. The potential value of 
this would be to introduce a concept that had an empirical bearing among my 
informants while, at the same time, being very different from the usual metaphors 
outlined above describing strategic research in terms of ‘bridging’, connecting or 
generally aligning. In that sense, the notion of screens implies a particular kind of 
undecided or lateral position (Maurer 2005), neither quite empirical and nor 
quite conceptual, or both at once, but with varying valences depending on context. 
Below I flesh out this idea, by specifying notion of screens that allow me to take 
into account some of the multiple screens encountered empirically. To strengthen 
this analytical device, I also discuss a number of other concepts from STS, which 
resemble screening in the sense that I work with the concept. This framework, I 
suggest, allow me to shed further light on issues of science-industry collaboration 
and strategic research practices in the following chapters. 
 
Screens in STS 
The notion of screens is not a mainstream concept in STS. However, Helen Verran 
has recently discussed screens in a way that I find valuable for the purpose of this 
project. Verran draws a parallel between screens and indices, and she argues that 
screens are primarily interesting to study for their interventionist capacities. 
Verran develops her concept of screens by way of semiotics. In particular, 
inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce, Verran proposes that screens are like ‘indices’ 
(Winthereik et al. 2011; Verran 2013). In Peirce’s terminology, an index is defined 
by having a direct relation to its referent. The statement “no smoke without fire” 
exemplifies an index. Here, smoke indices fire, since fire is a precondition for 
smoke, to which it directly gives rise. For another example, one might think of a 
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medical symptom as an index of a disease. Here, a disease produces the symptom, 
and the symptom, like fever, indexes the disease. By understanding screens as 
indices, Verran argues that screens have a direct relation to a practice.36 
Though semiotics is often taken as a purely linguistic endeavor, Verran suggests 
that screen-indices go beyond language: they intervene in the world, organize it 
and shape action. Like a book index, for example, a screen implies a particular 
organization that facilitates certain forms of interaction (finding the passages 
with the key words listed in the index) but precludes others (finding passages 
with words not indexed). The keywords thus enable a particular and highly 
structured kind of interaction with the book. It is not simply a representation of 
the book’s content; it intervenes in the readers’ worlds by arranging things in a 
particular way and creating specific options for interacting with them. 
Verran’s screen-indices are relevant starting points for my investigation of 
science-industry collaboration and aim of developing a framework capable of 
describing misaligned co-production. Attentiveness to the multiple forms of 
screening that occur in research collaboration and management facilitates 
analysis of the implied orders and forms of ordering that these practices draw 
upon. In recent work, Verran has engaged in a similar analysis of organizational 
risk communication, which followed the relation between screens and practices 
of risk (Verran and de Weydenthal forthcoming). Here, she demonstrates how the 
notion of screens might be used in analyses of organizational dynamics. But even 
so my problems are also in some ways different.37 
                                               
36 Verran also bases her concept on Gilles Deleuze’s notion of screens. Deleuze argues that 
screens are like membranes that filter things in particular ways (Deleuze 1993). 
37 See Vedel 2011 for a discussion of screens. I became interested in screens in 2010 during a 
PhD course on the topic with Helen Verran and Lucy Suchman. 
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Where Verran uses screens to look at somewhat established orders and the 
ordering they entail I am interested in using screens to study practices that imply 
more dynamic constructions of order. My material implies developing strategies 
and collaborations rather than consist of fairly instituted constructions. 
Therefore, I develop the concept to fit my research interests in misaligned co-
production and my empirical context of emergent strategies and collaborations. 
In order to further develop the notion of screens, I draw on two additional 
concepts that I use to emphasize and explore important aspects of my empirical 
material. 
 
Screens as emergent relations and multiple justifications 
The first notion that I draw on to further develop a notion of screens is Strathern’s 
idea of “emergent relations” (Strathern 2003b). Strathern suggests that we should 
see scientific practice as a continuous process of emergent relations. In this way, 
the notion directly addresses the dynamic nature of collaboration. In her 
discussion of emergent relations, Strathern draws on the historian of science 
Mario Biagioli’s idea of “multi-authorship” (Biagioli 2003). Multiple authors 
constitute scientific practice to the extent that it may even be difficult to clearly 
determine who and what has been involved in scientific inventions (Strathern 
2003b: 167). Drawing a parallel between “kinship relations” and “authorship”, 
Strathern further argues that in present scientific practices notions such as 
“conception”, “origin” and “ownership” are not given but rather continuously 
reconfigured (Strathern 2003b: 168-169). Instead of seeing science-industry 
collaboration as a two-sided affair in which university-based researchers form 
one coherent part and industrial researchers constitute another part, this 
encourages a view of collaboration as produced by multiple contributions. It 
becomes less predictable which contributions will be made by whom and from 
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where. In addition, an interest in emerging relations give attention to ways in 
which objects and researchers change over the course of a scientific project. 
Rather than assuming well-established relations between participants, we can 
thus think of collaborations as constituted by developing connections between 
different “authors” and their various forms of collaborative “work”. 
I also take inspiration from the work of French sociologists Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot on different “logics of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006).38 Rather than viewing collaborative misunderstandings as due to cultural 
differences we might see them as exemplifying how participants appeal, more or 
less consciously, to different ways of justifying action. Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
notion helps to expand the spectrum of explanations for collaborators’ actions by 
offering a nuanced alternative to the notion that collaborators must be either 
academic or industrial and that each relies on a single mode of justification. I do 
not directly apply Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework but rather take 
inspiration from the general idea that the same situation might be seen and 
interpreted based on different repertoires of explanation. Thus, I use this 
approach to explore the different justificatory logics that might be used even by 
the same researcher or group of researchers in various situations. As described 
earlier, we often encounter the idea that academic researchers apply one 
consistent line of thinking caused by their professional and institutional 
affiliation. 
By developing the notion of multiple screens to take into account different forms 
of ordering, emergent relations and the varied use of justificatory logics in 
research collaboration, I hope to offer a rich picture of such collaborations, 
premised on difference and divergence rather than on consensus and harmony or 
                                               
38 Boltanski and Thévenot categorize justification into six “logics”: civic, market, industrial, 
domestic, inspiration and fame (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
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on inherently incommensurable differences. I now continue to specify the 
conceptual and empirical problems that my use of screens should be able to 
cover. 
 
The multiple screens of collaboration 
In this section, I begin to develop a notion of screens based on the particular 
empirical and conceptual problems that my research topic raises. So first, what 
kind of problems should my notion of screens address? Answering this question 
requires reflection on both the nature of my material and the research interests of 
this thesis, which are different from Verran’s. 
First, I study how strategic research unfolds in Lundbeck. These are not strategies 
that are already settled. My material concerns the making of new strategies and 
approaches, which takes place in dynamic, continuous processes of 
experimentation. Verran’s notion of screens as indices that imply orders and are 
ordering is not completely adequate for studying practices and strategies that are 
unsettled and in process. Rather than drawing on strategies, diagrams and lists, 
these things emerge in an experimental process and display different expected 
futures for Lundbeck. I would like to address this dynamic, experimenting and 
“future-generating” aspect of strategy making (Jensen 2005; Rheinberger 1997) 
in my screens. Also, strategic research seems to involve attaching particular 
importance to something, which is also an aspect of this experimenting process 
that I would like to address. So I am conceptually interested in something more 
dynamic than studying orders and ordering imply. 
Second, I study science-industry collaboration and this is an arena of dynamic and 
developing entities rather than stable ones. In Lundbeck, the above-mentioned 
strategy making involves experimentation not only with strategies but also with 
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actual collaboration and conditions for these. As mentioned, the notion of the 
screen should facilitate analysis of how collaboration develops not only in 
alignment processes but also in activities that misalign the participants in 
different ways. Verran’s orders could potentially cover alignment and 
misalignment as involving different orders with implications for practice. 
However, orders seem to imply something slightly more permanent than what I 
have in mind. Like Fujimura, I want to consider collaborations from beginning to 
end and see how the participants construct their relation in different ways and 
with changing implications for the collaboration. 
Third, my material concerns different forms of differentiation. Both science-
industry collaboration and strategy-making seem not only to be about showing 
and making visible, but also about hiding and ignoring. In science-industry 
collaboration, some things are shared while others are rendered invisible, or 
hidden. Collaborative strategies in the pharmaceutical industry are famous for 
their confidentiality. In practice, the concerns with confidentiality involve not 
only sharing knowledge but also strategically hiding knowledge. Similarly, the 
making of strategies implies that some opportunities are chosen while others are 
strategically ignored. The analytical screens that I develop should be able to cover 
this aspect of co-production, which concerns leaving something out of sight or 
simply unshared. 
Rather than use one screen to cover these requirements, I will thus develop a 
framework of multiple screens. 
In everyday language and dictionary definitions screens have many meanings. 
Some appear rather more straightforward than Verran’s view of screens as 
indices. For example, to screen means: 
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 To conceal, protect, or shelter (someone or something) with a screen or 
something forming a screen 
 To show (a film or video) or broadcast (a television program) 
 To test (a person or substance) for the presence or absence of a disease 
 To pass (a substance such as grain or coal) through a large sieve or screen, 
especially so as to sort it into different sizes39 
According to dictionary definitions, “to screen” also means “to keep something 
safe and shielded from the outside” and, in fact, also the opposite, “to show and 
put forward”. To screen can also have a scientific meaning, namely to test 
something in a systematic way. Finally, screening can be used to emphasize the 
activity of categorizing and sorting according to a particular purpose or aim. 
Considering these diverse definitions and comparing them with the kind of 
processes and problems I wish to address in my material has allowed me to 
identify three forms of screens that I view as particularly important for the 
present analysis. Together, I propose they enable the analysis of a series of 
important aspects of how strategic research and university-industry relations 
evolve in Lundbeck. I refer to these screens as projecting screens, categorizing 
screens and occluding screens. 
 
Projecting screens 
Several things might be understood as projecting screens. Research strategy 
documents illustrate one very material form of screens that display an 
expectation to research and the future it generates. As projecting screens, strategy 
documents describe a relation between present research activities and future 
                                               
39 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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achievements. If we do this research with this outcome then we will be able to do 
this. In a company like Lundbeck projections of research are often related to a 
produced drug. Strategy document projects research into a future in which a 
disease can be treated with a drug developed on the basis of the research. 
Research strategy documents are examples of quite material projecting screens. 
In addition to these, I also suggest that more discursive things can be understood 
in terms of projecting screens. A conception of research management like “the 
project leader of the future”, which I return to in Chapter 13, is a projecting 
screen. It generates ideas about a future organization of Lundbeck and the role 
that research managers play. 
Coming from the Latin word projectum, projecting has diverse connotations, 
including to “estimate or forecast”, “to throw or cause to move forward” and “to 
present or promote”.40 In spite of their diversity, these meanings capture 
important aspects of strategic research such as developing future scenarios, 
setting a direction for research and making something visible, explicit and open 
for interrogation. In addition, projecting also comes in the form of “projecting 
something on to” and it has the distinct Freudian sense of “attributing or 
transferring an emotion or desire to (another person), especially 
unconsciously”.41 Although this meaning is quite different from the above-
mentioned ideas of projection, it also potentially relates to aspects of strategic 
research. This meaning can be used to address how the making of strategies 
involves giving something a particular prominence. Making it strategic implies 
making it stand out from something else that is not considered strategic. Taking 
inspiration from these various meanings, I suggest that projecting screens are 
                                               
40 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
41 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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analytically useful in highlighting the future-generating aspect of strategic 
research. 
 
Categorizing screens 
Many things might constitute a categorizing screen. We can think of quite material 
things such as collaboration contracts that describe a relation by distinguishing 
between different collaboration participants. Again we might also think of 
research strategy documents that highlight certain research activities by 
distinguishing them from others. Thus, the same thing might be seen as a 
categorizing and a projecting screen according to what we want to highlight and 
explore. More discursive things might also be seen as categorizing screens. An 
example might be an expression such as ‘bridge building’ that clearly implies a 
categorization. It involves the categorization of universities and industries as 
separated worlds in order to make sense of a bridge. I would also suggest, and 
test, whether arrangements and events can be seen as categorizing screens. It 
seems plausible that meetings and interaction between collaborators might both 
draw on and also produce categorizing of the participants with implications for 
how the collaboration can take place. 
Both strategic research and science-industry collaboration clearly emerge from 
processes of categorization. Strategic research can be seen as the outcome of a 
categorization process in which some things are seen as strategic and important, 
while others are left behind. In addition, strategic research is a category in itself 
that is distinguished from other forms of research, as we saw in Danish research 
policy. Equally clearly, science-industry collaboration involves categorizing. One 
obvious categorizing is the distinction between academic and industrial. We 
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might also think about categorization more broadly as related to aligning and 
misaligning practices. 
By deploying categorizing screens, I aim to analyze how the participants in 
research collaborations and strategic research classify themselves as similar and 
dissimilar. This screen can also be used to explore how different participants in a 
collaboration associate the nature of collaboration with different things and 
generate different expectations on that ground. Drawing on Strathern’s idea of 
emergent relations, I do not see categorizing screens as established orders, as 
Verran’s conception of screens as indices proposes. Rather I consider categorizing 
as an activity that has implications for collaboration because it also generates new 
relations rather than merely imply established ones. 
 
Occluding screens 
Many things might also compose an occluding screen. Occluding is about 
obstructing, as I will explain below. Again, a collaboration contract might serve as 
an example of an occluding screen. As mentioned, it involves a description of a 
relation that draws a line between two collaborating parties. But doing this, it also 
occludes other potential relations between these parties. The specific 
categorization does not necessarily account for how the collaboration unfolds in 
practice and in this sense it might occlude practical nuances. There are also more 
discursive forms of occluding screens. They can be conceptions such as the 
aforementioned “project leader of the future”. Such conceptions project a clear 
image of something (in this case research management), while simultaneously 
occluding messy or present aspects of research management practices. 
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The term occluding comes from the Latin word occludere, which means, “to stop, 
close up or obstruct”.42 As suggested, strategic research and science-industry 
collaboration involves processes that might be analyzed as projecting and 
categorizing screens. However, strategic research and science-industry relations 
also involve the construction of invisibility. In science-industry collaboration, 
participants might aim to hide certain things from other participants. In strategic 
research, on purpose strategy makers hide what is not considered within a 
strategic focus. When I focus on occluding screens it is to emphasize that screens 
are not only devices from which something emerges but also something that 
potentially prevent relations. 
Where the categorizing screen might be visualized as a dividing wall that cuts up 
a space into compartments and the projecting screen as a giant display for 
conceptions of future practices, the occluding screen might be seen as a dressing 
screen that one can hide behind. Accordingly, an occluding screen is somewhat 
like a barrier that can be placed strategically to prevent sight. We might also 
consider occluding screens as related to protection. In this sense, we can even 
think of Sigmund Freud’s notion of “screen memories” in which unacceptable 
childhood memories are repressed as a defense mechanism, emphasizing a 
protecting aspect of screens (Freud 1899). 
One might also think of ways in which managing research involves a number of 
activities that are not coherent but involve different perspectives, forms of 
engagement or, in Boltanski and Thévenot’s terms, different logics of justification. 
Rather than observing how these diverse forms of engagement, in spite of 
everything, manage to hold together, the occluding screen helps to explore their 
mutual exclusions and forms of blindness. An interest in occluding screens 
                                               
42 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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highlights that managing research involves taking different things into account at 
different times, and literally, at times, to see a matter in only one way. In that 
sense, one might also see occluding screens as involved in processes of 
simplification and as acknowledging that sometimes following one “narrative 
trail” implies a “frugality” (Thompson 2002: 184).43 
Further, occluding screens enable analysis both of what participants in a 
collaboration bring to it and what they strategically choose to hide. The term 
“collaborator” has the interesting double meaning of being both “a person who 
works jointly on an activity or project; an associate” and “a person who 
cooperates traitorously with an enemy; a defector” (Tsing 2005: 245).44 As we 
have seen, informal and academic discussions of collaboration often privilege the 
idea that collaborating parties somehow seek harmony as part of being in a 
partnership. However, collaboration also implies strategic processes of finding 
out what the other parties want and developing strategies for achieving separate 
goals. Hence, an exploration of the occluding screens of collaboration pays 
attention to what we might call ‘purposeful hiding’ as well as to the deliberate 
making of barriers and obstructions within collaborative frames. 
From this description of the three screens, we see that there are overlaps between 
the screens. A contract, for instance, might be analyzed in terms of all three 
screens and choosing among the screens is a matter of what one wants to analyze 
and highlight. For instance, we might see the contract as a categorizing screen if 
we want to explore the basic categorizations and relations that it draws on and 
produces. But if we rather want to explore how descriptions of research produce 
futures or involve projections of hopes and desires onto research activities, we 
                                               
43 “There is a frugality, however, to following selective, reductionist narrative trails through an 
episode and resisting multivocality” (Thompson 2002: 184). 
44 www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
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might see the contract as a projecting screen. Finally, we might also see a contract 
as an occluding screen and emphasize the things and practices that a contract 
leaves out or make invisible. Occluding might thus be seen as an implicit effect of 
categorizing and projecting, as both of these activities involve rendering certain 
aspects of a collaborative research invisible. For the sake of clarity I have chosen 
to define screens in terms of these three types. However, it is also possible to 
think of projecting, categorizing and occluding as diverse aspects of a screen. 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a co-production framework as an alternative to 
prevalent ways of describing university-industry interaction and to the models of 
the Triple Helix and Mode 2. I have suggested that a co-production approach 
allows for empirical investigations of science-industry relations that are not based 
on an idea of absolute differences between science and industry domains or 
absolute alignment in form of a partnership. Then I have explored three concepts 
– boundary objects, doable problems and trading zones – that try to pinpoint 
what makes collaboration between different participants possible. These three 
concepts address various relevant aspects of how participants, at the level of 
practice, align in different ways. I have then suggested that it would be interesting 
to also explore the role of differences in collaboration. Not in any absolute way, 
but specifically and related to how collaboration develops from misalignment, for 
instance, as the participants explicate how they are differently engaged in the 
research they jointly work on. 
To develop a framework that can describe misaligned co-production, I draw on 
Helen Verran’s notion of screens. Verran uses the screen to explore the embedded 
and interventionist orders that things imply. However, since my material and my 
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research interests are different – I explore experimentation, strategies and 
collaboration – I develop the notion of screens further. With inspiration from 
Strathern and Boltanski and Thévenot, I have defined three specific forms of 
screens – projecting, categorizing and occluding screens. These screens assist me 
develop nuanced empirically oriented accounts of strategic research and science-
industry collaboration in Lundbeck. 
With this conceptual framework of screens in mind, I now turn to Lundbeck. 
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10. MANAGING EMERGENT RELATIONS 
Early in my fieldwork, I took an interest in a particular collaboration that 
Lundbeck had initiated with a group of university-based researchers. Lundbeck 
research managers referred to this collaboration as “the neurocell 
collaboration”.45 It concerned the effect of a biological mechanism, neurocell, for 
drug discovery. This chapter investigates how strategic research developed in 
Lundbeck in relation to a specific collaboration. My inquiry focuses on the 
following questions: How did Lundbeck research managers come to see this 
collaboration as strategic research? What characterized the research as science-
industry collaboration? What did managing this collaboration imply? I analyze 
these questions using the concept of screens that I defined in Chapter 9 as an 
analytical tool. I look at how strategic research developed in this collaboration in 
processes of projecting, categorizing and occluding screenings. 
Discussion in this chapter is based on participant observation in approximately 
20 meetings that occurred during the years from 2008 to 2010. In addition, this 
discussion draws on interviews with several Lundbeck research managers that 
were particularly involved in this collaboration. I also base this chapter on 
informal discussions with research managers, since a part of the activity related 
                                               
45 Neurocell is a pseudonym. In the following four empirical chapters, I use pseudonyms for 
research managers in Lundbeck and their key collaborators. See Appendix D for an overview of 
key people. I mention the research managers’ actual title in Lundbeck to give the reader insight 
into their position in the company and into how they, in terms of their position, are related to 
other research managers. I have chosen to use pseudonyms to be able to differentiate the 
research managers. For instance, using pseudonyms, I illustrate how the research managers 
saw particular events differently, how the same research manager sometimes reflected on the 
same event in different ways, and how the research managers were involved in quite different 
activities. I sometimes group the research managers as “research managers in Lundbeck” as 
they also at times described themselves in general terms, typically in relation to collaborators 
inside or outside Lundbeck. 
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to this collaboration took place outside of formal meetings, in hallways and during 
lunch. Hallway discussion often ended with reflections such as “by the way, I 
thought about the neurocell collaboration, and this is what I think we should do.” 
Taking informal discussions into consideration, formal meetings were often 
summarizing reflections that the research managers continuously had about on-
going collaborations. 
First, I offer a short introduction to what characterized Lundbeck research 
managers’ activities concerning science-industry collaborations in general. Then, I 
describe what characterized the neurocell collaboration and how the 
collaboration changed and developed during key events. These events bear 
witness to the emergent nature of the collaboration. Subsequently, I analyze 
disconcertment in two episodes. I propose that investigating the disconcertment 
that emerged in the process of managing this collaboration highlights important 
dimensions of the nature of strategic research and science-industry collaboration. 
Finally, I summarize how the concept of screens is useful for making sense of this 
case. 
 
Becoming interested in science-industry collaboration 
I began to investigate external collaboration in Lundbeck by observing specific 
collaborations and activities related to managing them. Around 2009 to 2010, a 
group of Lundbeck research managers regularly discussed a handful of research 
collaborations. These research managers were Jens, who was the head of 
research; Lars, who was head of drug discovery; and Hans, the divisional director 
of molecular neurobiology. Occasionally, this group was expanded to include 
members of the two main management groups, the Research Management Board 
(RMB) and the Drug Discovery Management Team (DDMT). On other occasions, 
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the group expanded to include members from other parts of Lundbeck, such as 
Finance, Business Development, Patents and Trademarks, and Legal. Besides the 
neurocell collaboration, the collaborations that the research managers regularly 
discussed were a collaboration with an American non-profit research institution, 
a potential research collaboration with a Dutch biotech company, and a 
collaboration within a large European research initiative that involved both 
universities and companies. 
One of my immediate observations was that each of these collaborations was very 
different from one another. Each of them even appeared to represent a different 
model of collaboration. Lundbeck’s collaborators varied from biotech companies 
to academic research groups, and the size of the collaborations also changed from 
small groups to extensive networks of participants. Likewise, it differed who had 
taken the initiative to collaborate. However, in spite of these apparent differences, 
it was equally apparent that the group of research managers strategically 
categorized these four collaborations together and drew parallels between them. 
Indeed, they often described them as alike, simply because the collaborations 
shared an external element. They also often referred to these collaborations as 
similar because they all focused on a particular biological mechanism that was 
expected to have an important role in diseases in the central nervous system. 
Researching these biological mechanisms required external collaboration since 
building up the expertise in-house was seen as too long-term and inflexible. The 
biological mechanisms were thus both indicative in terms of a new strategy and 
had the potential to profoundly change the future pipeline of Lundbeck. 
Discussing collaborations and making specific decisions about them were 
therefore at once a matter of dealing with them individually and in relation to 
overall strategy. 
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For this investigation, I focused on those activities that could be observed when 
attempting to make sense of these strategic considerations about collaborations. 
First of all, I observed that the research managers spent a lot of time in meetings 
in which individual collaborations were discussed and plans were made. 
Collaboration implied tasks such as planning up-coming meetings with external 
collaborators; discussing scenarios for collaboration contracts; debating 
governance structures, both in-house and in relation to the external groups; and 
reflecting on incentive structures and future scenarios for these collaborations. 
Dealing with external collaboration also included preparing presentations for 
Lundbeck’s general management in the form of the Board of Directors46 and the 
Corporate Management Group47 that were to approve large investments in new 
research. The research managers raised a number of questions during the 
treatment of each collaboration: What are the primary incentives that motivate 
and encourage this research, for us and for the external collaborators? How do we 
manage and influence the development of the collaboration? How does the 
potential outcome of this collaboration relate to in-house activities? How do we 
present this opportunity to the general management as valuable and worth 
investing in? 
Although these questions were far from trivial and were given serious thought, 
the research managers approached them with an interesting mix of ease and 
optimism. Though the developing collaborations represented something new and 
in some sense unfamiliar, this group of research managers had a familiar way of 
dealing with new and uncertain things, on which they were clearly drawing. Thus, 
                                               
46 Lundbeck’s Board of Directors consists of six external directors that are elected by 
Lundbeck’s shareholders and three members elected by Lundbeck’s Danish employees. 
47 The Corporate Management Group (until 2011) consisted of the heads of Lundbeck’s main 
divisions. Today this larger group is replaced with the Executive Management that consists of 
the CEO, the head of R&D, and the head of Finance & IT.  
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despite the apparent risks of engaging in these collaborations, I noticed both 
laughter and confidence among this group of managers. 
The neurocell collaboration particularly caught my attention. I observed that the 
group of Lundbeck research managers spent a lot of time on this collaboration, 
and that they were especially attentive to how this collaboration was taking 
shape. They had previously interacted with members of the university-based 
research group with whom they were collaborating, but it appeared that the 
research had only recently started to look particularly interesting and promising. 
Thus, deciding what to do about the collaboration was particularly crucial. 
 
The neurocell collaboration 
In 2003, a group of researchers made a discovery about the behavior of the 
receptor, neurocell, a discovery that soon after was published in a leading 
scientific journal. The authors had found that neurocell, a biological mechanism in 
the brain, which was usually seen as playing an active role in cell growth, was 
sometimes, under certain conditions, actively involved in the opposite process of 
cell death. The authors noted the fascinating phenomenon that in certain 
situations, for instance, in the case of stroke, the body’s own protein immediately 
starts to kill brain cells, within minutes making the damage of a stroke worse. 
This discovery had broad relevance, not only for future research but also for drug 
discovery. For one thing, it became immediately interesting to understand how 
one might prevent the activation of the neurocell in situations of cell degeneration 
through drug-based control of molecule interaction. 
The discovery of the surprising effects of neurocell created a lot of attention, not 
only in international research circles, but also in the Danish national context. 
Thus, in 2005, the Lundbeck Foundation, an industrial foundation granting money 
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for biomedical and natural science, and the major shareholder of Lundbeck A/S, 
funded a Centre of Excellence with the two leading Danish authors of the 
discovery, Martin and Søren. The center, known as BRAIN, was established at a 
university in conjunction with a department of biomedicine. BRAIN focused on 
the molecular, cellular, as well as physiological, functions of neurocell. Hence, the 
center’s activities were inherently interdisciplinary, spanning studies of receptor 
crystal-structure and studies of physiological functions in animal models. It also 
drew on a large number of methodologies, including neurophysiology, protein 
structure, genetics and stereology. At the university, the center connected a 
number of departments across faculties and across specialties within the faculty 
of health, such as the departments of biomedicine and clinical medicine. The 
center also had a number of official international collaboration partners, among 
these the co-author of the 2004 publication, Henrik, who was employed at a 
different university. 
However, the discovery of neurocell’s lethal behavior did not merely result in 
strengthening academic research at BRAIN. Simultaneously, Martin and Henrik 
founded a private biotech company called PsychoIndex, through which they filed 
a number of patents involving neurocell technologies. As owners of PsychoIndex, 
Martin and Henrik contacted research managers at Lundbeck to discuss a 
collaboration agreement. According to my interviews with Lundbeck research 
managers, Martin and Henrik were excited about the potential commercial 
aspects of their research and particularly interested in the opportunity to develop 
a drug for treating Alzheimer’s disease. Their initial contact led to a number of 
meetings, including visits at the university and at Lundbeck. Finally, it led to a 
small research agreement in which Lundbeck would test the technologies of 
PsychoIndex. 
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In the years 2006-2008, the research field of neurocell grew stronger. At BRAIN 
and at the university that the center collaborated with, intensified research 
activities resulted in several new discoveries that were published in high-profile 
journals including Nature Neuroscience, Nature Reviews, and Journal of 
Neuroscience. As more specific ideas for how to use the findings in drug discovery 
developed, the collaboration between Lundbeck and the founders of PsychoIndex 
grew increasingly interesting. The group of research managers at Lundbeck spent 
much time contemplating how to develop the collaboration. They were especially 
curious about the value of the patent filings from PsychoIndex and about the risk 
of another pharmaceutical company purchasing these patents, thus blocking the 
way for Lundbeck’s ideas concerning developing a drug to treat Alzheimer’s 
disease. Worrying about how to respond to this risk involved consideration of a 
number of questions. For example, would it be better to acquire the patent 
applications or rather to let them mature in the context of PsychoIndex and in 
relation to BRAIN’s research activities? Considered in isolation, the patent files 
were not of obvious value. The files proposed a very broadly defined patent that 
would only rarely be approved. Even if they were approved, it was not obvious 
how they would lead to a new drug. Nonetheless, there was something potentially 
valuable and interesting about the patent files and their prospects of commercial 
use. 
As the result of a thorough due diligence process in 2009, the research managers 
at Lundbeck decided to buy PsychoIndex, thereby making PsychoIndex a 
subsidiary to Lundbeck. Martin remained in charge of PsychoIndex as the key 
executive. This generated a number of new relations between Lundbeck and the 
researcher Martin. From the perspective of Lundbeck, the collaboration changed. 
Originally, the collaboration had relied on one main relation between Lundbeck 
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and the owners of PsychoIndex. Now, it relied on three separate relations 
between Lundbeck and external collaborators. 
These new relations were described in three contracts. The first contract 
concerned the acquisition in which Lundbeck purchased the assets of 
PsychoIndex; this was an exchange of money for patents. The second contract was 
a consultancy agreement with the owners of PsychoIndex in which the owners 
advised Lundbeck on how to use the patents and technologies in their further 
investigations into the use of neurocell as a target for drugs; this was an exchange 
of money for advice. Finally, a third contract related to Martin implied a new 
relation between Lundbeck and the university research group. This contract 
stipulated that Lundbeck would give an annual grant to the group in return of a 
‘first right of refusal’ to discoveries made by Martin. This right implied that, 
before publishing, Martin would share new discoveries with Lundbeck and give 
the company the chance to patent these discoveries before any other companies 
was given the option. 
Both the university and Lundbeck viewed these agreements as a success. At the 
university, it was presented as a case of how funds for “free” basic research 
turned into knowledge that could subsequently be taken advantage of by 
industry. In Lundbeck, it was seen as a success to have acquired the patents and 
established a strong collaboration with the university-based research group. 
With this background in mind, I now turn to a more careful discussion of the 
neurocell collaboration. Just from lining up the key events, it is clear that the 
collaboration evolved around a biological mechanism and a number of key people, 
among these three Lundbeck research managers, Jens, Lars, and Hans, and three 
researchers employed at universities, Martin, Søren, and Henrik. What I want to 
highlight, however, is the way key people emerged in different roles and relations, 
both as users and producers of knowledge, through the collaboration (Woolgar 
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1991). In the university context, for instance, Martin is a producer of new 
knowledge about neurocell behavior. However, he is also a user of the same 
knowledge in the context of PsychoIndex, where he files patents to sell to 
Lundbeck. This already suggests that he is in fact related to both Lundbeck and to 
the university research group in multiple ways. Martin, we might say, single-
handedly creates numerous science-industry relations across traditional 
institutional boundaries. 
The fact that we can observe this merely by describing the main events of the 
collaboration suggests that understandings of research collaboration indeed are 
in need of more complex and dynamic characterizations than the black and white 
alternatives with which we are too often presented. Using Strathern’s terms, we 
are witness to a situation in which the relations between author and work are 
neither straightforward nor stable, but rather emergent and negotiated in the 
process (Strathern 2003b). In fact, exploring the notion of the origin of ideas and 
discoveries became important for managing the collaboration. So, how, more 
specifically, can we characterize the emergent relations that constitute this 
collaboration? To explore this, I now attend to two moments of disconcertment 
that I observed while participating in discussions of the neurocell collaboration 
that took place in Lundbeck. As described in Chapter 7, I use disconcertment as a 
tool for selecting and exploring instances where different screens appear and 
collide, creating a fundamental unsettlement. 
 
The transfer document 
Early in 2009, the research managers’ considerations in relation to taking over 
PsychoIndex involved a process of due diligence. Due diligence is a detailed 
investigation of everything related to a business that takes place prior to signing a 
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contract. The purpose of due diligence in this example was to investigate the 
company PsychoIndex, and to get an overview of the company’s assets and 
obligations, as well as its financial and organizational construction. I participated 
in five meetings that related directly to this due diligence. These meetings 
provided occasions for observing interaction between the Lundbeck research 
managers and employees from other parts of Lundbeck that also participated. The 
due diligence process involved not only an investigation of the research of 
PsychoIndex, but also a financial and legal investigation. Consequently, the 
meetings also included specialists from Patents and Trademarks, an expert from 
Legal, a specialist from Finance, and a tax specialist. An employee from Business 
Development hosted the process. At this point, the decision to buy PsychoIndex 
was already made. However, the research managers were still not certain about 
what kind of contractual set-up would be the best in terms of continuing 
collaboration with the owners. Deciding on a set-up required a thorough 
investigation of the company. 
The due diligence meetings took place in the building housing Business 
Development and Finance. The purpose of these joint meetings was to discuss the 
progress of the due diligence process, which implied going through key 
documents such as the patent applications and the university logbooks 
accounting for the research activities that had led to the patents. In this process, 
two major concerns had emerged. One concern had to do with the ownership of 
the research that led to the patents that Lundbeck were now acquiring. The due 
diligence group at Lundbeck wanted to make sure that they knew exactly who had 
been involved in prior research activities and that all potential inventors were 
registered correctly in the patent files. In particular, they wanted to counter the 
risk that they might end up being accountable to other researchers than the 
owners of PsychoIndex. Another concern related to the potential obligations that 
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Lundbeck would take over when buying PsychoIndex. For instance, it was noticed 
that PsychoIndex participated in an EU collaboration. The group of investigators 
at Lundbeck wanted to make sure they understood what this relation exactly 
implied, so this was discussed at the meetings. Both concerns required sorting out 
complex business and research relations, a process that disclosed that the 
relevant research had not only been produced by the owners of PsychoIndex but 
also by students and colleagues at the university. 
At one meeting, a document was brought up that immediately attracted both 
curiosity and attention. Hans was going through a pile of PsychoIndex documents, 
talking over each of them with the patent specialist. With a slightly despairing 
voice, yet not devoid of humor, Hans asked, “What about this?” pointing to a 
document. The document to which he referred showed a transfer of money from a 
university professor to a consultant. There was a slight pause in discussion in the 
room, interrupted by a quiet laughter among the research managers. The curious 
thing about the document was that Martin was both the professor and the 
consultant. In short, Martin, in his function as company owner and technology 
expert, had given advice to a research group of which he was also director. 
The document generated disconcertment and commotion. There was laughter 
around the table, shuffling in the chairs, and eye contact between the research 
managers who knew Martin in person. However, there was also a serious element 
in this encounter with the document. After all, the group was in the middle of an 
investigation with the purpose of sorting and categorizing relations. The 
document seemed to question the exercise itself, since it blurred these relations, 
rather than supporting a distinction between them. At the same time, the 
document was unsettling because it raised suspicion of a questionable practice. If 
this was the case, the document was not obviously hidden. 
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These concerns came to an end as Hans, holding up the document, addressed the 
legal expert by asking, “Is this document a problem for us?” The legal expert, who 
had clearly not found the document as entertaining as the group of research 
managers, replied, “No. From a legal point of view, there is nothing wrong with 
this document”. The group then moved on and the intense moment of 
disconcertment passed. I pause here, however, to ask what we might learn about 
science-industry collaboration from exploring this moment in more detail. In the 
following section, I offer an analysis of the episode, suggesting that the transfer 
document can be understood in terms of a categorizing screen. 
On the one hand, the document simply illustrates that researchers today often 
have multiple roles: they act as consultants, company owners, and research 
directors. On the other hand, looking at the document as a categorizing screen 
reveals something potentially interesting about how these multiple roles relate to 
one another in practice. Understood as a categorizing screen the transfer 
document does something; it classifies. The question is then, which categories 
does the transfer document present? And why does the document as a 
categorizing screen produce disconcertment? I suggest that the document and the 
unsettlement it created can tell us something important about the dynamics of 
science-industry collaboration and the challenges of managing strategic research. 
First, what does the document do? There is a particular dynamic related to the 
document as a screen. On the one hand, it clearly juxtaposes researchers and 
consultants. It describes collaboration between two entities that are completely 
distinct, a consultant and a professor. It also describes the nature of their 
interaction. A professor receives advice from a consultant that in return receives 
payment. This is what you would expect to see when looking at a transfer 
document. On the other hand, the document as a screen also describes a collapse 
of categories. It turns out that the exchange takes place between Martin-the 
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researcher and Martin-the consultant. Although something is still juxtaposed and 
split up, it is also clear that something is the same. The fact that the same person 
appears in two different roles alters the immediate image of two distinct entities. 
In other words, according to this document seen as screen, Martin is both two 
different persons and the same person. The screen is dynamic. In one moment it is 
possible to see two distinct entities in collaboration, a consultant and a 
researcher, and in the next moment we only see one entity, Martin. 
As a categorizing screen, the document also describes a relation that, in practice, 
is both impossible and possible. In practice it is impossible to separate Martin-the 
consultant from Martin-the researcher, and therefore the idea of interaction 
taking place between these two parties becomes grotesque. The transfer 
document describes an impossible relation that only makes sense within this 
document. However, in practice, Martin is neither consultant nor researcher, but 
deeply engaged in both consultancy and research. Because he is both, the 
document not only describes an impossible relation but addresses an important 
fact. Martin has generated a lot of activity in the field of neurocell research, and, in 
practice, some of the things he has initiated come back to him in different ways. 
His activities in the context of a company relates to his work in a research center. 
The transfer document as categorizing screen generates disconcertment. Why? 
Some disconcertment clearly arises from the way the document categorizes 
different collaborative engagements and thereby suggests something grotesque. It 
suggests that it is possible to distinguish between Martin’s diverse engagements 
in neurocell research to the extent that these engagements in fact reconnect, as if 
they did not cohere in the first place. The document ignores the fact that Martin is 
one person. The document suggests a sort of categorical inconsistency or rupture 
that is disconcerting because it does not relate to the Lundbeck research 
managers’ experience of collaborating with Martin. But there is also 
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disconcertment related to encountering something that is getting very close to the 
boundary of what is acceptable activity. It raises concerns that a researcher 
single-handedly is making a transaction occur. However, at the meeting, this 
disconcertment was being taken care of. It is interesting to observe that the 
lawyers did not find the document disconcerting. In legal terms, the construction 
was conceptually possible, and the categories were not as ambiguous as they 
were to the research managers. 
What do we learn about managing science-industry relations based on this 
example? The example suggests that, in practice, it is impossible to separate 
interests that are assumed to be distinct. In this example of science-industry 
collaboration, alignment was very strong from the start. The engagements of the 
distinct participants were even collapsed. Both Martin and Lundbeck did things 
that were commercial and excellent. Given this condition, what became important 
was to separate interests, as the document did. Thus, we might see the dynamics 
of science-industry collaboration as characterized by both making alignment and 
misaligned co-production. The case clearly illustrates co-production, not only in 
terms of merging, but also in terms of explicating differences between various 
researchers’ different engagements. It is interesting that the misalignment in the 
case of the transfer document was not between two institutions but rather 
between different engagements that the same participant has. This raises 
questions not only about how, but also where, misalignment takes place in 
science-industry collaboration—a point to which I return. 
In this example, I analyzed a document as a categorizing screen. I now look at an 
example of a more discursive categorizing screen, an expressed idea of a “double 
payment”. In the example of the transfer document, disconcertment developed 
from a sense of too strong alignment or even categorical collapse. In the following 
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example, disconcertment developed from the opposite situation of too little 
alignment. 
 
The double payment 
During the due diligence process, I observed that the research managers had 
different ways of arguing for the importance of buying the assets of PsychoIndex. 
Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), I see their diverse arguments as 
different logics of justification. As mentioned, the most common argument for 
buying PsychoIndex was that the purchase would prevent other companies from 
acquiring its patents. Such an event would potentially stop Lundbeck from using 
neurocell commercially. However, another argument suggested that the value of 
the patents depended heavily on future research on neurocell behavior, since 
there was not yet sufficient knowledge to know what the possibilities really 
were.48 The research managers often used this argument to suggest that the 
purchase needed supplementation with continued collaboration and research. 
I also observed a third argument for the PsychoIndex purchase, formulated by 
Jens, the head of research, who suggested that the acquisition had an altogether 
different purpose. According to Jens, the acquisition made an important statement 
in Lundbeck about changing research strategies. The primary purpose of the 
acquisition, he argued, did not have to do with external partners, but rather had to 
do with how research was understood within Lundbeck’s organization. Jens 
suggested that the acquisition of PsychoIndex entailed a kind of ‘double payment’. 
I found this statement interesting, as it seemed to suggest relations that I had not 
observed previously. As I inquired into this idea of a double payment, Jens 
                                               
48 I return to a discussion of the notion of “knowing enough” in Chapter 11. 
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explained that Lundbeck had already paid for this research once by funding a 
Centre of Excellence, and now they were paying for it again. 
The proposed acquisition clearly troubled Jens, and the reason for his 
disconcertment opened up another perspective on the collaboration. According to 
him, the first payment for neurocell research took place as early as 2005, when 
the Lundbeck Foundation funded the BRAIN Centre of Excellence. This grant 
allowed a group of researchers, among these Martin, to develop ideas and work 
towards scientific breakthrough. This breakthrough then resulted in important 
publications and in patents filed by PsychoIndex. Now, however, Lundbeck was 
purchasing the patents and granting additional funds to the research 
environment at the university. In that sense, they were paying twice for the 
research. How did this statement categorize and describe the collaboration? I 
suggest that if we want to understand the idea of double payment it entails 
investigating this statement as a categorizing screen. Although the screen in this 
case is discursive, as it emerges in conversation, it is not only discursive, because 
it relates strongly to material organizational structures in Lundbeck that separate 
Lundbeck A/S from the Lundbeck Foundation. Understood as a categorizing 
screen, the statement of a double payment describes the collaboration in a new 
way. 
Contrary to the transfer document that separated Martin’s different involvements 
in neurocell, the double payment notion categorizes certain things that in practice 
are formally distinct as the same. This notion has an effect opposite to that of the 
transfer document, which rendered certain things formally distinct that in 
practice were the same. First, the idea of a double payment depends on 
interpreting neurocell research in the context of the BRAIN center and patent files 
in the context of PsychoIndex as the same thing. According to a traditional 
understanding, university research produces one type of object (neurocell as a 
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fact) and companies produce another type of object (neurocell as a product). 
However, Jens sees facts and products as closely related. He sees research results 
as comparable with patents and spin out companies, since all of these objects are 
the results of the initial research grant. 
Second, the idea of a double payment describes a categorical collapse. It depends 
on a construction according to which Lundbeck A/S and the Lundbeck Foundation 
are merged entities, although they are formally two different legal entities with 
different missions and organizations. The Lundbeck Foundation owns the 
majority of Lundbeck and gives grants to biomedical and natural science in areas 
of research directly relevant to Lundbeck. Lundbeck A/S, on the contrary, is a 
company that engages in research with the main purpose of developing drugs. 
Consequently, although both are “Lundbeck”, we would expect these two entities 
to see the potential in research activities in different ways. However, the notion of 
the double payment suggests that Lundbeck and the Lundbeck Foundation are 
related to neurocell in the same way, and that, in practice, their interests amount 
to the same thing. 
From what perspective does this statement make sense? As head of research, Jens 
was authoritatively knowledgeable about the formal organization of Lundbeck 
A/S, the different Lundbeck institutions and their relations. Thus, the statement 
was not coming from a naïve outsider who would not immediately see the 
different parts of Lundbeck. However, as Jens explained his point of view, the 
acquisition of PsychoIndex was a double payment in the light of the changing 
strategies in Lundbeck A/S. According to Jens, Lundbeck A/S’s interests in 
neurocell had grown out of a new strategy according to which neurocell research 
was no longer outside the scope of Lundbeck A/S’s interests. Indeed, the new 
strategy had a strong focus on basic biological mechanisms and their potential for 
drug discovery. However, Jens worried that the Lundbeck Foundation did not 
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recognize the implications of this strategic change that would bring the interests 
of Lundbeck A/S and the Lundbeck Foundation closer. Consequently, he saw the 
situation as a matter of an unfortunate misalignment between Lundbeck A/S and 
the Lundbeck Foundation, although, formally, coordination was allowed to take 
place. 
By this categorizing screen, excellent research and commercial activities become 
recognizable as the same, both in terms of the institutions that engage in these 
activities and in terms of the activities themselves. I suggest that Jens’ 
disconcertment is caused by a collapse of interests in excellence and 
commercialization. I observed this collapse of categories during the PsychoIndex 
due diligence process, since it led to a kind of involuntary explication of the 
specific nature of the collaboration. The interaction among the participants in the 
neurocell collaboration brought to light the instability of categories of excellent 
and industrial research and elicited different kinds of relations between science 
and commercial activity. Seen from within the collaboration, the participants 
were at once engaged in both emergent excellent research and emergent 
commercial activities. 
The stories of the transfer document and the double payment both contain 
disconcerting constructions that can be analyzed in terms of a categorizing 
screen. I suggest that these constructions are important to explore in order to 
increase our understanding of the dynamics of science-industry collaboration and 
the potential challenges of managing it. Both of the stories allow for the 
articulation of categorizing screens relevant to science-industry collaboration. 
The collaboration, which might also be seen as a case of university-industry 
collaboration, is brought to light as a complex assemblage of highly 
heterogeneous practices. In these practices, categories of science and industry 
collapse and differentiate in intriguing ways. Understanding and exploring this 
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dynamic is important for generating relevant accounts of what science-industry 
collaboration entails. 
 
Strategic-explorative research 
I now proceed to explore through which screens strategic research develops in 
Lundbeck. I begin by investigating how the neurocell collaboration gradually 
became strategic in Lundbeck. Subsequently, I look at how that collaboration was 
managed, paying particular attention to the screens this process involved. Not 
least, I explore the kind of management issues that arose in the context of this 
collaboration. This is interesting, insofar as the collaboration challenged the idea 
of stable science-industry collaboration, and thus presumably would also 
challenge the standard ways in which we imagine that such collaborations ought 
to be managed. Because the collaboration was constituted by emergent, rather 
than stable, relations, the problem of managing it ceased to have to do with 
solving the issue of how to bridge a default gap or break down a barrier. As we 
have already seen, if there are gaps and barriers in this case that separate 
different participants, they do not usually appear between the collaborating 
institutions, but rather within them (as within Lundbeck). 
First, I look at how neurocell emerged as an instance of strategic research in 
Lundbeck. As my chronology of the main events suggests, the collaboration was 
not initiated based on a predefined strategy. Rather, it was initiated in discussions 
that happened between research managers from Lundbeck and the owners of 
PsychoIndex, and which dealt with the commercial prospects of neurocell 
behavior in brain diseases. As we saw, the collaboration gradually developed and 
transformed from this initial contact into a complex arrangement including both 
companies and research centers. One might then say that the collaboration 
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eventually became strategic research due to developing events rather than to 
preliminary predictions and plans. Making this research collaboration a matter of 
strategic attention was not so much a matter of making a decision as an outcome 
that related to the timing and maturation of research. For this reason, the 
collaboration is illustrative of what we might call ‘strategic-explorative’ research. 
Engaging in neurocell research entailed a form of strategic experimentation 
rather than the execution of a ready-made strategy. For instance, Hans reflected 
on the experimental nature of the collaboration: 
We knew at that time that if we thought it through all the way to the clinic we would run into 
some difficulties. So it was hard and there were some weak indications but we also knew that 
this was very early biology. So either it would turn out to be a bad investment, and we would do 
some discoveries that wouldn’t go anywhere, or we would in fact learn something over the next 
period of time. 
I now consider through which categorizing screens this strategic-explorative 
research took place. This involves exploring how the Lundbeck research 
managers characterized the collaboration and the work in which they were 
involved. It also entails looking at the categorizations that emerge from describing 
how the collaboration was strategic and explorative, and how the Lundbeck 
participants related to external collaborators. In this section, I do not pinpoint one 
thing that can be understood in terms of a screen, but test what happens if we 
understand the research managers’ descriptions and discussions of collaborations 
in terms of categorizing screens. 
First, we have Hans, who described the interaction between the participants as if 
it made no difference where the participants come from. They all engaged in a 
strategic-explorative practice of considering different scenarios: 
We discuss both on a very detailed level sometimes, but also at a very general level: ‘this could 
be interesting’ or ‘we have seen something’. Or we come back and say ‘That which we talked 
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about is clearly impossible’, right. Where he then says, ‘Why don’t we just do this and develop it 
in this disease?’ and I say, ‘It just isn’t possible. We can’t make those studies’. 
Hans described how collaboration involves ‘discussing at different levels’, both in 
details and in general, and exploring different scenarios. It includes asking 
questions, exploring them and coming back with answers. Hans described the 
collaboration as uncomplicated. There is interaction about ideas in which some 
ideas are seen as impossible, while others seem to have a potential. We notice two 
things. First, that the industrial research managers do not have a ready-made 
research scheme, but rather that they engage in a dialogue. The process is 
explorative rather than based on a ready-made strategy. Second, there are no 
immediate indicators in this research managers’ description of what the 
industrial contributions are and what the academic contributions are. There is 
discussion at several levels, and ideas and decisions emerge from this interaction. 
We might make sense of the description as a categorizing screen in which 
distinctions between strategic and explorative, and industrial and academic are 
blurred. 
Then, the same research manager, Hans, also suggested something quite different 
about strategic-explorative research. According to him, the neurocell 
collaboration was strategic and important for Lundbeck, but would not have been 
possible to initiate within Lundbeck. He suggested that because the collaboration 
was a complex, partly external arrangement, it made certain things possible that 
would otherwise not have taken place in Lundbeck. 
They are doing so many new things that we would never do, because we are kind of more 
streamlined and controlled in what we do, whereas they are more active, right. They make a PhD 
student do some kind of crazy experiment, I mean, it’s not crazy, but you [wonder], ‘What will 
come out of all this?’ right. And then nothing comes out of it. Or a nice scientific understanding 
comes out, but you can’t really use it. But then suddenly against all odds someone does discover 
an extremely important thing. 
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If we comprehend this research managers’ description in terms of a categorizing 
screen, we can observe that the account has more distinct categorizations, 
compared to the previous description. There is a clear distinction between the 
academic world and the world of Lundbeck that was otherwise blurred in the first 
description. As a screen, his description distinguishes between the “crazy” 
research activities that are allowed to take place at the university and the “more 
streamlined and controlled” organization of Lundbeck. However, rather than only 
distance himself from these crazy ideas and ask, “What will come out of all this?” 
Hans also argued that it is important to relate to them because this 
experimentation is also a source for developing “an extremely important thing”. 
By comparing these two quotes and exploring them as screens that categorize, we 
see that Lundbeck strategic research develops in a strategic-explorative process. 
Sometimes engaging in this research is based on a strong alignment with external 
collaborators, as the first quote suggests. At other times, defining it as strategic 
involves differentiating Lundbeck from external research environments, as the 
second quote suggests. In this example, external collaboration becomes strategic 
because it is possible to experiment more freely in a semi-external research 
situation. This is fascinating, since it seems that what is strategic is the 
opportunity to relate to a relatively free form of research. Consequently, we see 
another instance of a categorical collapse, according to which strategic and 
free/explorative research merge. 
I now move on to explore what managing this form of strategic-explorative 
research implied. As suggested earlier, there was a strong alignment of research 
interests in the neurocell collaboration. This condition had implications for how 
management developed. 
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Collaboration as “many different entrances” 
One might imagine that managing this collaboration was challenging since it 
implied governing emergent relations, developing strategies and relating to 
researchers with multiple roles and interests. However, rather than conceive of 
the situation as a problem that needed a solution, the research managers in 
Lundbeck argued that there was an advantage to these emergent relations. Hans 
described the numerous engagements with Martin this way: 
In fact, it’s an advantage to us, because it gives us an entrance, or many different entrances, and 
in this way it’s only an advantage that he appears many places, right, because our contact 
interface through him actually becomes much larger. 
Understood as a screen, the idea of Martin providing “many different entrances” 
implies a separation between Lundbeck and Martin, categorically. But rather than 
see Martin as part of one external world, Hans suggests that Martin links 
Lundbeck to a number of commercial and academic worlds. Interacting with 
Martin is subsequently the same as interacting with many different collaborators 
and research environment. Rather than control these relations, they are valuable 
because they are multiple and allows for different ways of collaborating. One 
might think that managing this multiplicity is mainly difficult. But it seems that, 
according to this idea of “entrances”, it is rather a condition that potentially makes 
strategic-explorative research possible and valuable. 
Rather than try to control the many entrances, Hans rather suggested that this 
condition allowed them to enter many different worlds in which they also came to 
have different roles. As he described it, entering a world sometimes required 
becoming similar to researchers. Again, we might understand this quote as a 
categorizing screen in which assumed distinctions between industrial and 
academic become blurred. 
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I put on a creased shirt, or something like that, and then I become part of the environment. I 
know how it looks, and then it appears to him [the university researcher, Søren] that we are 
equally interested in this science when we first get to the table. 
In this quote, Hans described how he “put on creased shirt” and this gave him 
access to an academic environment that he was not normally part of. However, he 
was very familiar with specific cultural codes that applied to this world and how 
using them potentially gave him access to particular discussions. Putting on a 
creased shirt made him appear as “equally interested” in the science and gave him 
access to “get to the table”. Understood as a screen, this description has an 
interesting categorizing dynamics. On the one hand, it makes a separation 
between the world of academic research and the world of industry. In order to 
access the academic world, industrial researchers must align themselves with 
certain cultural norms, here suggested as being a particular dress code. On the 
other hand, this description as a screen proposes that, in reality, the participants 
are equally interested in the research, but that it takes persuasion to make the 
academic collaborators see that the industrial research managers have similar 
interests. 
Above, I have suggested that managing strategic research in Lundbeck is about 
managing emergent relations. Contrary to what one might expect, the emergent 
aspect of this research does not make it less strategic. We have also seen that 
managing strategic research is, at least to some extent, related to developing 
many different entrance points to research. Rather than control these entrance 
points, the research managers argue for the strength of having many 
opportunities. 
However, even though managing strategic research was characterized by 
handling emergent relations with a certain reflexivity about entering different 
worlds, I also encountered a different form of managing. Managing in the form of 
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building relationships was most apparent in the early stages of the collaboration. 
Around the time of the due diligence process, however, the emphasis shifted to 
sorting out the emergent relations and even dealing with them separately. This 
form of management was more goal-directed and indeed more focused on gaining 
control. I now look at three collaboration contracts that emerged after the due 
diligence investigation and suggests that these contracts might be understood in 
terms of occluding screens, in that they made it possible to understand and govern 
the collaboration in three distinct relationships. 
 
Managing research through contracts 
As mentioned, the due diligence process resulted in a contractual framework 
consisting of three separate contracts. Each of these contracts defined a distinct 
relationship between Lundbeck and Martin. I suggest that the three contracts and 
the relationships they described can be understood in terms of an occluding 
screen, as they mutually occluded each other. As described in Chapter 9, the 
conceptual framework, occluding is about obstacles that are set up to block free 
access or vision of something. The first contract defined Lundbeck as the buyer of 
patents and Martin and his partner Henrik as the sellers. In the second contract, 
Lundbeck was the buyer of expert advice and Martin and Henrik consultants who 
offered this advice. Finally, in the third contract, Lundbeck offered money for 
“free” basic research activities related to neurocell at the university in exchange 
for access, obtained through Martin, to potential future discoveries. 
Thinking in terms of this metaphor, we observe that the three contracts manage 
the mixed up and emergent relations of the neurocell collaboration by separating 
them, then dealing with them one at a time. Consequently, from the perspective of 
each of these contracts, the relations that the other contracts accounted for were 
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invisible. The occluding screen thus does something quite different than the 
categorizing screen. The categorizing screen also separates, but it is very clear 
what it is that is separated. If academic and industrial are categorized as separate 
domains, it is still clear that there is both an academic and industrial domain in 
play. In contrast, the occluding screen renders something invisible. Thus, although 
the neurocell collaboration was constituted by many different relationships, 
according to the consultancy contract, it was only about consultancy and not 
about basic research. From within each of these contracts, we only see 
consultancy, basic exploration or purchase. Instead of multiple entrance points, 
we now have singular entrance points that are regulated and controlled in 
different ways. 
I suggest that this contractual arrangement implied a radically different way of 
managing the neurocell collaboration than what we saw in the former 
descriptions that emphasized multiple roles and relationships. As consisting of 
three occluding screens, the contractual arrangement implied important 
separations between the different roles and relationships that constituted the 
collaboration. As a result, from the perspective of each screen, the collaboration 
emerged as one-dimensional rather than multi-faceted. However, at times, this 
one-dimensional screening of the collaboration was challenged in practice. I now 
describe how the occluding aspect of the contracts became a practical problem. 
 
Dissolving screens 
In the contract that described a future collaboration between Lundbeck and the 
university research environment, it was stated that Lundbeck, in exchange for 
annual grants, would get access to new research findings, specifically those 
relating to Martin’s research. The university management preferred this 
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formulation, since making a framework agreement in which Lundbeck was given 
access to all research related to neurocell at the university was seen as risky and 
not feasible. However, although the contract formulation had aimed at a limited 
access, the fact that Martin, in practice, was part of every publication became a 
problem. As a consequence of this contractual formulation, a large group of 
researchers were indirectly drawn into the collaboration between Lundbeck and 
Martin. According to Hans at Lundbeck, an emerging conflict within the university 
group threatened to jeopardize the long-term value of collaborating with the 
group as a whole: 
All of a sudden there are some young associate professors that are asked if they are part of 
Martin’s group or not. They are clearly still working with Martin, so from our perspective we can 
say, “Yes, they are part of it.” They are also independent and have their own funding, but they are 
dependent on a close collaboration with Martin, and his name is on their publications. 
As Hans argued, making a formal contract between Lundbeck and Martin created 
new boundaries. Although these boundaries were part of a legal construction that, 
in some sense, seemed quite far from the collaborative activities, it still affected 
the group. Making these contracts implied strongly articulating some relations 
while ignoring others, and prioritizing research coming from some researchers 
rather than others. Within the contracts, this was not a problem because, from a 
legal point of view, this occluding construction was conceptually possible. 
However, in practice it was quite difficult, and also unfortunate, to occlude the 
larger network of researchers that was involved in neurocell research. It was 
unfortunate because the value of the collaboration lies in exactly the way in which 
it preceded without clear distinctions between groups and activities. The 
occluding effect of the contracts eventually became such a significant threat to the 
collaboration that lawyers at Lundbeck and at the university reopened the 
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contracts and defined the relation between Lundbeck and Martin in a way that 
took into account the activities and people that related to Martin. 
I suggest that this example, even though it is only briefly presented here, is 
important for understanding the science-industry collaboration and what 
managing it entails in practice. It is particularly important to notice that the 
collaboration is managed in a quite open way that allows things and relations to 
emerge. As we see, as things develop, it becomes more pressing to control 
relations that are potentially commercially interesting. However, enforcing this 
control, for instance, through contracts, is not unproblematic, since the openness 
of the collaboration is also its potential value. Openness simply allows things to 
emerge that are impossible to imagine before they are suddenly there, as one 
research manager stated it. 
I now move to a discussion of what using screens as analytical tools has so far 
resulted in. 
 
Screens and doable problems 
Working with this case of neurocell collaboration in Lundbeck raised a number of 
questions concerning science-industry relations and the management of strategic 
research. What characterizes science-industry collaboration in Lundbeck? What 
kind of management issues does it raise? How are individual collaborations such 
as the neurocell case related to overall strategies? As I have suggested, 
attentiveness to various forms of screens and modes of screening is helpful in 
addressing such questions. Here I suggest that this mode of analysis can be 
enhanced also by taking into account Joan Fujimura’s notion of doable problems 
(Fujimura 1987, 1996). 
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Looking at the collaboration in terms of constructing a doable problem highlights 
the fact that the collaboration was the result of a number of interactive events, 
which together produced the doability of neurocell research. The collaboration 
was not the outcome of rational choice among research managers in Lundbeck 
but rather the consequence of experimentation in which research managers co-
produced neurocell with many other people. It took hard work to figure out how 
new ideas about the behavior of neurocell might relate to Lundbeck’s strategies 
and its business. To say that the collaboration was simply a matter of good timing 
would be to significantly underestimate the effort that went into getting it into 
place. The notion of doable problems focuses attention exactly on the articulation 
work that the group of research managers had to engage in to make the 
collaboration work. 
To Lundbeck research managers, the process of considering neurocell as a 
strategic research area involved quite diverse activities and different phases. As 
mentioned, primarily three Lundbeck research managers worked on making the 
collaboration doable. They did this in quite diverse ways, which together 
illustrate a wide spectrum of articulation work activities related to making 
neurocell research strategic to Lundbeck. 
Hans, the divisional director, was familiar with the university researchers, Martin 
and Søren, since he used to be employed at the university before coming to 
Lundbeck. In Lundbeck, Hans was known for having an extensive network and for 
being up to date on the relevant research issues. In order to access the neurocell 
collaboration, Hans would be the one who had browsed through journals to read 
about neurocell and who discussed specific data and new opportunities with the 
university research group. He also had insight into the governance of research at 
the university and detailed knowledge of the collaboration agreements. 
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Lars, the head of drug discovery, was concerned with quite different issues. His 
main worry was how the collaboration activities relating to neurocell would fit 
into the portfolio of research projects in Lundbeck. Working on this problem 
involved drawing numerous organizational diagrams on how new research 
entered Lundbeck and how external projects were resourced. 
Finally, Jens, the head of research, again had completely different concerns. Jens 
was primarily interested in how this collaboration exemplified a new strategy 
focus on biological mechanisms and thus spearheaded a completely new way of 
doing research in Lundbeck. To Jens, working on the collaboration involved 
making convincing presentations about the relevance of this new approach to the 
general management of Lundbeck, discussing the collaboration with the other 
members of the Research Management Board, and emphasizing the unique 
contractual framework in which new incentive structures were defined. 
At the managerial level, the doability of the collaboration was premised on this 
particular division of labor among the three research managers. Making it doable 
required attending to multiple issues at once: dealing with the science and 
emergent data; aligning with the in-house organization and contemplating 
resources, budgets and governance; and fitting into the broader organization of 
Lundbeck. 
In this regard, it is noticeable that it seemed to take more articulation work to 
make the collaboration doable vis-à-vis Lundbeck than in relation to the external 
researchers. There are many reasons for this. For instance, there was an overlap 
in scientific backgrounds between some of the university researchers and some of 
the Lundbeck research managers; the research managers were as interested in 
this research opportunity as the university researchers; it was a matter of 
experimentation and as a new phenomenon in Lundbeck, it was necessary to 
explicate what the collaboration opportunity was about and afforded in terms of 
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business opening. I would like to emphasize this point that the problem of 
doability was not mainly an external achievement but rather an internal one. For 
what this suggests is that the worlds that had to be aligned to make the 
collaboration doable were not mainly a Lundbeck world in contrast to a 
university world. Rather, a number of things needed alignment in-house whereas 
it seemed fairly easy to construct a contractual arrangement between the 
involved parties. It was even possible to adjust this external framework when it 
showed to cause certain unwanted problems. It was certainly the case that there 
were distinct interests and engagements at play in the collaboration, but the main 
problem had little to do with creating alignment between academic and 
commercial interests, for in fact academic and commercial did not emerge as 
clearly distinct to begin with. To understand this situation, I return to what it 
might mean to think of the collaboration in terms of screens. 
I have already mentioned several situations in which events can be understood in 
terms of screens that do something such as categorize or occlude. The transfer 
document operated as a categorizing screen that separated Martin-the consultant 
from Martin-the researcher, and the three contracts each described one relation, 
while occluding others. What if we consider the feasibility of the collaboration as 
constituted by various screens that make particular categorizations, occlusions 
and projections? 
As noted, there were many shifts in the collaboration; relations changed 
continuously and neurocell transformed from being potentially interesting to 
being greatly important for Lundbeck’s future business. Corresponding changes 
could be observed in how research managers described their partners: they 
changed from being seen as very academic and mainly interesting for scientific 
matters to highly interesting as business partners with specific commercial 
assets. Rather than see these changes as indicative of inconsistencies and 
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misalignments, I suggest that we might see them as produced by different screens 
operating in the course of the collaboration. So rather than say that the 
collaboration was made doable through alignment, I propose that different 
screens produced and governed the dynamics of the collaboration. In that sense, 
forms of screening and doability are inseparable. For one thing, screens that 
differentiated the collaborating parties, or misaligned them, like the contracts 
were as important as screens linked the collaborating partners and made them 
cohere like the idea of a double payment. In some situations, it was important to 
explicate differences among the participants while at other times, it was 
important to explicate an equal interest in the science. 
Rather than notice efforts to align between diverse parties, in this chapter we 
have seen different screens that emphasize efforts to differentiate diverse 
participants. Specifically, we can think about screens in relation to the different 
phases of the collaboration. In the beginning, it was important to screen the 
collaboration as research involving parties with scientific-commercial interests in 
neurocell. The different backgrounds for being interested in neurocell became 
fused into one collaboration. There were efforts to align, even at the level of 
cultural codes as the creased shirt illustrated. In a second phase, differentiation 
became increasingly necessary. A different screening, taking the form of contracts, 
produced collaborators that were clearly distinct. At this stage, the research 
managers no longer support the previously valorized sense of indistinguishable 
activity. Like this, I suggest that the notion of screens is helpful in terms of 
describing misaligned co-production. This is relevant since producing 
misalignment turns out to be as important as, and sometimes even more 
important than, producing alignment. Thus, the main benefit of considering these 
changing relationships in terms of screens that give rise to them is that they make 
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visible a form of articulation work that both create sameness but also seek to 
differentiate between different worlds and forms of engagements. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how a group of research managers from Lundbeck 
deals with an emergent research opportunity. A close study of this collaboration 
has suggested that managing strategic research is neither straightforward nor 
premised on stable categories of industrial and academic interests. Instead, such 
managing requires dealing with a number of complex relations and trajectories 
and it depends on the ability to categorize and occlude these relations in diverse 
way, thus transforming the collaboration, moving it forward and making it doable. 
Using the notion of screens has also raised important questions for the following 
chapters. What constitutes a screen and how does one recognize it? Can screens 
be both intentional and even management tools that are deliberately used or do 
they just coincidentally occur? In this chapter, I have suggested that both material 
things such as documents and discourse such as talk can be made sense of as 
screens. Rather than restrict my analysis to either material objects or discourse I 
have explored screens that produce disconcertment or disconcerting situations. I 
have found these screens the most interesting ones, regardless of what produces 
them, since they can be used to say something new about the challenges of 
managing science-industry collaboration and the different ways this is done, for 
instance, through contracts or with an open approach. I will reflect on this 
question of what produces a screen as I proceed from here. 
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11. THE FIRST ENCOUNTER 
Simultaneous with exploring the neurocell collaboration, another collaboration 
was under preparation. It concerned plans for joint research with the Mayo Clinic 
in Florida, an American nonprofit research institution engaged in medical 
research, research education and treatment.49 Although the Mayo Clinic was not a 
public university, research managers from Lundbeck considered researchers from 
Mayo Clinic as “academics”. As a divisional director in Lundbeck, Hans, said “they 
are definitely academics, you see it in their way of working”. 
Like the neurocell collaboration, “the Mayo collaboration” (as it was called in 
Lundbeck) also explored biological mechanisms involving proteins such as LRRK 
and tau. This took place with a particular interest in the perspectives that these 
mechanisms might hold in terms of developing a drug for Alzheimer and 
Parkinson’s diseases. Unlike the neurocell collaboration, the Mayo collaboration 
did not evolve out of a specific scientific breakthrough that held a commercial 
promise. Rather, it arose due to the personal relation between the head of 
research in Lundbeck, Jens, and the department manager of neuroscience at the 
Mayo Clinic, Adam, who had communicated about what seemed to be converging 
strategies. For years, Jens and Adam had discussed the possibilities of a 
collaboration between Lundbeck and Mayo Clinic but had not yet managed to 
define one. Presently, they were interested in exploring the benefits of working 
together simply by making the attempt. So unlike the neurocell collaboration, in 
which a formal collaboration emerged from a clear sense of urgency, this 
                                               
49 www.mayoclinic.org. I agreed with staff at the Mayo Clinic to use pseudonyms for key people 
but otherwise not conceal that it was the Mayo Clinic. 
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collaboration developed from the strategic decision to try to define a framework 
for research collaboration with Mayo Clinic. 
According to several research managers, defining such as framework involved a 
rather new and open-ended approach to working hypotheses, specification of 
subprojects, scientific approaches, and particular experiments. Rather than 
focusing on a single target this collaboration was strategic in the sense of 
exploring particular areas of interests, centered on tau and LRRK, which it was 
then hoped would gradually develop into entities of relevance for drug discovery. 
 
Recurrent recalling of disconcerting events 
What mainly caught my attention, however, was not this new and open way of 
defining collaboration. It was rather the recurrence of an intriguing story, 
concerning a first meeting between Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic. The story that 
was repeated by Lundbeck research managers (and eventually also Mayo Clinic 
staff), who reveled in detailing the “disastrous” first meeting with scientists from 
Mayo Clinic. The two groups had completely misunderstood each other, both with 
regard to their expectations for collaboration and respective roles. Retelling the 
story, research managers in Lundbeck emphasized the sense of creeping 
embarrassment and surprise they felt when confronted with a completely 
unrecognizable interpretation of their own intents and interests. In Lundbeck, 
this case was often used to illustrate the challenges of research collaboration with 
academics, and in particular how such collaboration involved being confronted 
with external researchers in new ways. It was also noteworthy that the story 
about the first meeting was not only told in the involved management team but 
also seemed to hold importance across teams. In 2009, for example, it was used as 
the main case at a Research Management Board (RMB) seminar called “Future 
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models of external collaboration”.50 It also appeared as a key case at the 
workshop series “Optimize External Research Collaboration” that took place in 
the context of the Drug Discovery Management Team (DDMT).51 
In this chapter, I explore the Mayo collaboration to find out what kind of 
screening processes took place in this collaboration. The case is interesting, not 
least because in spite of the failed first meeting, in hindsight the collaboration was 
described as a success, both by Mayo Clinic staff and Lundbeck research 
managers. Using the notion of screens, I investigate how particular material-
discursive circumstances in this first meeting produced what I see as a 
categorizing screen that separated Lundbeck and Mayo Clinic participants. I then 
explore how this initial screen was dissolved and how other things in the process 
of collaboration eventually produced other categorizing screens. In this chapter, I 
look at the dynamics of science-industry relations as related to the making and 
negotiation of diverse screens, not only screens that produce sameness but also 
screens that make the participants, their interests and engagements, different. 
This chapter is based on participant observation in meetings and seminars in 
Lundbeck in which the Mayo collaboration was discussed and planned. In 
addition, it draws on interviews with the four Lundbeck research managers and 
one business developer who were all deeply involved in the collaboration. These 
people were Jens, the head of research; Hans, the divisional director; Jesper, a 
chief scientist and section head; Trine, the department manager for neurobiology 
and Will, a business developer from the American research site in Lundbeck. 
                                               
50 As described in Chapter 7, I hosted the seminar “Future models of external collaboration” for 
the RMB. The members of RMB repeatedly used the Mayo collaboration as an example of a 
challenging as well successful collaboration with external academic researchers. 
51 As I return to in Chapter 13, I also hosted the workshops named “Optimize External Research 
Collaboration” in which the Mayo collaboration emerged as an important example of 
collaboration. 
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Since I continued to hear about the mutual misunderstandings between the group 
from Lundbeck and the group from Mayo Clinic, I became increasingly curious to 
know how the event was seen from the perspective of Mayo Clinic staff. Hence I 
also interviewed Jerry and Dave who were both principal investigators from the 
Mayo Clinic and each responsible for one of the three main research projects of 
the collaboration; Nancy, a licensing manager at the Mayo Clinic; and Margaret, a 
technology development liaison officer at the Mayo Clinic. Nancy and Margaret 
were both involved in developing the collaboration contract with Lundbeck. 
Except for Nancy, all interviewees participated in the first meeting. The purpose 
of interviewing Mayo Clinic employees was not to ensure an equal representation 
of Lundbeck and Mayo Clinic’s respective perspectives on the collaboration. 
Rather, it was to put into perspective the Lundbeck research managers’ 
perceptions of the event.52 
The opportunity to interview Mayo Clinic employees itself developed in an 
interesting way. After having studied the collaboration from within Lundbeck, I 
was keen on interviewing the department manager from the Mayo Clinic, Adam, 
and the three principal investigators Dave, Jerry and Laura. However, I soon 
realized that getting access to Mayo Clinic staff was not unproblematic. The 
department manager, Adam, never responded to my email requests and Jerry and 
Laura’s willingness to be interviewed was conditioned on approval from the 
licensing manager at Mayo Clinic. However, this manager, Nancy, argued that 
getting such an approval would require a separate meeting in which lawyers from 
Lundbeck and from the Mayo Clinic participated and discussed the terms of the 
interviews. In her view, simply communicating about the collaboration was a 
potential violation of the agreement between Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic. 
                                               
52 See Appendix D for a list of key participants and their positions. 
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However, this situation changed as a consequence of two events. First, Jens wrote 
directly to Nancy that “bringing in the lawyers” would not be necessary, as my 
investigation of the different experiences of collaboration would benefit both 
sides of the collaboration. Second, Nancy herself queried me several times about 
the purpose of my research. During these interviews, it became clear that the 
main problem was not in fact my research as such, but rather that I, as a Lundbeck 
employee, took an interest in investigating a collaboration partner. When Nancy 
learned that interviewing Mayo Clinic employees was part of a PhD project she 
therefore allowed the interviews and allowed that the Mayo Clinic could appear in 
my thesis. She even suggested that I also interviewed “administrative people” like 
herself and Margaret who again had “quite different perspectives” on the 
collaboration compared with Mayo Clinic researchers. Eventually, I was even 
invited to visit two of the Mayo Clinic offices, in Jacksonville, Florida and in 
Rochester, Minnesota.53 
I continue to describe the collaboration as research managers in Lundbeck 
accounted for it. I then explore the disconcertment to which the first meeting gave 
rise, with particular reference to the screens that emerged and collided in this 
meeting. I then examine how and why these screens are constructed and how 
they changed in the process of defining a collaboration. Subsequently, I change 
perspective and look at the same event from the perspective of Mayo Clinic staff. 
Finally, I discuss how we might see these different and subtle screenings as 
significant for the practices of science-industry collaboration and strategic 
research management in Lundbeck. 
                                               
53 A visit to the Mayo Clinic was planned to take place in spring 2011 but cancelled due to 
unforeseen circumstances (pregnancy complications). Instead, I conducted the interviews using 
phone, Skype and videoconference. In one case, I was able to supplement a phone interview 
with a face-to-face interview, as Jerry from the Mayo Clinic was visiting Lundbeck headquarters 
in May 2011. 
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The Mayo collaboration 
In 2007, a group of research managers from Lundbeck traveled to the Mayo Clinic 
in Jacksonville, Florida. The group consisted of Jens, Hans, Jesper, Trine and Will. 
The purpose of the trip was to visit the department of neuroscience at the Mayo 
Clinic. According to interviews, the trip was imbued with several expectations, 
among these to find out if the “personal chemistry” with the Mayo Clinic 
researchers was good and if it would be possible to define a framework 
agreement with the Mayo Clinic concerning research on tau and LRRK. 
In advance, Jens had discussed the purpose of the meeting with Adam and they 
had decided that it would involve a presentation of the department of 
neuroscience and a tour around the Mayo Clinic site, including visiting labs and a 
hospital facility. The trip would also include a joint meeting. On the second day, 
smaller workshop meetings were planned between Lundbeck representatives and 
Mayo Clinic researchers. 
As mentioned, Jens and Adam had discussed the opportunity to collaborate for 
years. However, Jens in particular argued that it was not until now that there was 
a good reason to collaborate. Things had changed, both at Lundbeck and at the 
Mayo Clinic. At Lundbeck, new strategies were emerging that put a strong 
emphasis on understanding the biology of diseases. At the Mayo Clinic, things 
were also changing. The general management of the Mayo Clinic had announced 
that the future strategy of the Mayo Clinic would focus on more basic research. 
Thus, there was a joint interest in exploring biological mechanisms at a basic 
level. I addition, both Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic were under financial 
pressure. In Lundbeck, this related to expiring patents and changes in the 
regulatory system, which pushed the company towards new research models. At 
the Mayo Clinic, basic funds were decreasing and department managers were now 
searching for external funding. One might say that the strategies of the Mayo 
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Clinic and Lundbeck were converging, making joint research sensible from many 
points of view. 
Adam hosted the meeting at the Mayo Clinic, which took place in a large 
conference room. During the day, researchers from the Mayo Clinic came into the 
room, gave presentations, participated in brief discussion with the Lundbeck 
research managers, and left. Consequently, there was a lot of traffic in and out of 
the room. Some Mayo Clinic researchers lingered for one and two presentations 
to hear a colleague’s presentation but only Adam and the group from Lundbeck 
stayed throughout the day. At the end of the day, Adam turned towards the 
visitors and said “Okay, this is what we got, what do you want?” The question took 
the group of Lundbeck research managers by total surprise. A sneaking suspicion 
that had gradually developed during the day was now completely clear: this 
meeting was a complete misunderstanding. But what was the misunderstanding 
about? 
One Lundbeck research manager, Trine, suggested that the meeting was a failure 
because of a mutual misunderstanding of the roles and expertise each of the 
potential collaborators brought to the table. “We were just bombarded with data”, 
she said. According to her interpretation, the Mayo Clinic researchers had 
constructed the Lundbeck group as industrialists that knew exactly what they 
were looking for and therefore would be able to give Adam a clear response to his 
blunt question “what do you want?” However, as she had anticipated something 
quite different, she was now utterly confused. 
We came to them because we were not experts in this. We did not know what we wanted within 
tau. They were the ones that were supposed to give us that input. If it was their money and bid 
and they had to think about how one should approach a disease like Alzheimer’s and had 
decided to focus on tau, what would they do? 
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Trine thus argued that the failure was due a misinterpretation of roles, not 
necessarily the Mayo Clinic scientists’ inability, or unwillingness, to advice the 
Lundbeck research managers on how to explore LRRK and tau with the interest of 
developing a drug. Yet another research manager, Jesper, suggested that the 
failure was in fact due to the inexperience of the Mayo Clinic with industrial 
research. The Mayo Clinic researchers, Jesper suggested, did not have the 
background for presenting their research in a manner relevant to the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
If you are an academic and have spent all your time in an academic world, then you don’t have 
[pause], you live a world where you maybe have a quite untrained perception of how [pause], of 
what kind of research that takes place in the pharmaceutical industry. 
There was a particularly interesting twist to Jesper’s account of the 
misunderstanding. From this argument, it certainly seemed that he believed in a 
separation between academic and industrial research, suggesting, as it did, that 
the Mayo Clinic researchers, being academics, were not able to relate to 
commercial research. However, when I inquired further into Jesper’s notion of an 
“untrained” perception of Lundbeck, it became obvious that he was in fact mainly 
offended by the separation that the Mayo Clinic researchers had made between 
academic research and industrial research, thus failing to acknowledge the 
creativity and openness of commercial, pharmaceutical research. 
I mean untrained because they generally understood what takes place in the pharmaceutical 
industry as much more structured [pause] and so they might have imagined that we would be 
thinking only inside the box and have a much more narrow mind-set that we really had. 
Using the categorizing screen, I now explore what constituted a screen in this 
situation, and what the screen produced in terms of particular categorizations of 
science and industry. As illustrated above, the group of research managers from 
Lundbeck had all observed a particular developing understanding of them that 
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they did not agree with. One research manager argued that the Mayo Clinic 
scientists had misunderstood what Lundbeck wanted and suggested that they 
could just pick and choose. Another research manager suggested that the Mayo 
Clinic scientists were not capable of understanding industrial interests and 
therefore only gave an academic presentation of the science. However, although 
they gave different explanations to what exactly was misunderstood in the 
situation they all saw that a distinction was made. I suggest that the categorizing 
screen can be used to explore what this distinction was about, how it was 
produced in the situation and what implications it had. 
 
Emergent ideas of collaboration 
In spite of their different accounts, the Lundbeck research managers seemed to 
agree that the meeting was a failure insofar as the Mayo Clinic researchers had 
premised it on a misconstrued notion of the potential collaboration and of 
Lundbeck’s role in it. In which sense was the implied form of collaboration 
wrong? As Jens described it, Lundbeck research managers were looking for a kind 
of “equal collaboration”, while the Mayo Clinic researchers were unexpectedly 
acting as if they were entering into what in Lundbeck was termed traditional 
“cash and carry” collaboration. This notion of “cash and carry” was used to 
illustrate collaborations with a clear distribution of roles: a company provided a 
question and “cash” and a research institution provided an answer that the 
company could eventually “carry” home. By “equal collaboration”, Jens meant a 
form of collaboration in which all parties gave scientific input, even as Lundbeck 
would still also be paying for the collaboration. In his mind, this differed from 
“cash and carry”. Although the intention of Lundbeck research managers was to 
establish an “equal collaboration” the arrangement of the first meeting with the 
Mayo Clinic researchers worked as a categorizing screen that made a sharp 
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distinction between companies’ and research institutions’ different engagements. 
The arrangement of the meeting can be seen as a screen that produced a different 
idea about collaboration, more similar to “cash and carry”. 
Even though the concept of an “equal collaboration” was also rather new to 
Lundbeck, the research managers had clearly not expected to be misunderstood 
on this point. After all, there had been a phase of preparation for the meeting. At 
first, Adam had in fact suggested the model of “cash and carry” collaboration to 
Jens, but he had received the response that this was not what Lundbeck wanted. 
Instead, Lundbeck wanted a framework, which would allow for change within a 
number of topics over a period of years. As Jens argued, putting all eggs in one 
basket by betting on just one biological mechanism would be too risky. His 
strategy was rather to broaden the collaboration and initiate a number of 
potentially valuable investigations in which Lundbeck researchers engaged 
deeply in external collaboration. I suggest that we can see these ideas of an equal 
and flexible collaboration framework that had developed in Lundbeck as a screen 
that categorized researchers as more or less the same whether they came from 
the Mayo Clinic or from Lundbeck. 
Jens presented his idea of a flexible framework as quite challenging since a 
contract would often bind the parties for a limited number of years, making the 
research inadaptable to beneficial strategic changes. However, he insisted that, in 
advance of the meeting, he had thoroughly discussed his ideas for such a 
framework with Adam and, so he thought, convinced him that this was an optimal 
way of working together. Accordingly, the Lundbeck research managers shared 
the general expectation that they had flown to the US to explore ideas for such a 
framework agreement. This is why the scenery of the meeting in which current 
research projects at the neuroscience department was pitched to them conflicted 
with their anticipations and produced disconcertment. 
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In fact, it was surprising to Jens that the Mayo Clinic researchers would 
themselves even be interested in a contract research arrangement, given that they 
now had the opportunity to try something different. Why was Lundbeck’s open-
handed invitation to a joint scientific collaboration not greeted with excitement? 
This seemed completely strange, since such collaboration would appear to fit so 
well with the academic work style that Lundbeck research managers had 
observed at the Mayo Clinic. Thus the notion of collaboration itself seemed to hold 
quite different meanings for the participants and quite different ideas about 
science-industry interaction. I propose that we might understand these ideas 
about science-industry collaboration in terms of screens that categorize academic 
and corporate researches as different or similar. In the meeting, different ideas 
about collaboration produced different ideas about roles and interests. The 
appearance of these different categorizing screens produced disconcertment 
among the participants. 
Thus, I see diverse assumptions about science-industry collaboration as screens 
that categorize the participants in different ways. Assumptions suggest that this 
screen is mainly constituted by something discursive. But, as we see in the 
accounts of the meeting, assumptions are also manifested in more material ways. 
There is a particular arrangement of the participants that suggests a separation. 
The Lundbeck participants are sat in front of a screen in a position suitable for 
watching scientific presentations. In comparison, an arrangement of the 
participants at conference table would have suggested that they took part in an 
equal round table discussion. 
The question “this is what we got, what do you want?” that was repeated in 
interviews by several of meeting participants also had the effect of producing a 
separation of the participants and might consequently also be understood in 
terms of producing a categorizing screen. The question indicates that Mayo Clinic 
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offers research that can be purchased or invested in. The question also suggests 
that this research is not going to change as a consequence of purchase. This 
emerging idea of collaboration is offending to the Lundbeck research managers in 
that it presumes that they are not researchers capable of creatively engaging with 
the research but have only a financial or business interest. What we see in this 
example is that assumptions about collaboration, material arrangements of 
meetings and talk all add up to a screen that does something that eventually 
creates a strong reaction among the participants. 
I continue to explore Lundbeck research managers’ self-understanding as 
researchers more specifically in relation to the other major explanation offered by 
them for why this first meeting failed. 
 
A science/industry screen 
How did the Lundbeck research managers feel that their role had been 
misunderstood? First of all, the Lundbeck group was clearly seen as industrialists 
rather than researchers. The Lundbeck research managers were literally placed in 
front of a screen where the Mayo Clinic researchers gave presentations. However, 
they were not invited to join a discussion of these ideas. Further, with the 
exception of Adam, only the Lundbeck group stayed in the room, which made 
dialogue about and between the presentations impossible. At the end, the 
question posed by Adam, simply handed over the initiative to the Lundbeck 
group. In conjunction, a set of discursive and material arrangements generated a 
screen that differentiated between Mayo Clinic scientists and Lundbeck 
industrialists. 
There were important nuances in the research managers’ description of a science-
industry collaboration. According to Hans, because Lundbeck was defined as 
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industrialists, the research managers were also ascribed the limited role of being 
potential “providers of money”: 
Their perception of us was a checkbook. We provided money without demanding something 
particular in return. We were presumed to just say ‘this is a good research group so let’s see 
what comes out of supporting it’. 
Although disappointing, this idea was not unfamiliar, as Jesper suggested, but 
something that he had encountered before: 
We have to move beyond the notion that industry is the ‘cash cow’ in these projects. Apparently 
there is a communication task in this because I often meet this idea that we are just supposed to 
give them money and then they can just proceed with what they are already doing. 
According to Trine, Lundbeck was neither research experts nor investors and 
thus she felt that the screening of her as investor-expert was highly unsettling. As 
she argued, her role was neither to simply fund free research at the Mayo Clinic, 
which she argued that the department managers’ statement “this is what we got” 
had suggested. Nor was she an investor capable of “picking a winner” among the 
suggested research areas. Considering the kind of collaborative relation she 
would be interested in, she said that she hoped the two groups would enter a 
dialogue in order to explore what might be an interesting outcome of the 
research. This might not imply agreement but it would be predicated on a certain 
level of awareness about what the other part wanted: 
But in my mind they were not necessarily supposed to do what we said. They needed to know 
what we wanted and have an incentive for giving us that. 
Hence, a screen that several material and discursive elements in the meeting had 
generated caused her disconcertment. This screen had given her a particular role 
that she did not agree with. The Lundbeck researchers felt mis-categorized as 
industrialists that would provide for the Mayo researchers but in no way 
creatively engage in the research. However, there was something inescapable 
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about the screen; it was not just a matter of expressing disagreement. But how 
then did they see themselves? This becomes clearer as we examine how they 
began to actively change the screens that shaped the encounter. 
 
Changing the screen 
During the meeting, the research managers felt unsettled by the fact that they 
were restricted to a narrowly defined role as industrialists. Hans especially 
reacted against this. At the end of each presentation, Adam turned to the 
Lundbeck delegation to ask if they had any “clarifying” questions. According to 
Hans, the event was planned as a “scientific meeting”, however, the presentations 
were quite generic and somewhat popularized. Hans interpreted this as a polite 
gesture to the visitors. However, it was insulting since it assumed that the visitors 
were unable to understand specific scientific content. During the meeting he 
became increasingly annoyed by being talked down to and he started to engage in 
a scientific discussion. As he explained, he deliberately asked sophisticated 
scientific question to reveal his knowledge. Nonchalantly, he referred to state-of-
the-art publications and mentioned that he used to be an associate professor at a 
university. Primarily, he offered suggestions to show that he related to the 
research as a researcher. To begin with, the presenters ignored Hans’ serious 
involvement as a scientist but eventually something happened. 
It takes a while before they respond really scientifically to your questions […] it was becoming 
really exciting and we became scientifically engaged in it and started to ask questions, and was 
first ignored. But then, all of a sudden, and it was actually Golde who interrupted and said ‘but 
listen this is actually a really good suggestion’. […] If it really was important I’m not sure, but it 
was a mindset, a different way of interpreting the data. 
According to Hans, the screen that was initially created by specific circumstances 
in the meeting (for instance, ideas about collaboration, the presentations and 
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gesture to choose among them) gradually dissolved and eventually changed. The 
Lundbeck research managers acted in a particular way by asking questions and 
initiating debate that was observed by the Mayo Clinic researchers. It created a 
moment of clarification of what the Lundbeck research managers were expecting, 
both in terms of how they saw collaboration and how they saw themselves as 
researchers. 
During the meeting I think they actually get the impression that we think it’s genuinely 
interesting what they do because they see that we are responding to it like other researchers do 
and not just making notes. […] Because of this the atmosphere became good. 
Thus there was a change of screen taking place from a science/industry screen to 
a science/science screen. The science/science screen that developed during the 
discussion of scientific content was not merging the participants into one type but 
rather contained the idea of different but equally scientific or academic 
engagements that connected. 
Changing the Mayo Clinic researchers’ perceptions of the Lundbeck research 
managers was important, according the Hans, not because the Lundbeck 
researchers were vain but because it was important for making collaboration 
possible. Rather than simply chose among presented research, Hans asked the 
Mayo Clinic researchers to make a “research proposal.” The purpose of this was to 
present how research at Mayo Clinic might be relevant for drug discovery. He 
argued that the situation “was not different from if they were writing up an 
application for a research grant”. Writing an application entailed “figuring out 
how to find a target within an area”. According to the Lundbeck managers, making 
such a proposal for new research rather than pitching already existing research 
was an important first step towards the collaboration. Among the proposals 
eventually received, the Lundbeck research managers selected three projects that 
became the core of the collaboration. 
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Now, with the notion of screens we might see the making of a research proposal 
as part of the construction of a new categorizing screen that structured the 
collaboration. Where the first screen that was eventually dissolved categorized 
the participants as very differently engaged in the collaboration, this new screen 
brought them together in a different way. Rather than separate parties with 
separate interests and activities, we now observe a joint group of scientists that 
are working on “a joint research proposal”. 
However, from a slightly different angle, we might also see this collaboration as 
developing from some rather subtle differentiations of science. Not industrial 
science versus academic science but rather particular situated notions of science 
developing in the specific contexts of Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic. These 
notions are not stable but exactly developing in the encounter of other ideas 
about what science is. The idea of a research proposal suggests that Mayo Clinic 
researchers are still offering research to Lundbeck research managers. In this 
sense, Mayo Clinic researchers are still seen as being the originators of research. 
However, the fact that Lundbeck research managers are then capable of looking at 
these proposals and selecting among them suggests that they are also scientists 
that in principle have no problems relating to the research that takes place at the 
Mayo Clinic. This is to say, the science/industry screen is not replaced by a screen 
that makes Lundbeck and Mayo Clinic the same but rather with a more dynamic 
screen that categorize more precise ideas about what describes the participants 
as researchers. 
To begin, the collaboration developed from two main screens both differentiated 
academic and industrial researchers and made them alike. I now move on to 
discuss a number of later key events that shaped the development of the 
collaboration from the initial meeting. As mentioned, I first became interested in 
the recurrent story about a misunderstanding, which nevertheless did not seem 
 190 
 
to have made collaboration impossible. Studying the further course of the 
collaboration, I discovered not only more kinds of categorizing screens related to 
science-industry relations but also screens that distinguished between scientists 
and managers. 
 
Managing screens between the management and scientists 
Shortly after the establishment of the research collaboration, some important 
changes occurred in the organization of the Mayo Clinic. All grants from the 
National Institute of Health were decreased by 10%. Consequently, the Mayo 
Clinic management decided to decrease basic research activities at the 
Jacksonville site and increase its efforts to attract external funds, primarily by 
collaborating with companies. In the transition from one strategy to another, 
many of the principal investigators at the Mayo Clinic was advised to look for 
other jobs, since they might not be able to continue their employment at Mayo 
Clinic. Thus, three of four principal investigators involved in the collaboration 
with Lundbeck soon left the Mayo Clinic for other positions. Dave found a position 
at the. As Department of Medical Genetics at the University of British Columbia, 
Canada, and Adam and Laura at the Center for Translational Medicine in 
Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of Florida the only principal investigator 
in the collaboration, Jerry stayed at the Mayo Clinic. From the perspective of the 
Lundbeck research managers, this meant that collaborating with Mayo Clinic now 
implied interacting not only with researchers at the Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville 
but also with researchers that were in the process of establishing themselves in 
new academic environments. In spite of this important change the collaboration 
was not cancelled. 
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When the Lundbeck research managers accounted for the Mayo collaboration 
they often laughed at the slightly absurd situation of collaborating with the Mayo 
Clinic by interacting with researchers at universities in Vancouver and Florida. 
Even so, the situation did not seem overly frustrating to them: the research 
activities generally continued as if nothing had happened. This illustrates the 
important point that moving between the neuroscience research environments at 
the Mayo Clinic, universities in British Columbia and Florida and at Lundbeck was 
not particularly difficult. The environments were, in some sense, very much alike, 
and people working in these places had a very similar academic training. So even 
though these environments were initially viewed as academic, industrial or semi-
private, the collaboration did not rely on these categories. After the frustrations of 
the first meeting, the Lundbeck research managers mentioned no important 
difficulties in working together with former Mayo Clinic scientists, even as they 
moved into new academic environments. Cultural institutional differences 
seemed to be no issue. They did, however, point to another problem that had 
emerged as consequence of the changes at the Mayo Clinic. 
The moving of the Mayo Clinic scientists separated them from the Mayo Clinic 
management and administration. The physical moving of these researchers 
created a new screen that categorized Mayo Clinic managers and scientists as 
very distinct. This screen that was actually in part constituted by an actual 
physical separation had a number of implications for the collaboration. First, the 
relation between the former Mayo Clinic scientists and the Mayo Clinic as an 
institution became ambiguous. Some of them had left in frustration over strategic 
and organizational changes at the Mayo Clinic. Nonetheless, to Lundbeck, and in 
the light of the collaboration, they were still Mayo Clinic scientists. When I first 
contacted the main Mayo Clinic researchers in the collaboration, Laura, Jerry, 
Dave and Adam, I noticed that they were very cautious about talking to me, which 
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in part had to do with the fact that it was complicated to sort out their relations to 
the Mayo Clinic. Getting access to these former Mayo Clinic researchers was not 
only, as suggested earlier, related to my relation to Lundbeck but also with their 
relation to the Mayo Clinic. Although the Mayo Clinic, in this collaboration, still 
employed these researchers they were also external to the Mayo Clinic and had 
new jobs. The three former Mayo Clinic scientists had very different ways of 
handling this. As mentioned, Adam never responded to my email request, 
whereas Laura said that she would be happy to participate but only if the Mayo 
Clinic allowed her to do so. Dave was very keen to participate in an interview but 
also extremely critical of the Mayo Clinic, which made it difficult to get him to talk 
about the collaboration. In addition, he was interested in building a strong 
relationship between his new research environment and Lundbeck but 
completely dissociated himself from the Mayo Clinic. 
These complex relations between former Mayo Clinic scientists and Mayo Clinic 
staff resulted in a number of absurd situations, which the Lundbeck research 
managers described as distinctly frustrating and problematic. The administration 
at the Mayo Clinic was responsible for evaluating the exchange between Lundbeck 
and the Mayo Clinic, which included analyzing whether Lundbeck had received 
the agreed deliverables and whether the Mayo Clinic had received the agreed 
funds. However, this was not an easy task because the research activities and 
collaboration was taking place outside the Mayo Clinic between Lundbeck and 
former Mayo Clinic scientists. As one Lundbeck research manager suggested, 
things worked fine as long as no one was being overly strict about who did what 
from which location. However, towards the end of the collaboration when the 
Mayo Clinic administration started to evaluate the collaboration according to the 
contract who was doing what and was related to whom became very important 
questions to clarify. 
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Using the notion of screens, we can make sense of these events in the following 
way. According to the contract, this was a collaboration between Lundbeck and 
the Mayo Clinic about particular research projects. However, in practice, as a 
consequence of various events such as the moving of the Mayo Clinic scientists it 
became something else: a collaboration between researchers at Lundbeck and 
researchers at the Department of Medical Genetics at the University of British 
Columbia and at the Center for Translational Medicine in Neurodegenerative 
Diseases, University of Florida. In practice, among the researchers from Lundbeck 
and these universities this was not so important. They were still part of the same 
networks and worked on the same problems so therefore it was less important 
which institutions they were affiliated with. However, towards the end it became 
important to make the situation more comprehensible in order to make sure that 
according to the contract the exchange was completed. Sorting out these relations 
created a screen that categorized Mayo Clinic staff and managers as different from 
former Mayo Clinic researchers. In fact, these ending activities also made former 
Mayo Clinic researchers more the same as Lundbeck research managers because 
they all approached the collaboration in what they described as a more pragmatic 
way compared to the Mayo Clinic administration. According to this pragmatic 
approach it was less important whether all deliverables were achieved. It was 
more important that something interesting had come out and this was in fact the 
general perception, which I return to. 
In the final phase, the Mayo Clinic decided to hold back payments from Lundbeck 
to the former and now external Mayo Clinic researchers because it was not clear 
to what extent these researchers had accomplished the agreed tasks. This was 
seen as a tremendous barrier to the collaboration and as an unfortunate example 
of how research and business administration had become separate practices in 
the course of the collaboration. 
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Here we have a screen that is highly important for understanding science-
industry collaboration although it does not address relations between academics 
and industrialists but instead relations between researchers and administrators. 
That certain things in the collaboration (such as the moving of the Mayo Clinic 
scientists) produced this categorizing screen between scientists and business 
administrators says something significant about how dissolved the initial screen 
between Mayo Clinic scientists and Lundbeck investors had become. The 
collaborative actions had shifted from producing a science/industry screen to 
producing a science/management screens. Here I have used the notion of screens 
to explore other types of categorizations that emerged in the collaboration that 
were important although they did not concern the science/industry nexus. 
 
“Knowing enough”  
Before I discuss how the collaboration was seen from the point of view of 
scientists and managers at the Mayo Clinic, I now turn to explore the role of 
making difference in collaboration. Until now, I have described how Lundbeck 
research managers attempted to dissolve what we might see as a screen that 
made them industrialists and not scientists. I have shown how Lundbeck research 
managers became scientists in the process of interacting with Mayo Clinic 
researchers in a particular way. They did various things to make themselves 
slightly more similar to the researchers from the Mayo Clinic. However, although 
it was important for Lundbeck research managers to become scientists to make 
the collaboration possible, I also noticed situations in which it was highly 
important to explicate differences among the researchers, which I now explore. I 
argue that divergence and the explication of difference, as much as convergence, 
move collaboration forward. However, there are also situations in which 
differences are of the wrong kind, or so serious, that they inhibit collaboration. 
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When I interviewed Trine about how the Mayo collaboration ended, she told me a 
story about a discussion she had had with the former Mayo Clinic researcher, 
Dave. These people got along well, and throughout the collaboration they had had 
in-depth conversations about the process. The collaboration was now coming to 
an end simply because the contract was running out. However, Dave suggested 
that they should continue to work together to explore the LRRK mechanism. In 
response, Trine explained to me, she argued that, as an industrialist, there simply 
comes a time where one “knows enough”. This strong emphasis on being an 
industrial researcher was slightly surprising because Trine had earlier explained 
how being equal researchers was highly important. As she saw it, this point had 
been reached, and thus there was no further reason to collaborate. I found the 
idea of “knowing enough” intriguing. When I inquired further into it Trine offered 
the following narrative. 
And then I tell him [Dave] that is very exciting but if you see it from our point of view we already 
have decided to make a LRRK inhibitor. A kinase inhibitor so now we also need a cell based 
assay that can show that we are really dealing with a LRRK inhibitor and an in vivo model that 
shows that we can interfere with the LRRK enzyme, the kinase activity. So we do not need more 
research on this, that’s how we are. We don’t need to know everything about LRRK to do this and 
now we have made our decision and now we are doing it. 
What kind of screens does Trine’s argument produce? We are dealing here with a 
screen that is constituted by talk but that nonetheless is also deeply rooted in 
practices and material organizational culture. Trine describes a situation where 
Dave suggests that more research could be continued in a particular way but that 
this is not interesting to her because she already “knows enough” to accomplish 
what she wants to do next based on the collaboration. Where a former screen 
categorized Trine and Dave as researchers equally interested in these biological 
mechanisms then the expression of “knowing enough” suggests that they are no 
longer equally interested. Rather there is an asymmetry. Dave wants to know 
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more and Trine knows enough. I now suggest that “knowing enough” produces a 
screen that differentiates industrialists and academic researchers. Here Trine 
suggests that industrialists and academics have different accountabilities. 
First, notice the structure of Trine’s argument. It relies on the assertion that “this 
is how we are” and “this is what we do”, and because of that there is no point in 
continuing collaborative research. What she is describing is a specific aspect of 
the identity of the industrial researcher. For the industrialist, there comes a time 
where further research simply ceases to be worthwhile. Making this argument, 
Trine brings into play the organizational context of Lundbeck. From the internal 
point of Lundbeck, external collaboration serves the purpose of collecting enough 
data to make a strong case for a biology. When this data is available, completely 
different machinery starts up in which the biology is tested in cell based assays 
and in vivo models in Lundbeck. The research interest changes as the biology 
moves in-house. In external collaboration, the potential value of the biology is 
explored in an open-ended process, but once inside Lundbeck, it is evaluated for 
relevance and importance based on much more specific and severe criteria. 
Trine talks about the industrialists’ as having a particular relation to knowledge: 
it is a matter of “knowing enough”. However, the issue of knowledge is itself 
intimately related to organizational process, and especially to the different phases 
of the collaboration. The beginning is characterized by a screening process geared 
towards opening up perspectives and be receptive to new inputs, whereas 
towards the end the issues is how to narrow the exploratory process to ensure 
that the production of industrially relevant knowledge can be made at Lundbeck. 
Thus, we encounter efforts to create convergence in the early phases of the 
collaboration and we see the reassertion of difference towards the end. Another 
way of saying this is that there is no clear-cut and general distinction between 
academic and industrial research in the context of this collaboration. At different 
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times, industrial research is characterized by both openness and narrowness. 
Different phases correspond with changes in the attitude to knowledge taken by 
Lundbeck research managers, and this illustrates the often-overlooked fact that 
strategic research is a dynamic process that involves both decision-making and 
exploration. 
Trine suggests that the emphasis on “knowing enough” is distinctly industrial. As 
she argues, “this is how we are”. Even so, we might inquire further into who the 
“we” concerns in this context. Speaking as an industrial researcher, Trine 
emphasizes her difference from her academic collaborator who always wants to 
know more. However, Trine is also a research manager, the department manager 
of neurobiology at Lundbeck. Yet, managing research, no matter if it is at a 
university or in a company, requires making decisions on what research to 
prioritize and develop, resource and promote. In fact, we might easily imagine a 
situation where a research manager at a university argues for discontinuing a 
project because it does not fit with strategic priorities and interests. In this sense, 
too, the distinction between academic and industrial settings blurs. 
 
Mayo Clinic screens: Science/industry 
As mentioned, I became increasingly interested to know how the Mayo Clinic 
collaborators had interpreted the first encounter with Lundbeck. At the Mayo 
Clinic, I interviewed Nancy, a licensing manager; Margaret, a technology 
development liaison officer; Jerry, one of the principal scientists, and Dave, a 
former Mayo Clinic scientist. All had been involved in the Lundbeck collaboration. 
With the exception of Nancy, they had all participated in the first meeting with 
Lundbeck, and they all agreed it had been surprising and more or less a failure. 
The accounts of Nancy and Margaret were particularly interesting because, in 
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their role as administrators, they were partly external to the collaboration. As 
Nancy saw it, the collaboration with Lundbeck “looked like a very good deal” since 
it implied “quite a generous upfront payment” and “the potential for a number of 
milestones that would be related to intellectual property”. However, in her 
account, establishing a collaboration was proved challenging, especially because 
the aim, scope and content of the research project was “a bit of a moving target” 
for both parties. Neither really knew “what they were looking for”. The target 
continued to move even after the collaboration was established as “expectations 
changed in the process”. Where the group of research managers from Lundbeck 
saw the open-ended framework structure as strategically valuable, Nancy viewed 
it as slightly unsettling, as indicative of not knowing what to look for. 
Margaret agreed that Lundbeck’s approach was peculiar. Retelling the events of 
the first meeting, she emphasized that they had not expected the meeting to fail. 
In fact, the Mayo Clinic had had meetings like this with other companies and 
research groups with little trouble. According to Margaret it came as a great 
surprise that the scientific presentations did not generate much excitement. She 
described her moment of disconcertment moment in this way: 
The last thing he [Adam] said in his summary was ‘and now we’d like to know what you think?’ 
And it was like ‘oh my God!’ and I was like ‘no this is not good, this is not good at all’. But when 
one of the men from Lundbeck spoke it was clear to me, I don’t remember exactly what he said, 
but it became crystal clear to me that they didn’t understand the science. 
According to the Lundbeck research managers, the meeting failed because the 
Mayo Clinic researchers did not connect their current research to drug discovery. 
The threat of breakdown was prevented, as the managers from Lundbeck forced 
themselves into the scientific discussion, thus redefining themselves as scientists 
debating with other scientists about a research proposal. However, according to 
Margaret, the problem was that the Lundbeck managers could not understand the 
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science. In her account, the Lundbeck visitors started out as scientists who 
gradually turned into industrialists who did not have the same scientific training 
and interests as Mayo Clinic investigators. She used the disconcertment 
experienced at the meeting to reflect on the differences between scientists and 
companies: 
I see that the scientists think that they are talking to a scientist, but they are not. They are talking 
to a company, the company’s goal is to make money not to develop a whole knowledge base, and 
they are not as interested in the knowledge as in the end result. 
From the perspective of Lundbeck participants, a joint research proposal solved 
(their version of) this problem. Using the terminology of a research proposal 
made it possible to transform the Mayo Clinic presentations of on-going research 
into a collaborative project. This new research project defined a small number of 
focus areas and explored the potential of specific biological mechanisms for drug 
discovery. The idea of a research proposal that was familiar to all scientists made 
the Mayo Clinic investigators start to think in terms of specific goals, timelines 
and milestones. However, Margaret had quite a different story. At the end of the 
first day of Lundbeck’s visit there was a joint dinner. Although Margaret described 
the dinner as a casual get-together, the atmosphere was rather gloomy. The 
disconcertment from the meeting had not disappeared and the participants were 
still struggling to interpret what had taken place. Feeling that something had to be 
done, Margaret began talking to the visitor sitting next to her: “you know, I don’t 
think our people have a clue as to what your people want from us”, she said. This 
led to a conversation about “the basic structure of the relationship”, which took its 
point of departure in the kind of collaborative arrangements that Lundbeck had 
had with other academic institutions. Margaret concluded that Lundbeck was 
“looking for a very broad type of goal yet with a specific milestone”. “Then I saw 
the light go on at the people from Lundbeck”, Margaret said. Asked how she would 
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describe the change in mutual understanding between the morning and the 
evening, she explained: 
Well, the difference was that it was a much broader. In the morning, it was like a dissertation 
with full details and scientific, but in the evening it was more general. It was generalized ‘okay, 
so we have this target and we’d like to spend some more time identifying it and it’s going to be a 
major marker for Parkinson’s disease and we would like to develop some mouse models for it, 
what we could do if we worked with you, we could develop cell based assay to do drug 
screening’ because that’s what Lundbeck was interested in. 
Clearly, the forms of screening applied by the collaborators to one another are 
different. Indeed, we are witness to a radical reversal of accounts. Lundbeck 
managers viewed themselves as mistakenly identified as investors looking for a 
contract research arrangement. In contrast, they saw themselves as scientists 
entering a collaboration on an equal footing with Mayo Clinic scientists. They 
complained that the presentations were too popular whereas they wanted to 
engage real science. According to people from the Mayo Clinic, however, the 
problem was that they initially mistook the Lundbeck collaborators for scientists 
capable of understanding the details of research. However, during the meeting, 
this perception changed and instead Mayo Clinic participants came to see the 
Lundbeck representatives as people from a company, primarily interested in 
making money. Hence, they gradually popularized their discussions to make them 
understandable by their visitors. 
The extent to which both of these opposed versions rely on standard 
categorizations of science and companies is noticeable, not least because the 
situation was also clearly hybrid. Yet, in spite of the incommensurable 
interpretations of events and even of mutual identities, the involved parties were 
clearly also able to communicate and connect. Gradually, the mutually exclusive 
interpretive screens that occluded the potentials of collaboration were replaced 
with others that produced sufficient similarities for the groups to fruitfully 
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collaborate. As noted, difference and divergence was reasserted at the very end. I 
now take a final look at the kinds of screens that emerged during the 
collaboration, from the point of view of Mayo Clinic employees. 
 
Mayo Clinic screens: Science/business 
Although there was a strong focus on science as the key factor that either 
connected or differentiated Mayo Clinic from Lundbeck, both parties also had a 
focus on business and intellectual property rights. It took more than a year to 
negotiate the contract. In Lundbeck it was often said that the aggressive IP and 
licensing strategy of the Mayo Clinic caused this delay. Indeed, although the Mayo 
Clinic appeared as the academic partner of the collaboration, the research 
managers in Lundbeck often joked that the Mayo Clinic was much more business 
oriented and eager to settle things in advance than Lundbeck. However, as the 
collaboration developed, the categorization that separated the Mayo Clinic and 
Lundbeck along the axis of science/business, transformed into a screen that 
separated science and business within the Mayo Clinic. 
According to Nancy, it was profoundly disconcerting to realize that the scientists 
working with Lundbeck were leaving the Mayo Clinic, in part because she became 
aware of this very late in the process. 
I must admit I have never seen this happen before. The scientists that were working with 
Lundbeck left Mayo within a three-month period, […] it was really appalling. I mean quite 
honestly from our end, we didn’t, my office didn’t find out about it until really close to when they 
left. And I called, I think it was Will at Lundbeck as soon as I knew, and I think they actually knew 
before I did. 
The Mayo Clinic researchers were leaving the Mayo Clinic due to changes in the 
research strategies that meant that basic research would not be as highly 
prioritized as in used to be. Since these scientists saw themselves as scientists 
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involved in basic research they all sought other job opportunities. Both Lundbeck 
research managers and the former Mayo Clinic researchers gave this explanation. 
At the time of the scientists’ leaving from Mayo Clinic, there was a close 
interaction between these scientists and Lundbeck researchers. When the 
scientists left, the contract became immediately relevant, since it was necessary to 
re-evaluate the obligations and funding agreement. According to Nancy, it was a 
scramble to figure out what had taken place between Lundbeck and the 
researchers at the Mayo Clinic, as she realized that her office had effectively been 
sidetracked from the collaboration, making it very hard to get an overview. Based 
on this experience, she reflected on the gradual separation between business and 
scientists at the Mayo Clinic. During this phase, she saw no collaborative problems 
between Mayo Clinic scientists and Lundbeck scientists who seemed to be 
“talking back and forth” and shared the news about the moving researchers as if 
they were colleagues. However, she felt that her office had been separated from 
both the collaborative scientific activities and business discussions: 
What we lacked very much on the Mayo end was a coordination between the business people, 
you know, myself and Bernadette, and our Mayo scientists and also a lack of communication 
with Lundbeck’s business people. So the scientists were talking back and forth, one assumes that 
they were happy with how things were progressing, and then, you know, things are starting to 
go a little wrong and they called me up saying ‘Lundbeck is asking for more than we originally 
had agreed upon and we can’t do it’, we begin to hear about the problem after it has occurred 
rather than being in the discussion so that we could have helped before there was a problem. 
What started as a distinction between Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic ended as a 
distinction within the Mayo Clinic. What do we learn from this observation? It 
draws attention to constructions that are not directly related to distinguishing 
scientists from industrialists but nonetheless have importance for science-
industry collaboration. It also suggests that we should not only look for barriers 
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and gaps between collaborating institutions but also think more openly about 
what might prevent and advance collaboration. 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas the previous chapter analyzed the management of emergent relations, 
this chapter has illustrated how external collaboration in Lundbeck involves 
experimenting with new frameworks for such emergent relations. As we have 
seen, developing such frameworks is challenging. Among other things, it involves 
a series of subtle and dramatic shifts in constructions of difference and similarity, 
convergence and divergence. 
It is interesting to notice how far this case is from illustrating asymmetries in the 
sense of industrial dominance (as envisioned by, for instance, Vallas and 
Kleinman 2006). Indeed, we are rather witnessing to the co-production of science 
and industry. Co-production is not a result of collaboration between two 
institutions, representing science and industry, but the result of being deeply 
involved and implicated in the same thing, in diverse ways. Thus sometimes 
Lundbeck research managers will argue that the value and interest of the 
collaboration, as far as Lundbeck is concerned, is in the open format and the 
opportunity for making a broad search. At other times, we hear them say that, of 
course, they are searching for results that can be developed into a drug. Indeed, in 
the case of the Mayo collaboration, the Mayo Clinic seemed to expect more 
industrial determinacy than they actually encountered. The initial disconcertment 
produced by this surprise opened up for a process in which the object of study 
could be mutually defined. While I would not argue that industrial dominance 
nowhere takes place, this leads me to suggest that strategic research, at least as 
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developed in Lundbeck, does not in a general sense conflict with academic 
research agendas.54 
External collaboration with academic groups clearly emerged as a new form of 
strategic research in Lundbeck and to a remarkable extent this happened 
detached from the rest of the Lundbeck organization. To get a better sense of the 
Lundbeck organization, I now turn to an analysis of how external collaboration 
related to this broader organizational context and to other emerging forms of 
strategic research. 
  
                                               
54 This might be seen as similar to Perkmann et al.’s notion of “academic engagements” 
(Perkmann et al. 2013). However, Perkmann et al. suggest that collaboration with industry does 
not (at all) alter academic agendas. What I suggest here is co-production, which implies change 
but not dominance. 
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12. MAKING SCREENS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While I studied external collaboration, Synapse was launched and managers 
began discussing the implications of this strategy for external collaboration. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, Synapse was the name for a new strategy that 
emphasized making connections (hence the idea of synapses) between areas that 
were imagined to be separate. This included connections between Lundbeck and 
an outside world, in part constituted by external research collaborators. In 
addition, it involved connections within Lundbeck between separate divisions of 
Lundbeck such as Research and Development. For example, Hans reflected on the 
implications of Synapse. He suggested that some existing external collaborations 
would not have been possible to initiate under Synapse since it introduced the 
idea of thinking things through all the way to the Clinic. Synapse, it seemed, 
initiated some new ways of legitimizing research that somehow made it more 
complicated to start research without knowing the ending. 
The Synapse strategy process thus introduced the idea of creating more 
integration between separate parts in Lundbeck. Doing so, it drew on the idea of 
initiating research on a rational basis. Whereas external collaborations had 
previously been initiated based on the initiative of a small group of research 
managers, new research was now going to be initiated as a joint decision among a 
broader group of managers. It would also be based on a systematic investigation 
of opportunities. 
This chapter is based on interviews and conversation with Lundbeck research 
managers who participated in developing strategies in the process of Synapse. It 
is also based on interviews and conversation with (senior) research managers 
who were members of an established Synapse management and made final 
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decisions on which strategies, reorganizations and approaches to develop and 
implement. 
After shortly introducing Synapse, I explore a number of disconcerting topics that 
came up in interviews with research managers, which reflected on the first phase 
of this strategy process. Contrary to the previous chapters, the forms of 
disconcertment I engage in this chapter were related to processes that stretched 
over a longer time period rather than an isolated event. I am particularly intrigued 
by the fact that it seemed to be more difficult for research managers to collaborate 
with people from Lundbeck than with people from the outside. Indeed, it seemed 
to imply more risk for research managers to open up their decision processes to 
other perspectives than to let external collaborators influence priorities. I 
continue to use the notion of screens to explore how activities in relation to 
Synapse produced various specific categorizations of research and new 
projections of what strategic research entails. 
 
Introducing Synapse 
Synapse was introduced in 2009 and continued until 2011. The process involved 
an extensive reorganization in the Research division and it defined a new 
approach to initiating research. Synapse had several phases. Here I focus on two 
most important phases as far as the research managers were concerned. The first 
was an initial phase in which new research areas and approaches were identified. 
The second phase aimed at integrating Research and Development processes. 
Both were, at least to start with, based on the idea that creating more integration 
between preclinical and clinical research and between Research and 
Development would improve the chances of becoming more innovative. Including 
clinical perspectives in the prioritization of very early research projects would 
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potentially increase the future value of these projects. Clinical perspectives could, 
for instance, make sure that the early research projects addressed a clear unmet 
need and that it would be possible to make clinical tests of the aims. Similarly, the 
inclusion of people from development in the prioritization of research projects 
was meant to make it more likely that the transition from research to 
development would be smooth. 
This first phase, which took place in 2009-2010, focused on developing a new 
strategy for research. Management wanted to determine whether Lundbeck 
operated in the right areas of research and whether there were research areas, 
diseases and market opportunities that had been previously overlooked. Before 
Synapse, Lundbeck operated in a limited number of disease areas, which covered 
Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, psychosis, depression and anxiety. The 
intent of Synapse was to investigate whether Lundbeck’s future business could 
include other disease areas. Thus, the process was initiated based on a strategic 
question phrased thus by the CEO: “are we working within the right areas?” 
Phase one of Synapse introduced the idea of what Jens in particular referred to as 
a “biology focus”. This was not completely new to research managers in the 
research division, where the idea of focusing on biology instead of disease had 
circulated among research managers for some years. In fact, an interest in 
biological mechanisms was exactly what had guided the making of both the 
neurocell and the Mayo collaboration. However, in both cases, the research 
managers’ interest in biological mechanisms such as tau, LRRK and neurocell was 
based on their potential relation to specific diseases such as Alzheimer and 
Parkinson’s, and the search for links between biology and diseases had therefore 
not been completely open. Compared to this, Synapse, introduced a more radical 
biology focus. Rather than look at links between biology and a particular disease, 
the intent was to “take a step back” and open up for more broad questions such 
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as: what biological mechanisms do we find interesting and which range of 
diseases might they link to? From now on, new research projects thus had to be 
qualified by strong hypothesis about the biology involved in various diseases. 
This first phase engaged researchers and research managers at several levels. 
However, it also immediately introduced a new division of research managers, as 
a group of senior research managers became part of a Synapse management. The 
Synapse management consisted of managers from Research, Development and 
Clinical Research. It had the role of making final decisions about new strategic 
focus areas based on material and presentations developed in Synapse working 
groups. The members of these working groups also counted some of the research 
managers that usually took part in decision-making. Where research managers 
from different levels of the Research division usually worked together they were 
now separated. Thus, from the beginning, the initial organization of work in 
Synapse created a screen that separated Lundbeck research managers who were 
usually working together, a screen that I return to. 
The consultancy firm Boston Consulting Group (BCG) managed the Synapse 
process. Its role was to keep the process on track and to facilitate the dialogue 
between members of the Lundbeck organization that did not usually work closely 
together. BCG worked closely with the Synapse management, and the general 
management including the CEO, and it generated questions for the working 
groups. It also developed various tools that were to be tested in the groups. 
Early in the Synapse process, the notion of product concepts was proposed as a 
means to develop new research proposals that included clinical and business 
perspectives. I now examine this notion and explore the disconcertment to which 
it gave rise. I suggest that we can understand product concepts as a categorizing 
screen that classified and related various perspectives on research in Lundbeck. 
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Product concepts 
The first phase of Synapse focused on identifying new strategic research and took 
place in the existing Disease Teams. As mentioned, in Lundbeck researchers and 
research managers were organized in groups that were concerned with a 
particular disease, hence Disease Teams. The Synapse management and BCG had 
initiated this phase by simply asking the Disease Teams to list all possible 
indications within the central nervous system that they had come across in their 
work and which did not fall within the categories of Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s. 
For example, this initial phase allowed the Disease Teams to explore dementia, 
not simply as an aspect of Alzheimer’s disease but also as an indication of other 
diseases such as HIV and stroke. To some research managers, this first phase of 
Synapse was extremely satisfactory. It allowed time to go into details with what 
they described as “intriguing” aspects of diseases that there was not usually time 
to explore. This was, for instance, the case for Jesper. 
The interesting about this process was that it was some of the things that we have looked at in 
the Disease Team but then we ended up by saying ‘let’s look at Alzheimer’s because we don’t 
have the resources or time to explore the other indications in depth’. But all of a sudden we had 
the time. 
It was during this phase that the notion of product concepts came up. Members of 
the Synapse management suggested that the notion of a product concept could be 
used as a tool for organizing the proposals that the Disease Teams came up with. 
The notion of product concepts was meant to illustrate that a future product 
should be present in the initial articulation of research proposals. The quality and 
relevance of the research should consequently be evaluated based on the 
potential product that it would result in. Product concepts were designed to take 
a number of perspectives into account at the same time. They were visualized 
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using the shape of a chemical compound, a coronene shape consisting of seven 
adjacent hexagons, one in the center and six surrounding hexagons. 
 
Illustration 6: Lundbeck’s Product concept model. 
The point of this visualization was to emphasize that a product concept ideally 
consisted of a number of components that besides “Disease Biology 
Understanding” also covered “Clear unmet needs” and “Commercial 
Attractiveness”. A product concept thus combined several points, making it a 
concept rather than a loose idea, and it depended on formulating an explicit idea 
of the relation between biology and market perspectives. 
To make product concepts into practical tools not only for generating ideas and 
describing relations but also for getting an overview of indications, they were to 
be filled into an excel sheet, thus eventually creating a database of indications. For 
each idea, the Disease Team members had to fill out a form containing questions 
for each dimension. Thus, these excel sheets catalogued the different possible 
indications that Lundbeck might choose to focus on. To some research managers, 
making product concepts was seen as a new way of making research proposals 
based on what Hans described as coherent “stories” about a potential relation 
between biology and disease: 
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The idea in product concepts was to try to build up a story that said now we have some 
combinations, some new discoveries in the biology and then we are trying to make a document 
where we are trying to get as far as possible within the time that we have. 
However, some research managers also found product concepts problematic. 
They argued that product concepts put strong emphasis on mainly symptoms, 
which resulted in a vast material on diverse groups and subgroups of indications. 
Even if each indication specified a clinical perspective and a business case, the 
approach failed to observe fundamental connections and similarities between 
diseases at the molecular level. Early in the process, some research managers, like 
Jesper, thus felt that the new approach was strangely “old fashioned”. 
Disease was defined in relation to something quite old fashioned, which is a pattern of 
symptoms. Such a pattern of symptoms does not have anything to do with what is wrong with 
you at a molecular level. 
Gradually the Disease Team members came to think that there was something 
wrong with the product concept approach. As they started to upload files in the 
product concept database, it became clear that there were actually several 
problems. First, it was possible to create a new file by making only a minor and 
potentially insignificant change in the indication. Two indications that in practice 
would be the same might thus emerge in the database as completely different 
projects. Rather than group the material in new and useful ways, the product 
concept approach threatened to result in chaos. Indeed, within a very short time, 
the developing database was overloaded with thousands of proposals. 
Second, there was a problem with the way the different perspectives, illustrated 
by the different compartments of a product concept, were taken into account in 
the process of finishing a product concept. In some cases, the Disease Team 
members completed a concept by filling out all dimensions, including clinical 
perspectives. But in many cases, research managers simply single-handedly made 
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a file and completed only the descriptions of indications and the biology link. 
Thus, many concepts were not in reality the result of a discussion between 
different perspectives but rather of listing them that took place independently. 
The result was, according to Hans, an enormous amount of data that was only 
halfway completed. 
That process completely sidetracked because promptly there were 500 product concepts that 
were only more and less filled out by the clinicians. 
In consequence, some of the Disease Team members that worked with product 
concepts did not share the enthusiasm for this tool with the Synapse 
management. Members of the Synapse management emphasized that this was 
simply suggested as a tool for “experimentation”, as suggested by Lars, the head of 
drug discovery. It might reveal something new or it might not. However, it was 
suddenly difficult for the Disease Team members to communicate the specific 
weaknesses of the concept to the Synapse management. Research managers 
explained this as an artifact of the Synapse organization that had separated 
research managers who usually worked together. Rather than explicating their 
criticism to the Synapse management, it seemed that team members made the 
weaknesses of the product concept model visible by purposely overloading the 
database. Some research managers, like Thomas, laughed when they explained 
how the system was completely overwhelmed: 
We totally got the better of the system because it was completely unable to handle [laughing] I 
think we made around 5-600 product concepts in each Disease Team! 
Eventually, the Disease Team members presented the product concept catalogue 
to the Synapse management group. As usual, the presentations provided an 
occasion for discussing the results. During the presentations, it became clear to 
the Synapse management that the product concept model had not worked 
according to expectations. As one of the research managers who presented on 
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behalf of his Disease Team explained, to some members of the Synapse 
management the limitations of product concepts was a genuine surprise. For 
others, the presentation of a final catalogue was an opportunity to state what they 
had thought was obvious from the start. In this vein, Jens, who had been quite 
skeptical about the tool from the start had burst out during a presentation of a 
long list of indications: “but, really, there is nothing new in this!” I now explore in 
more detail what exactly was slightly wrong with the idea of product concepts, 
according to research managers in Lundbeck. 
According to some of the Disease Team members, like Thomas, who had worked 
intensely with product concepts it seemed that although product concepts was a 
new term the approach of taking various perspectives into account was in fact not 
new. Rather, as he suggested, “biology was already taken into account as part of 
considering diverse symptoms”. Consequently, some Disease Team members 
argued that product concepts failed because they were believed to provide 
something vitally new where they were, in fact, blind to how research was already 
a creative process of making connections and comparing perspectives. 
Another research manager, Hans, argued that the main problem with product 
concepts was the idea of having produced a list of available projects that had a 
lasting relevance: 
I think there was an expectation that product concepts would make up a menu of projects, 
enough to feed the organization for the next 2-3-5 years but it wasn’t a menu, it was just pure 
chaos! 
In his interpretation, the hope was to have a final record of proposals that the 
management could return to and pick from, hence the metaphor of a “menu” with 
options to choose from. 
Yet another manager, Andreas, argued that the problem was related to an idea of 
having “turned every stone”. The image of “turning every stone,” suggested that 
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research was a process of discovering what was already there and available for 
scrutiny, hence the image of uncovering something hidden. This image was 
wrong, according to Andreas, because it described research in Lundbeck as a 
matter of simply mapping or listing things. Rather he argued that research in 
Lundbeck required interacting and creation of opportunities in a continuous 
process. At the time of the presentation to the Synapse management, the product 
concept catalogue might have presented the most recent ideas about indications 
and opportunities for making drugs. But from that moment and onwards the 
catalogue would be gradually more and more outdated. The catalogue, he argued, 
was “dead” in terms of setting a future direction. This seemed to be a key worry 
among research managers. 
Even though the product concept model was questioned as tool for generating 
future products,55 it remains analytically interesting because they articulated 
different changing notions of strategic research in Lundbeck. From the 
perspective of product concepts, strategic research was simply that which 
emerged through systematic mapping rather than what emerged through 
experimentation in external research collaboration. Although the notion of 
product concept was originally introduced as a tool for opening up new areas it 
came to constitute a rather restricting screen for defining new strategic research 
areas. It was restricting in two senses. First, it operated with a fixed set of 
categories that the articulation of new research proposals should relate to. These 
categories were promoted as equally relevant and interrelated, although in 
practice some research proposals might be specifically interesting seen from one 
or two perspectives. Thus the product concept model rendered heterogeneous 
research proposals more or less the same, making it difficult to effectively 
                                               
55 Although the model was criticized in Lundbeck Research, it was subsequently modified and 
renamed the “Value Proposition” model or “the flower”, and is today used in Lundbeck. 
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evaluate the potential in each proposal. Second, the product concepts produced a 
restricting screen because they effectively suggested that strategic research 
would be the outcome of a controlled mapping process, which occluded important 
dynamics about how research took place in Lundbeck. Rather, than seeing 
strategic research as emergent, product concepts thus assumed it to be a much 
more controlled process, which included systematic mapping, rational choice, and 
harmonious interaction between diverse aspects of the research. 
As noted, the disconcertment to which product concepts gave rise had to do with 
the fact that this tool failed to take into account the dynamic and creative relation 
making processes connecting disease, biology and patients. In other words, rather 
than a tool that supported the making of such relations, product concepts 
functioned as a reductive categorizing screen that delimited research 
opportunities in advance. 
At the same time, however, Synapse also facilitated the construction of another 
form of screening. This form of screening relied on a distinction between research 
management conceived of as itself a creative process based on intuitions and ‘gut 
feelings’ and the quite different notion that management has to do with making 
rational choice between well-defined options. I now look into the emergence and 
qualities of this screen, and to its consequences for the reorganization at 
Lundbeck. 
 
Transparency and ‘gut feeling’ 
There wasn’t any roadmap for how this process was going to be executed. One of the great ideas 
was that we were trying to invent the process as we were going along. 
As Jesper suggests in this quote, Synapse was premised on the idea that the very 
process of making new strategies in Lundbeck could not be defined in advance. 
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Rather, the Synapse management and BCG intended to find out in the process 
what was the best way of developing new strategies. However, although the 
research managers who participated in working groups in Synapse were all 
familiar with open and uncertain processes (they all had a research background), 
some of them found the particular openness of Synapse rather unsettling. This 
was in contrast to the open and “risk-taking” approach that the very same 
research managers had developed in relation to the neurocell and Mayo 
collaboration. The unsettlement was in particular related to the role of the 
Synapse management. Several research managers said they were unsure why the 
Synapse management did not just set direction for future research rather than 
involve all researchers in the process of finding it. The process seemed 
contradictory, as if it was at once open-ended with regard to how strategies and 
approaches were identified and closed with regard to what the Synapse 
management’s exact plans and intentions were. As Thomas, one research 
manager, argued, it was slightly “mysteries” what the management had in mind: 
Why do they [the management] not come and say ‘you need to work on this and this’? 
At the same time, some of the research managers clearly enjoyed the openness of 
the process since it gave them the opportunity to affect the overall strategy: 
It gave us a freedom to explore what kind of direction we wanted to go in. 
But this direct involvement also created uncertainty. During the initial phase, the 
process of identifying new strategic targets had become extremely transparent. 
Proposals for future research were not just discussed at meetings in Disease 
Teams or presented for the Research Management Group that usually evaluated 
upcoming research ideas. They were out in the open in a database, described in 
detail in lists, and compared. In contrast, it was unclear how the Synapse 
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management used the material that the working groups produced to make 
specific decisions, and in this sense the process was also strangely closed. 
Research managers expressed disconcertment related to the collision of two 
styles of management, represented by the Synapse management and the working 
groups respectively. Where the working groups were asked to consider research 
opportunities using diverse rational tools that made their decisions clear and 
transparent, it was in contrast completely unclear how the Synapse management 
used this material to make final decisions. To some research managers from the 
working groups, it therefore seemed that the Synapse management continued to 
make decisions based on ‘gut feeling’, whereas the working groups were forced to 
feed into these discussion by making material based on rational considerations, 
sometimes against what they found most sensible thing to do. 
In discussions of research opportunities ‘gut feeling’ had indeed been an accepted 
basis for making decisions. Especially Jens was known for a style of management 
where decisions were not the outcome of long systematic investigations but 
rather based on a strong intuition of what was right to do in diverse situations. I 
now explore the disconcertment that I noticed as a result of a collision between 
these two forms of research management. 
After the initial listing of product concepts, the Synapse management decided to 
change focus from indications to biology. A number of biological processes now 
came to work as a sorting mechanism and led to the establishment of new groups. 
Described with the notion of screens, a new categorizing screen emerged in the 
process that related strategic research to biological mechanisms. The members of 
these groups were a mixture of research managers and clinical researchers. Each 
group had a name such as “Neurodegeneration”, indicating the particular 
biological mechanism that was explored. In addition, the Synapse management 
provided the groups with a number of sub-headings describing biological 
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processes such as “mitochondrial dysfunction”, and a list of specific targets. The 
Synapse management now asked the new groups to prioritize biological targets. 
Rather than producing what was now seen as “arbitrary lists”, the groups were 
asked to reach an agreement about their priorities. Thus whereas the product 
concept model had allow collaboration between preclinical and clinical 
researchers to be indirect and uncoordinated, this part of the process forced these 
researchers to work together in a direct sense. To assist this process, BCG 
provided the groups with a rating tool. Thus the groups were to rate each target 
on a scale from one to six based on a number of parameters. For instance, one 
parameter was “drugability”, that is, ability to find a compound that could be used 
as a drug. Another parameter was the likelihood of finding “patients and 
populations”, corresponding to the target. 
The working groups produced detailed presentations of the prioritized targets, 
explaining why each target was selected and why they saw it as a promising 
opportunity. These presentations were given to the Synapse management. During 
presentations, the working group members discussed their finding with the 
Synapse management and the management asked the groups to go back and 
provide more detail on particular targets and ideas. Meanwhile, the Synapse 
management began making lists of priorities based on the input from groups. 
Group members saw glimpses of these lists as they were given requests for more 
information. As one research manager, Trine, argued, it was slightly ambiguous 
what the lists that the Synapse management produced at this time illustrated. She 
started to wonder if topics that were on a list were prioritized highly or rather on 
the way out. 
I did not know how they had reached those conclusions, that is, we laughed a lot about this, right, 
because it was like ‘well does it then mean that the six or seven things, are they on the top of 
their list or the things that are going out, and why do they need more information on this?’ 
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How to characterize this sense of disconcertment? Here I consider it in relation to 
how activities related to Synapse produced a categorizing screen that 
differentiated groups of research managers that usually worked together across 
management levels. This screen categorized research managers into two groups, 
one providing information and the other making decisions. This screen not only 
differentiated between different groups of research managers, it also made some 
processes extremely transparent while occluding others. It made the work of 
producing lists visible while the work related to making decisions using these lists 
and using ‘gut feeling’ invisible, at least to the research managers from the 
working groups. 
Thus, whereas a new form of rationality and transparency was imposed on some 
managers, the decisions of the Synapse management were shielded and occluded 
from view, with the result that these decisions seemed ambiguous and generated 
uncertainty. In some situations, like in relation to the aforementioned lists of 
targets, the contrast between these forms of management became very visible. In 
itself this list suggested a process in which decisions were made according to 
rational criteria. However, the ambiguity of the content of the list suggested that it 
had not in fact been created by rational criteria (c.f. Jensen 2011). 
It is worth repeating that the disconcertment, about lists in particular, and the 
first phase of Synapse in general, was not produced by any general dislike for 
intuitive decisions. On the contrary, it related to the way in which Synapse 
claimed to rationalize research by occluding ‘gut feeling’, which was otherwise 
widely accepted, but only for the lower level of management. As Trine argued this 
meant that it became increasingly difficult, among the working group members, to 
use experience as a valid basis for making decisions: 
I found it very frustrating because I tried to get through with the idea that a lot of what we do is 
somehow based on a ‘gut feeling’ and the experience that you have achieved so why? The 
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managers, why couldn’t they just use ‘gut feeling’ to guide us through this process? They usually 
don’t have a problem with telling us what they think? 
After having focused on the relation between the Synapse management and the 
working groups, I now consider yet a form of disconcertment that some research 
managers in the Synapse working groups gave accounts of. This disconcertment 
was related to working closely with clinical researchers in Synapse working 
groups. Of particular interest is the recurrent observation that many research 
managers seemed to find collaborating with their Lundbeck colleagues from other 
divisions much more challenging and difficult than working with external 
academic researchers. On the one hand, they consistently referred to university 
groups as “external” and to activities in Lundbeck as “in-house”. On the other 
hand, many research managers were much more concerned with their own role 
as researchers in in-house contexts compared to in relation to external 
researchers. What does this tell us about the potential hurdles of strategic 
research and science-industry collaboration? 
 
A research/clinic screen 
As mentioned, one of the initial aims of Synapse was to make stronger 
connections between preclinical research and clinical research. Research 
managers conceptualized this task in different ways. Some suggested that it was a 
process of aligning preclinical and clinical research. Some proposed that it was 
about making a good story that would hold all the way to the clinic. Yet others 
argued that the process was about “broadening to see if a biological concept 
would make up an investment area”. Others emphasized that a new strategic area 
could emerge either from “a biology push” or from an identified “unmet need” for 
a drug, which in Lundbeck was termed “the clinical gold”. 
   221 
 
As Thomas described the work process, the group members were perfectly aware 
of what their joint task was about: 
There need to be a strong biological rationale that kind of argues that this is something we 
would like to do. But there also has to be a need from the perspective of the clinic that says, ‘if we 
could do this then it is because there is an unmet need that legitimizes that we do this’. And the 
clinicians might also say ‘we have a symptom, symptoms, or a patient population that is not 
treated at all and we think that there is something wrong. Can we find a biology that might 
address this?’ That is clinical pull. 
Nonetheless, in practice agreeing on what was interesting and valuable was not 
always easy. It was my impression that the research managers had not previously 
worked this closely with clinical researchers. They had not previously been asked 
to sit down and discuss proposals for future research. Of course they had 
discussed strategies before, as members of Disease Teams, but then their roles 
had been clearer because they were representatives of different ends of a value 
chain. Now, from the perspectives of research managers, the clinical researchers 
were moving in on their territory and interfering in their affairs. This was 
interesting to observe because, among the research managers, there was a 
pronounced awareness that some boundaries in Lundbeck, such as the ones 
between Research and Development and between preclinical and clinical 
research, were not convenient and practical. However, when it actually came to 
inviting clinical researchers into what they understood as their area of experience 
this was immediately experienced as troublesome and difficult. In fact, talking to 
the research managers about their experiences with working with clinical 
researchers elicited detailed descriptions of the differences between clinical 
perspectives and what they saw as “real research”. 
Here we might fruitfully compare the relationship between preclinical research 
and clinical research in Lundbeck with that between Lundbeck research and 
external academic research. As we saw in the previous chapter, Lundbeck 
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research managers not only differentiated themselves from external academics 
from the Mayo Clinic. They also sometimes drew strong parallels, or insisted on 
similarities, even identity. Thus specific collaborations generate emergent forms 
of screening. At best, these forms of screening facilitate a broad spectrum of 
research forms because they do not assume a watertight distinction between 
industrial and academic research. As different screens take priority, external 
academic researchers may indeed emerge as more business-oriented than 
industrial researchers. We saw this in Chapter 10 where academic researchers 
from a university in fact approached research managers from Lundbeck because 
they saw commercial prospects in their research. Hence I concluded that in these 
collaborations, research emerged through a dynamic of changing screens that 
generate emergent relations, rather than emerged as a result of interaction 
between clearly delimited and stable forms of research. In this light, it was 
surprising to see how collaboration between research managers and clinical 
researchers primarily emerged through screens that consistently differentiated 
them and fixed their respective roles. There were of course variations. But 
although the overall intent of Synapse was to integrate and align, I did not in 
practice encounter any forms of screening that supported the merging or 
reconfiguration of these roles. Let us now look closer at how the research 
managers described their collaboration with clinical researchers. 
Rather than bringing value to early research in Lundbeck, the research managers 
generally suggested that working with clinical researchers restricted their ideas. 
As one research manager put the matter, the problem was that the clinical 
researchers held on to “traditional norms” and were unwilling to explore new 
ideas. However, rather than try to understand the reservations clinical 
researchers had to their ideas, some research managers accused the clinical 
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researchers of rejecting interesting proposals based on “personal opinion” or due 
to being “overly cautious”: 
We are confronted with a form of conservatism where we, where it becomes very difficult to sort 
out what is fair and what is just conservatism, right. ‘We have never done that so we can’t do it’. 
Thus, the research managers presented themselves as adventurously thinking out 
of the box and challenging decisions about what can be done. What I find 
interesting here is not the presentation of clinical research as restricted but 
rather the way research in Lundbeck emerges in heterogeneous relational ways. I 
did not interview clinical researchers in Lundbeck and have no basis for 
describing collaboration seen from their point of view, although this would have 
been valuable. Notice how Trine above describes her interaction with in-house 
collaborators. She specifically argues that her research ideas are restricted with 
reference to “what can’t be done”. In comparison, consider the following 
description made by Hans of the role of a Lundbeck research manager in relation 
to an external academic collaborator. 
We come back and say ‘that just isn’t possible’ right where he then says ‘why don’t we just do 
this and develop in that or this disease?’ and I say ‘ that just isn’t possible’ right ‘we can’t make 
those studies’. 
In this quote, Hans is specifically reminding the external researcher, Martin, who 
is thinking out of the box, “that just isn’t possible”. These two descriptions 
describe an identical relationship. They both stage a dialogue between two 
researchers and they both describe how one researcher has generated an idea 
that the other researcher rejects. In both examples, the researcher who proposes 
an idea emerges as an academic whereas the researcher restricting this by saying 
‘no, it is not relevant’ represents an industrial perspective where not everything is 
valuable to do. It is thus more than a bit intriguing that the academic in the first 
quote is a Lundbeck research manager confronted with an in-house clinical 
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researcher colleague, whereas the second quote concerns an external 
collaborator, Martin, faced with a Lundbeck research manager, Hans. I do not 
think that the two situations illustrate inconsistency or contradiction. Rather, they 
offer a vivid illustration of how science and industry roles and perspectives are 
defined by very particular contexts rather than by institutional location. Thus, 
what is categorized as academic and industrial emerges from the interaction and 
is, at the same time, organizing that interaction. 
Before moving on to address the new boundaries, which emerged within 
Lundbeck as a consequence of the Synapse process, I pause to reflect on one 
interesting phenomenon that was brought to light in one of my interviews. 
Synapse seemed to suggest that in order to become more innovative the different 
divisions of Lundbeck would have to learn more about each other’s perspectives. 
Consequently, research managers in Lundbeck had to learn more about 
development and about clinical research in order to take part in making the right 
long-term decisions about research. Yet, research managers did not see this as a 
matter of expanding their expertise or converging with other divisions. As Hans 
said: 
It doesn’t mean that my people have to become experts in clinical studies. They just need some 
kind of idea that that is where we are heading. They should be experts in the basic research and 
that is what they are good at. 
As this illustrates, although there was a strong idea of alignment in the process of 
Synapse there was also the notion that too much alignment would destroy a 
valuable tension between different forms of expertise and research practice in 
Lundbeck. 
You have to make sure that you have alignment in this process. However, you also have to make 
sure that you don’t have too much alignment because then you will kill everything. 
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I now move from considering particular disconcertments related to Synapse to 
look into the implications of Synapse. 
Thus, in the context of Synapse we can observe a form of science-industry 
collaboration that is different from collaboration between Lundbeck research 
managers and external researchers. In this science-industry collaboration, 
Lundbeck research managers become academics and clinical researchers become 
(from the perspective of the research managers) industrialists imposing certain 
criteria of relevance on the research. Although collaboration between Lundbeck 
research managers and external researchers, for instance, from the Mayo Clinic, 
is, in many ways, different from collaboration between Lundbeck research 
managers and Lundbeck clinicians, it seems to produce and draw on a similar 
screen that distinguish academic from industrial. There is a similarity in the way 
what emerges as academic is associated with lively, unrestricted thought 
processes whereas what is associated with industrial is the opposite activity of 
rejecting and restricting according to criteria of relevance. However, by 
comparing these two forms of science-industry collaboration we must also notice 
that research managers from Lundbeck emerge as both academic and industrial, 
depending on context. 
In the context of Synapse, we also find ideas about science-industry collaboration 
that are worth comparing with ideas about collaboration emerging in external 
collaborations. First, we observe that Synapse is based on the idea that innovation 
develops from close interaction between different practices, some academic and 
some closer to market. This idea is recognizable from policy discussions, as 
described in Chapter 8. Thus we see in Synapse a process of convergence between 
assumed separate domains. However, in practice, among research managers in 
Lundbeck, we find the opposite notion, that in fact too much integration comes at 
the risk of important expertise. They suggest instead that collaboration develops 
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from a “valuable tension” between diverse domains. While the idea of complete 
convergence seems quite far from what we saw in Lundbeck’s external 
collaborations the idea of valuable tensions seems much descriptive of this 
practice. Using the notion of screens, we might understand these tensions as 
created by changing screens that generate different categorizations of the 
participants. With this in mind, I now move from considering particular 
disconcertments related to Synapse to look into the implications of Synapse. 
 
The emergence of new boundaries 
In this chapter, I have explored disconcertment related to the specification of new 
strategic research areas and using new approaches. As we saw, the introduction 
of product concepts generated prioritized lists of targets to the Synapse 
management and entailed collaboration with clinicians, both of which produced 
forms of disconcertment. It took the shape not of a drastic shock or a big surprise 
but rather as a subtle form of discontinuity and interruption from the everyday 
norms of work. Exploring these moments is interesting because they make 
explicit what those norms are, and thus of the forms of screening through which 
strategic research in Lundbeck normally unfolded. I now consider in more details 
the actual outcomes of the Synapse process in terms of strategic research. 
Synapse led to a remarkable change of the formal organization of research in 
Lundbeck and, also, to a significant round of layoffs among researchers. The 
layoffs came as a surprise to many of the involved research managers and many 
connected them with the identification of new research areas that they had been 
involved in. Defining new approaches to research, it seemed, had made certain 
existing forms of expertise unnecessary. Indeed, for several of the research 
managers this serious outcome also generated a sense of retrospective 
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disconcertment about the first phase of Synapse. In particular there seemed to 
them a tension between the rather casual way of making new strategies in which 
the process developed along the way, and the very tangible outcome in the form 
of layoffs. 
Before Synapse, research was organized in three lines, Biology, Pharmacology and 
Chemistry, and in four Disease Teams for Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, Psychosis, and Depression and Anxiety. After Synapse, research was 
organized in separate Biology Units that each had its own technologies and 
resources. These Biology Units were named after what was broadly considered 
biological mechanisms: Neurodegeneration, Synaptic Transmission and Discovery 
Chemistry. In this sense, the first phase of Synapse resulted in the making of new 
boundaries, approaches and orientations to research. We can also see this 
reorganization as related to the emergence of new screens that classified research 
according to (disease) biology rather than disease. Aside from the layoffs, what 
were the implications of this new classification? 
According to one research manager, working within Biology Units made daily 
research activities remarkably easier, since the reorganization comprised 
“everything that one needed in one unit”. Consequently, some processes 
immediately seemed to accelerate because there was no preceding coordination 
with the line function. However, according to other research managers, the need 
to coordinate across research projects had in fact been an advantage of the old 
structure. As one manager, Hans, argued, trying to break down ‘silos’ between 
preclinical and clinical research had only produced new ‘silos’ in the research 
division. Biology Units had become what he described as “autonomous entities” 
that could easily operate without coordination. Consequently, instead of working 
together, the Biology Units had become in-house rivals. 
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The risk of Synapse is that you’re making some silos that become competitive units and we are 
too small for that because we do not have enough shared resources. 
In this view, establishing autonomous entities posed a strategic problem. The 
initial phase of Synapse had made it clear that there were many possible roads to 
take. Consequently, management had come up with a number of very broad 
strategic areas, which provided them with a flexibility to define and initiate the 
best projects within these larger groupings. However, making the large areas 
autonomous units with their own technologies and staff also made it very difficult 
to prioritize between the units. What would the research management do, he 
wondered, if they found out the most promising research projects were all within 
one unit? And who would have been given the task to determine the potential of 
projects across the Biology Units? 
Another research manager, Thomas, argued that the Biology Unit structure made 
it easier to collaborate within the unit but made the surface of contact with the 
surrounding organization smaller. He argued that having many potential contacts 
in the organization was important when moving a research project forward. 
Decreasing the number of potential contacts made the structure vulnerable to 
future change. 
The way forward for a project is shorter but people’s surface of interaction within the 
organization has become much smaller. 
Notice again the similarity between this argument for a broad “surface of 
interaction” and Hans’ comment about the neurocell collaborator Martin’s many 
roles as constituting a broad range of “entrance points” (in Chapter 10). Both 
suggest that engaging in complex emergent relations is not a problem that should 
be handled through control. Rather such relations are advantageous because they 
generate more opportunities. But what, in fact, were the implications of Synapse 
for external research collaboration? 
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Synapse and external collaboration 
The first phase of Synapse did not directly address external collaboration but it 
was nonetheless often drawn into discussions. It was widely believed among 
research managers that the Biology Units would interact closely with external 
research groups, as the focus on biology would imply an expertise that the units 
neither had nor could establish. However, something about the rationale of 
Synapse made it more difficult rather than easier to initiate external 
collaborations. As one research manager argued, large framework collaborations 
like the Mayo collaboration would be difficult to initiate after Synapse, for in such 
collaborations the scientific rationale was the outcome of the collaboration rather 
than the starting point. The problem was that in Synapse, the initiation of 
research required not only a rationale but also a clear link to future clinical 
research. Such a link had not been defined in advance of some of the main cases of 
external collaboration, and had indeed even been actively avoided, as was the case 
with the Mayo collaboration. Whereas external collaboration had certainly been 
legitimized in various ways, using different repertoires of justification in different 
contexts, Synapse had produced a new screen in which research promise was 
directly related to clinical outcomes. Consequently, external collaboration ceased 
to offer something of a free space for experimentation and became subject to 
novel forms of screens that relied on much narrower kinds of legitimating. 
In addition to these changed conditions for external research, some research 
managers also argued that the new boundaries of research in Lundbeck had 
consequences for the expertise that Lundbeck researchers could invest in 
external collaborations. As one research manager argued, the old organization 
had given Lundbeck researchers a focused expertise in particular diseases like 
Alzheimer’s. Consequently, they were able to have in-depth discussions with 
external academics in which they contributed with cutting edge knowledge of 
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diseases. With the new organization, each unit would also develop detailed 
knowledge about biology but they would no longer automatically be up to date on 
diseases. This was an important problem since, as we saw in the Mayo 
collaboration, close interaction with external researchers was seen as constituting 
collaboration: 
We actually knew a lot about both Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s before we started to 
make those collaborations. Now we risk going into collaborations where we are going into some 
diseases where we have no expertise at all. That’s a concern I have. 
Thus although external collaboration was considered an important and integral 
part of future strategies, certain strong ideas in Synapse slightly prevented 
external collaboration. The idea of “thinking things through” from start to end and 
the rule of only initiating research projects that clearly anticipated a future drug 
both conflicted with the way external collaboration had previously developed. It 
had often not been possible to think projects through, and external collaboration 
had provided a context for exploring things and gaining more certainty about 
different opportunities. In addition, the organization of research in new Biology 
Units had introduced a new form of expertise that was related to biology rather 
than disease. Contrary to what one would have believed this shift from disease to 
biology expertise had made it more difficult to interact with external researchers. 
With a precise competence in certain diseases research managers from Lundbeck 
had previously been able to challenge the ideas of external collaborators. In 
contrast, a broader knowledge about biological mechanisms did not give them the 
same ability to enter discussions about the direction of a joint research project. 
 
A subtle emphasis on biology 
As we have seen, one of the central ideas of Synapse was that a shift in focus from 
disease to biology potentially opened up a wide range of new diseases. 
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Theoretically, it implied thinking biology before indication, rather than the other 
way around. In practice, however, some research managers argued that this 
reversal was impossible. For in fact focusing on biology did not mean that a 
decision about indications and disease was postponed. Rather, biology, 
indications and diseases were considered together. Synapse relied on an idea of 
connecting biology, indications and diseases, however, as some research 
managers suggested, this implied enforcing an imagined disconnection between 
them. Accordingly, one research manager, Trine, argued that the focus on biology 
did not actually imply a shift to biology but rather introduced what she described 
as “a subtle emphasis”. In practice, a subtle emphasis did not imply a dramatically 
new research routine. As she argued, 
You have to find an indication quickly. Now you just can choose freely among all, but that doesn’t 
mean that you shouldn’t think about it very early in the process. 
Indeed, this research manager suggested that making decisions about indications 
had always been related to biology. The limited number of indications that they 
had previously worked with might have constituted a constraint but thinking 
creatively about biology and diseases had nonetheless always taken place. As she 
argued, 
But really, people who worked in Alzheimer’s disease units before they really tried all they could 
to understand the biology in Alzheimer’s otherwise they couldn’t say that there was something 
that they thought was a better idea than something else. 
Consequently, Trine argued, “the shift to biology was oversold”. Rather than a 
shift from one perspective to another, she argued that Synapse simply implied 
taking more perspectives into account when defining research projects. 
People are thinking harder about how the patient population looks and how the disease looks in 
a clinical perspective and that this is not just something that people will fix when it gets over to 
development. 
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So what at the level of strategies had seemed to introduce radically new research 
practices was at the level of practice rather a matter of describing research in a 
new ways, giving slightly more emphasis to biology and clinical perspectives. 
Synapse obviously implied new emergent boundaries and relations within 
Lundbeck. Several research managers suggested that the new organization of 
research was particularly demanding for research managers and project leaders. 
What, in particular, did they have in mind? 
 
Implications for research managers 
Research managers argued that Synapse had particular implications for their 
work, which I suggest might be made sense of using the notion of occluding 
screens. First, establishing separate Biology Units meant that scientific 
discussions moved out of the coordinating DDMT and into the individual units. 
Since the units did not share resources and technologies, overall coordination was 
not needed. In principle, the units were only considered together by Lars, the 
head of drug discovery, who was responsible for all research activities. The 
research managers in the units no longer had any incentives to discuss progress 
outside the units. We might think of this implication in terms of screen in the 
following way: Activities and ideas that developed in the context of Synapse 
produced new categorizing screens that differentiated between different main 
biological mechanisms. Simultaneously, the separations emerged as occluding 
screens that removed a previous transparency between groups of researchers 
and research activities. 
Some research managers saw this consequence of the reorganization (that we 
might understand in terms of an occluding screen) as problematic because the 
interaction between different divisions had previously been a valuable source for 
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generating ideas. As a result, the research management took various initiatives to 
strengthen interaction between the units. At the annual project review, for 
example, some researchers were appointed reviewers with the task of discussing 
the progress of projects in another unit. However, it was clear that the new 
structure had made it more difficult for research managers to consider the project 
portfolio across units. I propose that Synapse eventually organized research 
activities by generating new occluding screens between sections in the Research 
division, which made it harder for research managers to continue a valuable 
comparison of research projects across the research organization in Lundbeck. 
Research managers also suggested that Synapse posed new challenges for the 
research project leaders. To lead a project post-Synapse entailed working across a 
number of boundaries. Research managers said that the new Biology Unit 
structure made some parts of managing research easier as decisions were made 
locally, in the unit. However, to an increasing extent, the project leader was also 
expected to be particularly proactive in making connections between activities 
that took place both within Lundbeck and outside Lundbeck. As Jesper argued: 
It [the focus on biology] demands a lot from the individual project leaders in terms of being able 
to have things done outside Lundbeck and at the same time make sure that the data gets in. 
I return to the discussion the emergent role of research project leaders in 
Lundbeck in the following chapter. To wrap up this chapter, I discuss how the 
notion of screens helps shed light on the way strategic research emerged in 
relation to the Synapse strategy process in a quite different way than what we 
saw in collaboration with Mayo Clinic and with research groups around neurocell. 
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Synapse and misaligned co-production  
How does strategic research and research collaboration emerge in the context of 
Synapse in Lundbeck? In some obvious ways, the situation in-house is very 
different from the contexts of external collaboration discussed in previous 
chapters. In the context of Synapse, strategic research was rendered as the 
outcome of a rational approach where strategic research areas are chosen after a 
process of mapping available options. This seems to be a more restricted sense of 
research than what we found in the neurocell collaboration. Here, value was seen 
as an emergent quality rather than a feature that was predictable in advance of 
engaging in various research relationships. 
Second, it also seems quite clear that Synapse put an emphasis on collaboration 
between distinct parts of Lundbeck, such as between research managers and 
clinical researchers. Thus, Synapse introduced a new format for collaboration 
where different types of researchers work together in groups to prioritize 
research projects. Again, this is quite a different framework for collaboration that 
the emergent framework of the neurocell collaboration. 
Although in Synapse research managers worked within a framework that 
highlighted processes of integration and alignment it is noteworthy that their 
accounts of relations with other parts of Lundbeck nevertheless continue to be 
based on differentiation. For example, collaborating with clinicians implies 
screens that strongly distinguish between what it implies to be research manager 
and clinical researcher in Lundbeck. So in this in-house context, collaboration, 
even when premised on ambitions of alignment, we also see misaligned co-
production taking place. There is co-production but it develops from ideas about 
how the participants are different and produce different things. 
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However, although collaboration between preclinical and clinical research in 
Lundbeck seems to be premised on divergence there are also moments of 
alignment. Thus, one research manager told me that Synapse has made her think 
very hard about how a disease might look from a clinical perspective. We can see 
these aligning perspectives as examples of some sort of emergent relations. 
However, they are still quite different from the relations that are developed in 
external collaborations such as the Mayo collaboration. 
In the Mayo collaboration, Lundbeck research managers emphasized their own 
credentials as academics. In a sense they became academics or, at least, similar to 
their collaborators in order to collaborate. In collaboration with in-house 
clinicians, the research managers are also emphasizing the importance of clinical 
perspectives. However, the difference is that while they find becoming academic 
important for making collaboration with the Mayo Clinic possible, they do not 
seem to find becoming clinician a constitutive factor of in-house collaboration. 
Drawing in a clinical perspective is a matter of developing a valuable tension 
rather than becoming the same. In this sense, the notion of misaligned co-
production seems to describe an important dynamics of in-house science-
industry collaboration. The implication of Synapse is that research managers can 
no longer refrain from thinking about what happens to a research project once it 
develops beyond their control (co-production) but they still demarcate their own 
research practices from other in-house practices. 
Although the terminology of external collaboration and in-house research is 
prevalent in Lundbeck, the cases I have discussed also demonstrate the ambiguity 
of this distinction. In fact, different forms of screening continuously generate 
multiple externals and internals, even within Lundbeck. For example, within the 
Department of molecular neuroscience, clinical research was external to research. 
As a consequence of Synapse, the unit of Neurodegeneration became external to 
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the unit of Synaptic Transmission. In some cases, external collaborators became 
internal to researchers in Lundbeck simply because they had more related 
interests, backgrounds or approaches. 
This chapter draws attention to the question of whether it is, in fact, in some 
situations, easier for industrial research managers to collaborate with external 
academic groups than with in-house colleagues. The implications of this question 
suggest a new direction for studies of science-industry collaboration. Often 
science-industry collaboration is seen as mainly challenging due to the cultural 
differences between academics and industrialists. As we have seen, the idea of 
such essential difference even emerges in practice in Lundbeck’s external 
collaborations. Remember that the Mayo Clinic researchers took for granted that 
there would be a difference in culture and interests between the Mayo Clinic and 
Lundbeck and that collaboration would develop from quite distinct roles and 
engagements. However, although this idea emerged it was challenged by a 
different idea of science-industry collaboration in which there was an initial 
strong alignment between industrial and academic research interests. At various 
points, it then became important to differentiate, especially towards the end (c.f. 
the idea of “knowing enough”), but this did not change that interaction was not 
hard due to different scientific practices. 
In comparison, in Synapse we see collaboration between research managers and 
clinical researchers. They are part of the same company and they participate in a 
strategy process that even emphasizes further integration. Nonetheless, they are 
far from essentially the same and we can observe activities and talk that strongly 
differentiate research managers and clinicians. For an outsider, these 
collaborating parties might seem the same because they are all part of the same 
company. But what we find is collaboration that develops as misaligned co-
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production for instance, co-production that not mainly seeks to merge but also to 
make explicit important differences. 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored how research managers in Lundbeck have defined 
new strategic research areas using a new rational systematic approach. This 
approach focused on the mapping of opportunities, rational choices and the 
making of connections between separate parts of Lundbeck. Synapse resulted in a 
reorganization that strengthened the emphasis on biology and clinical research. I 
also discussed how collaboration within Lundbeck relied on forms of screening 
that differentiated starkly between kinds of researchers, despite the explicit focus 
on making connections. Finally, I have indicated that research managers in 
Lundbeck take on multiple roles and analyzed how these roles changes depending 
on particular contexts. 
I now turn to consider what, more specifically, characterized the emergent role of 
research project leaders in Lundbeck. In particular, I examine how this role 
produced particular new screens between research and development. To examine 
these questions, I turn to the final phase of Synapse. Here, the focus was on the 
relationship between Research and Development and on the concept of project 
leaders as employees with a particular responsibility for establishing strong 
connections across boundaries. 
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13. THE PROJECT LEADER OF THE FUTURE 
During Synapse, research management was viewed as central to the integration of 
different divisions of Lundbeck. I found this intriguing, since this conception of 
research management resonated with trends in Danish public research policy, 
while it also seemed to have some rather different entailments. In these novel 
collaborations between parts of Lundbeck, conceptions of research management 
were made explicit. These collaborations also brought some of the key 
assumptions about the nature of research in Lundbeck and about collaboration 
between research and non-research out in the open. In this chapter, I explore the 
kinds of screening that emerged in-house in the process of strengthening 
connections between the divisions of research and development. Specifically, I 
investigate the basic forms of categorizations on which the emerging notion of 
research management drew. I also explore various collaboration activities in 
Lundbeck as screens that entail various projections about the future organization 
of Lundbeck and consider how these activities and projections attach value to 
certain forms of research management rather than others. 
This chapter presents a series of events in which I took active part. While 
previous chapters were based on participant observation and interviews, this 
chapter is based on formal participation. For instance, I was the host and 
organizer of a series of workshops, I presented findings and gave 
recommendations to the Research Management Board (RMB), I was a member of 
strategy working groups, and I took part in making a handbook that described a 
new operational model for Research and Development in Lundbeck. This direct 
participation gradually developed during my employment in Lundbeck. It gave me 
the advantage of close access to ongoing discussions and to different screenings of 
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research, collaboration and management. Yet such participation also meant that 
my research became more directly “attached” to ongoing activities in Lundbeck’s 
research management (Jensen 2007). 
Being this directly attached to ongoing activities has implications for how I use 
the notion of disconcertment in the present chapter. Whereas previously I 
explored Lundbeck research managers’ disconcertment in situations that I had 
either observed or encountered in interviews, in this chapter I explore events that 
I participated in, and in which I myself experienced disconcerting moments. In 
some situations, the disconcertment was mine alone, but in other situations, it 
had a public, collective dimension, being shared either among the entire group of 
participants or among research managers. 
Using different forms of disconcertment enables me to explore different aspects of 
research management. I use my own disconcertment to explore what is specific 
about research management practices in Lundbeck. When I experienced surprise 
in various situations, I used this to investigate further what generated my 
surprise, and which assumptions about industrial research management were 
challenged by what I saw. Thus, I used my own disconcertment to investigate 
what was normal in Lundbeck practices. In addition, I used a shared, public form 
of disconcertment to explore what emerged as surprising for Lundbeck research 
managers. This form of disconcertment can be used to explore what research 
managers in Lundbeck found challenging about research management, in 
particular when research management practices in Lundbeck met other practices. 
 
Optimize External Research Collaboration 
During 2008 and 2009, new ideas about external research collaboration started to 
develop among the research managers in Lundbeck. Research collaboration had, 
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of course, always taken place, but now research managers thought explicitly 
about how external collaboration fit with new research strategies and how it 
could best create value. Different concerns were at stake in these considerations. 
For example, Hans, was deeply engaged in initiating collaborations and 
developing specific contracts. Another research manager, Jens, was involved in 
formulating the overall research strategies of Lundbeck, in which external 
collaboration was one focus area among others. Yet another, Lars, was concerned 
with the interface between external collaboration and the in-house organization 
of research. To Lars, reflecting on external collaboration mattered in relation to 
the question of how to optimize the outcome of external collaboration and how to 
ensure a strong link between individual collaborations and overall strategies. 
During this phase, I became involved in organizing a series of workshops about 
external research collaboration. One of the concerns among the research 
managers was that external research collaboration was not given separate 
attention. Instead, it was lumped together with in-house research in Lundbeck’s 
portfolio of research projects. At the same time, there was continuous discussion 
about certain issues that specifically related to working with external 
collaborators. These issues concerned, for instance, how Lundbeck researchers 
could influence and motivate external collaborators, how they could maintain a 
form of scientific expertise that made them capable of challenging external 
collaborators’ ideas and suggestions, and how the scope of external collaborations 
related to Lundbeck’s strategic visions. In particular, Lars was interested in the 
formal organization of external collaboration and in finding ways to optimize 
their outcomes. Consequently, he proposed a series of workshops that would 
explore these issues. The workshops were called “Optimize External Research 
Collaboration”. I hosted these workshops. 
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In total, three workshops were organized in the spring of 2009. In preparation, 
we—Lars and I—made a list of all ongoing external research collaborations. The 
list contained 18 collaborations, different in many ways, but similar in that they 
shared a formal external element, i.e. they all had a collaboration agreement. In 
some cases, the external collaborator was an academic research institution like 
the Mayo Clinic; in others, it was a network of collaborators working on a number 
of projects. In yet others, a contract research organization were the collaborator. 
The workshop participants were project leaders and scientists, as well as 
managers, working with these collaborations. In addition, the Drug Discovery 
Management Team (DDMT) participated. DDMT consisted of Lars (the head of 
drug discovery) and Hans, Niels and Anne who were all divisional directors. 
In advance of the workshops, the project leaders were asked to prepare a 
presentation of the collaboration they led. Specifically, they were asked to 
describe how the collaboration was organized and managed, and how they 
believed it fit within the present developing research strategies. In addition, the 
project leaders were asked to address issues of significance and issues that had 
generated surprise or caused problems. 
The workshops gave rise to lively discussion among the participants. One 
research manager, Trine, emphasized the coincidental development of many of 
the collaborations and argued that the idea of optimizing them, or relating them 
post-hoc to developing strategies in Lundbeck, was rather complicated. Another 
research manager, Jesper, described the difficulties of managing such 
collaborations, since it required leaders to work not only within the constraints of 
Lundbeck, but also to develop an understanding of how things worked at the 
collaborators’ organization. One of the divisional directors, Niels, argued that 
working with contract research organizations was just as challenging as working 
with academic institutions, since it involved cultural differences equivalent to the 
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differences between academics and researchers at Lundbeck. Towards the end of 
these workshops, it was clear that each case presented a different story, and it 
would be difficult to compile a list of generic issues. Lars found this rather 
unsettling and hard to accept. After all, the purpose of bringing the leaders of 
external collaborations together was to discover and develop a way of optimizing 
the management of these collaborations. Instead, it primarily resulted in 
exhibiting diversity, which did not seem like a step forward. 
Eventually, it was concluded that optimizing indeed meant different things from 
case to case, and, therefore, the strategy for managing collaboration had to be 
made “case by case”. Even though the DDMT agreed that this conclusion felt right, 
they insisted that something more tangible had to come out of the workshops. To 
meet this demand, Lars and I developed a checklist for project leaders. According 
to this list, it was important to develop a contractual set-up with a clear 
distribution of immaterial rights and responsibilities. In most cases, this should be 
supplemented with an “adaptive framework” that allowed the collaborative 
content to develop and change (See Appendix A). 
We can make sense of what happened in these workshops in terms of the screens 
that the meeting preparation, presentations and discussion produced. First, the 
planning of the workshops involved a screen that separated in-house research 
projects from research that had a formal external element. This categorizing 
screen separated research areas that were normally not considered to be distinct 
and grouped projects that were usually not considered to be alike. For instance, 
by categorizing external collaborations as similar, the screen constructed “cash 
and carry” projects as equal to the investigation of biological mechanisms. In the 
planning of the meetings, particular screens also developed that emphasized 
organization and management rather than discussion of scientific progress. One 
might say that there was an attempted separation of context (how the research 
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was conditioned and organized) and content (what the research particularly 
concerned). So activities in the planning process produced a screen that separated 
external research from in-house research, and management and organization 
from research progress. 
At the workshops, the participating project leaders gave presentations according 
to the initial screening of these meetings. They gave accounts of various 
management and organizational topics. In these presentations, figures and 
illustrations of molecules were replaced with organizational diagrams. However, 
the discussions that emerged from presenting research in this way challenged the 
initial screening of research according to what was external and relevant for 
organizational/management. Several things became clear. It became clear that the 
external collaborations were not alike, and that categorizing them in this way 
displayed a diversity of different, rather than similar, projects. The screen that 
separated external from in-house also became problematic, because it was clear 
that external activities were closely related to internal activities, which was why 
they were not organized separately. In addition, during the discussions of 
organizational structures, issues about scientific content emerged. For instance, 
one research manager, Thomas, described how a controversy between two 
laboratories with which Lundbeck collaborated was not merely an organizational 
issue, but had implications for the progress of the research. Consequently, he 
suggested that organizational issues were deeply entangled with matters of a 
“strictly scientific nature”. 
In this way, the planning of the workshops had produced a new screen for sorting 
out research in Lundbeck. But using this screen turned out to be difficult because 
it not only categorized but also occluded important relations from sight. 
Distinguishing external from internal, and organizational/management issues 
from scientific progress, occluded the understanding that, in practice, external 
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collaboration was closely related to internal activities and 
organizational/management issues to scientific activities. Thus we might say that 
the discussions during the workshops challenged an initial categorizing, and in 
part also occluding, screen. The workshop discussions also produced a new 
screen with somewhat broader categories. This screen classified research in 
Lundbeck as consisting of interrelated research projects with various internal and 
external activities. This emerging screen arranged matters of research 
governance as closely related to matters of science. In the stories that the project 
leaders gave, these issues were not separate considerations. 
The outcome of the workshops was a “case by case” approach, according to which 
differences and links rather than similarities and neat separations between 
research projects had developed. However, as mentioned, although this approach 
seemed right it was also unsatisfactory, according to Lars. Optimization and “case 
by case” were somewhat contradictory approaches, since optimization involved a 
desire to do something similar to a category of projects, and thus strategically 
move them in a particular direction. Managing these projects “case by case” left 
strategy more open and made it difficult to distinguish how these projects were 
illustrating a new strategic approach to research. In the following, I explore this 
contradiction further. Using the notion of screens helps me explore the 
development of strategic research in Lundbeck as a heterogeneous process in 
which various assumptions and sorting mechanisms are used and negotiated. In 
this case, it was not one document or one verbal expression that made a screen. 
Rather a number of activities produced screens that categorized research in 
particular ways, with implications. We also saw how screens gradually dissolved 
because it did not capture important aspects of research in Lundbeck. 
The workshops “Optimize External Research Collaboration” initiated a discussion 
among research managers about how to make models based on the diversified 
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and changing nature of research collaborations. Simultaneous with these 
workshops, a parallel discussion about took place at the Research Management 
Board (RMB).56 I was invited to present the conclusions from the workshops on 
optimization to the RMB—a presentation that, as we shall see, had a surprising 
outcome. 
   
Project leader competencies 
My presentation to the RMB took place in spring 2010. According to the RMB’s 
secretary, the members were curious about the results of “Optimize External 
Research Collaboration” workshops that had taken place in the context of the 
DDMT. Hence, I was expected to present these results as well as stimulate a 
discussion about organizing and managing external collaboration. Unsurprisingly, 
the RMB was a rather different audience than the DDMT. Although the members 
of the DDMT represented different divisions of Lundbeck’s drug discovery 
research, they all operated within discovery research. In contrast, the members of 
the RMB represented a much broader field of preclinical research, including drug 
discovery, non-clinical safety research (toxicity issues), and patents and 
trademarks. Presenting results from the workshops, therefore, meant presenting 
specific collaboration and organizational issues to a broader audience, not all of 
whom were equally familiar with these issues. 
Aside from presenting the purpose and main issues of the “Optimize External 
Research Collaboration” workshops, I also aimed to explicate the difference I saw 
between the RMB’s ambition to make models for external collaboration and the 
DDMT’s decision to develop a “case by case” approach. The purpose was to 
                                               
56 This RMB discussion related to the aforementioned seminar “Future Models of Collaboration” 
that took place in spring 2009. See Chapter 6 for a description. 
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encourage a discussion about how overall models would be able to anticipate and 
take into account the complex dynamics of actual collaborations. On my 
concluding slide, I contrasted a “case by case” approach with a “model” approach, 
which produced yet another screen that separated two prevalent ways of 
managing research in Lundbeck. I did not argue that one approach was inherently 
better than the other, but I emphasized that the two were only vaguely connected, 
and in some sense even opposed, to one another. 
As I described the outcomes and conclusions of the workshops, members of the 
RMB nodded and gave indications of appreciation and recognition. However, my 
final slide, which screened an adaptive approach as different from strategic 
models, immediately created a confused and unsettled atmosphere. It was not my 
impression that the members of RMB disagreed with the slide content. Yet, 
somehow, there was something slightly unacceptable about making this screen 
and describing the two approaches as being in opposition. 
Breaking the awkward silence, Jens, the head of research, said, “I’m missing a slide 
on the competencies of the project leader of the future”. This created immediate, 
disconcerted laughter in the room, and I also felt slightly confused by the 
question. After another brief silence, I argued that the diversity of research 
collaborations in Lundbeck suggested that there would not be one set of 
competencies but rather various competencies following from the specific nature 
of each collaboration. This explanation, however, did not change Jens’ mind in 
regards to what was missing. “Yes, well, I still need a list of key competencies” he 
argued. Jens, and the rest of the RMB, had clearly understood, even appreciated, 
my presentation of collaboration as entailing emerging relations rather than 
ready-made strategic tools. So what was this request for a list of key 
competencies about? 
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Jens then said that he did not disagree with an adaptive approach. However, he 
was concerned with the apparent “gap” between Lundbeck’s future research 
model and the skills of current project leaders. In this sense, he made the slide 
expressing opposition between the two approaches into a screen that projected a 
particular image of the future in which practice and models were connected. In 
fact, analyzing gaps was part of Synapse and a task that ran in parallel with 
discussions of new research models. Jens further said that, in the near future, 
human resource managers in Lundbeck would start to look for new research 
“profiles”. At this point he would have to decide on the kinds of competencies they 
should be looking for. It was one thing, he said, to agree on a “case by case” 
approach within the Research division. Who would disagree? Yet it was quite 
another thing to be able to communicate to other parts of Lundbeck what 
characterized the specific challenges of research (which the slide suggested) and 
to specify the kinds of researchers and managers needed. Vis-à-vis Human 
Resources, presenting a list of issues that research managers in Lundbeck were 
currently dealing with would simply not “do the trick”. So, he asked, what would a 
list of skills look like that reflected the complex issues that research managers 
were presently dealing with? 
In the following weeks, I made a list of such competencies. I drew on my previous 
experience with management of research in a policy context and on input from 
Lundbeck research managers to do this. For example, the list emphasized the 
need for “a high tolerance level with regards to risk and change”, and the need for 
“experience working with people with different scientific backgrounds”. As he had 
suggested, Jens used the list in following discussions with human resource 
managers. As far as I know, the list was also used at other occasions. For instance, 
two years later a senior research manager, Jørgen, brought the list to a meeting in 
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the advisory board of a Danish university president. Here it was used in a 
discussion of the kind of university candidates companies like Lundbeck need. 
In hindsight, the RMB meeting marked a turning point, at which time Lundbeck 
began shifting from a primary focus on models for the optimal organization of 
external collaboration to discussions of research project leadership. Both the 
research managers and I held on to the notion of the project leader of the future. 
It became a key concern both in the organization, as well as in my own research, 
which began exploring what this notion implied. 
So, how were screens involved in generating this notion of a project leader of the 
future? We see how various presentations of research make categorizations that 
again have implications for what emerges as strategic concerns. As I have 
emphasized throughout this thesis, such presentations can be seen as particular 
screenings of research. In Lundbeck’s annual Project Review, for instance, 
research projects were presented according to progress and expectations 
described in goals and milestones. As I have just shown, my presentation to the 
RMB also produced a screen that separated different approaches to research 
collaboration. Arguing that one approach to research collaboration accepts that 
such collaboration is diverse and messy, while another supposes that it is possible 
to model, my final slide operated as a categorizing screen that created a 
disconnection between two ways of dealing with research collaborations. 
Subsequently, Jens challenged this screening, first, as it seemed, by changing the 
topic of discussion, but, in reality, by claiming that the separation was a false one. 
In relation to parts of Lundbeck that did not share the research managers’ 
experiences, the crucial issue, he suggested, became how to make a model that 
took its starting point in complexity but ended with a list of competencies. 
Subsequently, this very list of competencies that emphasized, for instance, 
“tolerance of change” became a screen on its own with, at least in principle, 
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implications for the recruiting of new project leaders. The list as a screen 
projected a view of future Lundbeck research as a heterogeneous practice that 
nevertheless must be managed by a research manager with particular core skills 
and experiences. 
As we have seen, the notion of the project leader of the future emerged in 
discussions among research mangers in Lundbeck and eventually it became the 
center of attention in the final phase of Synapse. I now move on to discuss how 
the project leader of the future was first developed. 
 
The multi-faceted research manager 
Six months after the discussion of the project leader of the future at the RMB, a 
working group was established with the purpose of further developing the notion 
of future project leaders. I was invited to join the group. The group was asked to 
give a presentation of project leader skills at the annual goal coordination 
meeting in December 2010, once again in front of the RMB. The project leader-
working group had four members: Richard, the head of drug discovery at the US 
research site; Andreas, a chief scientist from the chemistry department; Morten, a 
human resource manager affiliated with the research division; and me. We met 
three times in Andreas’ office in the chemistry building. Participating in these 
meetings gave me valuable insight into how research was approached outside the 
RMB and DDMT. However, it was also disconcerting, as our discussions developed 
into a screen that categorized project leaders as superhuman, which I had great 
difficulties accepting. 
First, I learned that the discussion of the project leader’s role was not new in 
Lundbeck. In fact, Andreas and Morten had both been involved in several former 
groups dealing with this issue. These groups had focused in particular on 
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developing project leader courses and on professionalizing project leaders. In the 
research division, all project leaders were scientists and only a few had actual 
leadership training. For this reason, in-house project leader courses had been 
developed. However, our project leader-working group had a different task. We 
were meant to describe new skills that would potentially be required of project 
leaders in order to deal with research in the future of Lundbeck, post-Synapse. We 
were thus expected to use our different insights into Synapse to predict the kinds 
of skills that would be essential to acquire or nurture. In a sense, we were 
producing a projecting screen for project leaders. 
Based on the first meeting, however, it was clear that we had very different ideas 
about both the implications of Synapse and the role of project leaders. Andreas 
and I argued that one main skill would be the ability to adapt to changes and to 
collaborate with external parties. Morten maintained that the outcome of our 
discussion should be the design of new training modules. Richard argued that the 
project leader of the future would be a multi-faceted artist. Not only would he or 
she have to be an excellent scientist, he or she would also be highly skilled in 
strategy and finance, and, finally, be an excellent leader. The list of imagined 
competencies was overwhelming and grew longer during each meeting. 
There was an ambiguity to the list that made it disconcerting. In particular, 
Andreas and I argued that the list described a broad range of competencies, while, 
in reality, individual project leaders would have combinations of competencies, 
but not all. Thinking that one project leader could possess all competencies at 
once made us laugh. We gave examples of current project leaders who had 
excellent skills in some respects, but were less skilled in other respects. However, 
this did not matter, because in practice they were able to compensate for lacking 
skills. 
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However, Richard, argued that the elements on the list were not optional, but 
parts in a coherent description of the project leader of the future. He argued that 
since the list of competencies addressed a future organization, it was not relevant 
to argue that these competencies could not be achieved on the basis that, today, 
Lundbeck project leaders did not possess them. As Andreas and I challenged this 
view, arguing that the list hardly produced a realistic image, Richard insisted that 
Synapse in fact introduced completely new circumstances for research that would 
require completely new skills. This concerned us all, especially Morten, as the 
human resource manager. Would any of the current Lundbeck research project 
leaders be able to live up to these demands? Were the competencies something to 
strive for and gradually develop, or were we part of a process that would entail 
the replacement of most project leaders? 
The outcome of the meeting was a presentation of the condensed list. We agreed 
to present the list while also describing our reservations about it. However, in 
practice this was made difficult by the fact that Richard gave the presentation and 
was also part of the RMB. So, in the presentation, the project leader of the future 
was described as a strong scientist, a strong leader, who was financially and 
strategically savvy, who was an expert in regulation, and who was good at 
influencing agendas and achieving results. Interestingly, we found it difficult to 
communicate the point that the list did not reflect the present project leader 
practices in Lundbeck. There was something about the way the task of describing 
future skills created an opportunity to think in more abstract terms, unattached 
from the present situation in Lundbeck. The list of project leader competencies 
became a projecting screen that envisioned a completely different Lundbeck. As 
screen the list constructed project leaders as key people in Lundbeck who pulled 
together a number of practices and activities. 
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While our task was to stimulate discussion about project leaders, the list seemed 
at once universal and disconnected from the current situation in Lundbeck. It 
failed to give a qualified estimate of the future that Synapse was generating, and it 
also failed to make a strong connection between that potential future and the 
specific implications for project leaders. Nonetheless, to my considerable 
surprise, the description of the project leader of the future did not at all 
disconcert the RMB, which I return to. Before describing the reception of the 
description, I briefly introduce the context of the goal coordination meeting. As 
the name suggests, at this time in Lundbeck coordination was at the center of the 
research managers’ attention. 
 
The goal coordination meeting 
The annual goal coordination meeting had the purpose of organizing and aligning 
the specific goals for each area within research in Lundbeck. These areas were 
Drug Discovery Research, Non-Clinical Safety Research, and Patents and 
Trademarks. Within the area of Drug Discovery, two research sites needed to be 
aligned: the site in Denmark and the site in the US. Coordinating ideas of research 
between the Danish and the US site was a constant matter of concern for research 
managers. Even though the US site also involved drug discovery, it was seen as 
just as external to Danish drug discovery as other divisions of Lundbeck.57 The 
coordination of goals then implied that the head of each research area within the 
RMB would give a presentation about the coming year’s goals, and they would 
lead to a joint discussion about coherence. At this particular meeting two 
                                               
57 The coordination between the Lundbeck DK and US research sites is a story in itself that I 
have chosen not to include in this thesis. I visited the US site in New Jersey in May 2010. Here, I 
conducted approximately 20 interviews with US research managers. In addition, I held two 
workshops similar to the “Optimize External Research Collaboration” and “Future models of 
collaboration” seminars. 
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additional items were on the agenda. The first was a new set of operational 
principles introduced by the general management of Lundbeck. The second was 
the project leader of the future. 
The goals coordination meeting took place at Munkebo Kro, a luxurious 
restaurant and conference venue in Northern Funen, Denmark. The participants 
were the RMB members and each of their management teams. Thus, the DDMT 
participated along with the management teams of Non-Clinical Safety Research, 
Patents and Trademarks, and the US management teams. In addition to these 
ordinary participants, a number of guests were invited in relation to the 
additional agenda items. Morten, the human resource manager, and Elena, a 
human resource manager from the US site, led the discussion about the new 
operating principles, and Andreas and I participated in the discussion of project 
leaders. The meeting took place over three days. The participants arrived in the 
evening on the first day to have dinner and socialize. On the second day, the two 
additional agenda items were discussed. On the third day, the guests parted and 
the research managers had their goal coordination discussion. Let us then 
consider the screening of research that emerged during these discussions, and the 
subsequent screening of project leaders and the future organization of Lundbeck. 
 
The culture of research 
On the second day of the meeting, Jens began by giving a presentation that related 
the task of coordinating goals and developing joint operating principles to 
Lundbeck’s current situation. This involved depicting the broader purpose of 
Synapse and the way in which Lundbeck, in recent years, had developed as a 
company. To do this, he used a metaphor of trees. 
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Illustration 7: The tree metaphor of Lundbeck’s development. 
Jens’ slide showed two trees. One was withered, in brown and grey colors; it was 
lifeless with almost no branches. The other was large and strong, with lots of 
branches and thick with green leaves. After a sluggish period, Lundbeck had 
recently experienced very considerable growth. The thriving green tree 
illustrated this. However, as also illustrated by this tree, the growth was rather 
uncontrolled. In his imagery, each branch represented a research project that had 
been initiated without prior coordination with other projects. Because there had 
been little coordination in recent years, the result had been that research had 
developed rather chaotically. The task of Synapse was consequently to “prune the 
tree”, as Jens described. This illustrated a new approach to research that entailed 
much more communication and coordination between different research 
practices, as the metaphor of the synapse itself indicated. 
Although “pruning the tree” immediately seemed to suggest something radically 
new and different compared with the image of a green leafy tree, it did not, to my 
surprise, evoke any strong reactions from the group of research managers. The 
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use of images was fascinating, since the green tree was contrasted with the 
withered tree that represented the past. However, the slide did not have an image 
of a tree after it had been pruned, and thus the green tree seemed to illustrate 
something healthy and desirable. But the green tree did not represent the new 
direction; rather the new direction was evoked with the expression of “pruning 
the tree”. The idea of “pruning the tree” seemed to suggest reducing research 
projects in number or controlling them to a much larger extent than previously. 
Thus, it surprised me that the group of research managers did not react more 
explicitly to what the images were suggesting, and that they seemed to accept that 
research needed to be subjected to more control. I see the image of the trees, 
combined with the expression of “pruning the tree,” as a screen that projects an 
idea of future research practices in Lundbeck as increasingly controlled. 
In contrast to Jens’ presentation, the following presentation on the new operating 
principles deeply disturbed some of the participating research managers. Elena, 
the human resource manager from the US research site, opened the discussion of 
Lundbeck’s future operating principles. With the aim of stimulating a more 
coherent culture in Lundbeck, the general management had introduced four 
principles that were, according to research managers, somewhat enforced on 
them. Indeed, it was quite unclear to many of the research managers where the 
principles came from and what they meant. They suggested that the main idea 
was that if employees in Lundbeck followed these principles in whatever 
practices in which they were involved, Lundbeck would operate better as a 
business. First, Elena introduced the four new principles. They were: “Own the 
future”, “Be ambitious and take action”, “Better for less” and “Create results – 
together”. As she explained, these principles were meant to be included as soon as 
possible, both in the annual goals and in the individual goals of all employees. But 
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what might they mean in the practical context of research? For instance, what 
would exemplify a “Better for less” approach? 
To inspire a discussion about their adaptation, Elena, offered an introduction to 
the notion of “culture”. “Each organization has a unique culture”, she argued, “and 
so does Lundbeck”. “But what is culture?” she asked. There were no responses 
from the audience. The situation started to grow uncomfortable. “Well, I have 
brought some examples of culture,” she said, and put on a slide show. The first 
slide had the title “What is Culture?” and showed a cartoon. 
 
Illustration 8: The cartoon illustration of corporate culture.  
Two men sat behind desks wearing oversized harlequin hats. One of them says to 
the other: “I don’t know how it started, either. All I know is that it is part of our 
corporate culture.” Her second example concerned a company in which the CEO 
was always hostile towards his employees. He would often throw pens at his 
employees if they did not do as told. Elena argued, “This is also culture.” Then 
Elena said to the crowd of managers, “So, you see, culture is important,” and she 
asked, “The question is how do we motivate employees to adapt to these 
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operating principles, for example, how do we motivate them to ‘think better with 
less’?” 
Anne, one of the members of DDMT, was clearly affected by the presentation. 
With manifest irritation she exclaimed: “But this has nothing to do with us!” This 
abrupt confrontation clearly unsettled the participants in the room. Some started 
to laugh since the confrontation itself was slightly embarrassing. But Anne 
continued, “The way you talk about culture has nothing to do with us.” Elena 
looked completely surprised by the sudden attack and asked why. “Researchers 
are clearly different,” Anne argued, pointing to the slide with the two men 
wearing harlequin hats. “They are not motivated by external factors like you’re 
suggesting. My employees are driven by curiosity, not some overall principles.” 
What seemed to take place in the situation was a discussion between two 
different perspectives. Where Elena gave an image of culture by drawing on a 
somewhat popular idea of culture, Anne presented research as a unique practice. 
Elena suggested that culture is what makes a group of people cohere. Then she 
addressed the question of what motivates people to work more efficiently and 
coherently in a company, thus making research a practice quite similar to other 
non-research practices. Anne’s image of research as a unique practice generated a 
different screen, categorizing researchers from non-researchers. Drawing on this 
screen, Anne suggested that researchers are not motivated by external factors but 
rather work from a profound interest. The screen that Anne’s account of 
researchers produced has the implication of presenting researchers in Lundbeck 
almost as academics, to some extent detached from the business of Lundbeck. 
This was somewhat surprising, considering that this screening of research that I 
read as suggesting something academic took place in the top research 
management in Lundbeck. However, it was a significant screening that was not 
left unchallenged. 
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Another research manager, Irene, who was Danish but working as a divisional 
director in the US site, interrupted the discussion between Anne and Elena with 
repressed laughter to say, “Well, researchers think they are different but they are 
really not.” This created some amusement, but the affected research manager, 
Anne, did not laugh. Clearly annoyed, she responded, “Tell me specifically how this 
applies to us and what we are confronted with?” She added that she saw no point 
in discussing operational principle “in loose terms”. Then Anne returned to 
Elena’s introduction to operating principles, which suggested that although the 
four operating principles were shared, they were supposed to be adapted to 
particular work tasks in the different divisions. Adapting them meant prioritizing 
a joint discussion of them, as was what took place at the goal coordination 
meeting, and, as soon as possible, integrating the principles in both annual goals 
for each division and employees’ individual goals. Anne asked, “How does 
discussing culture relate to the task of integrating the operating principles in the 
goals of my employees?” Again, this question made the atmosphere in the room 
grow tense. Elena did not answer this direct question. 
At this point, Jens, who had kept in the background during this heated discussion, 
interrupted. He argued that the introduction of operating principles in the 
Research division was a little “enforced” but it was nonetheless the common 
perception in general management that introducing the principles had a high 
priority. However, he also said, “Let’s see how far we get with this”, which seemed 
to calm the divisional director, Anne. Lars supported this suggestion to take it 
easy by suggesting that using the operating principles in practice could be part of 
the evaluation of goals in the spring. 
How can we make sense of this interaction as producing screens with 
implications for research management in Lundbeck? This is an example of a 
public moment of disconcertment. Although it was mainly the research manager, 
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Anne, and eventually the human resource manager, Elena, that felt disconcerted, 
the unsettlement that they felt spread to the other participants. I interpret the 
disconcertment as stemming from a collision of two screens of research that were 
produced by Anne and Elena. Elena’s descriptions of culture, using images of men 
wearing funny hats without knowing why they do so, created a screen that 
categorized all employees in Lundbeck as the same. The analogy she made to the 
cartoon provoked Anne, who experienced it as condescending. Anne, the research 
manager, described research as a unique practice hardly adaptable to overall 
ideas about culture and operating principles. Thus, her account generated a 
completely different screen in which research is separated from non-research. 
In order to understand the relation between the two contradictory screens we 
might backtrack a little. The head of research presents the image of trees and 
proposes that in order to become a healthy company, Lundbeck research 
activities must become more coordinated with other parts of the organization and 
also become more controlled. Following from this image, or screen, Elena’s 
introduction of operating principle makes good sense, as the operating principles 
are meant, and presented as, devices for creating more coordination. However, 
there is something about the screen that Elena produces that is highly provoking. 
I suggest that the image of the two men wearing hats presents an idea of 
coordination in which the coordination is incomprehensible. The core of the story 
is that the two men do not see the immediate purpose of adapting to this culture 
of wearing hats. This is provoking because, according to Anne, the strategy on 
intensifying coordination in Lundbeck does have a comprehensible purpose of 
stimulating better research and products, and is not only a matter of culture. Also, 
as we shall see, many research managers did not associate collaboration with full 
integration and merging into one homogenous culture. Rather they saw 
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coordination as a matter of connecting with a specific purpose, while keeping 
their distinct research practices intact. 
Thus, I used the notion of screen to explore emergent ideas about collaboration 
in-house. In this case, we have an encounter between researchers and non-
researchers (represented by the human resource manager). It is similar to the 
encounter between Lundbeck research managers and Mayo Clinic researchers 
because it also generates screenings of researchers and industrialists. Yet it is also 
quite different from that encounter since it took place in Lundbeck as an in-house 
discussion about strategies and operating principles. Nonetheless, in this in-house 
context we also find situations in which misaligned co-production takes place, a 
point I return to. But how did the idea of research as a unique culture relate to the 
emergent notion of project leaders? 
 
“The spider in the web” 
After this commotion, Richard gave our presentation on the project leader of the 
future. This involved presenting a range of implications of Synapse and the 
aforementioned list of skills, which future project leaders were expected to have. 
Surprisingly, the (to my mind) excessive list of skills did not at all perturb the 
group of research managers. Indeed, when asked to prioritize the listed qualities, 
the response was as follows: “Well, they are all important.” While I had 
anticipated disconcertment about an ideal image of a project leader presented on 
a slide that seemed dense with unsorted information, the managers did not 
perceive this as a problem. In fact, it seemed that to have a list was a priority that 
surpassed the relevance of the listed elements. 
In the context of coordinating goals, however, the discussion of the future project 
leader served a general purpose that went beyond the quality of the list. After the 
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meeting, Jens explained that putting project leaders on the agenda signified that 
the RMB was already developing ideas about project leaders before entering into 
a discussion of leadership in the broader forum of the Synapse management. By 
having made this specification, it was possible to enter into discussions about 
future requirements for project leaders with managers from the Development 
division that saw project management in quite different ways, as I return to. At 
this time, it was anticipated that Synapse would focus precisely on the role of 
management for improving collaboration between parts of Lundbeck. 
While the list of project leader competencies did not generate disconcertment as 
an unsorted list, it did raise questions that suggested a different screening of the 
role of project leaders than the multi-faceted project leader. During his 
presentation, Richard emphasized that, in the future, project leaders would have a 
crucial role in Lundbeck. Project leaders would be initiating new research 
projects, developing them and paving the way within the organization, and they 
would be coordinating with both in-house and external collaborators. He favored 
an image depicting the project leader as, as he said, “a spider in a web”. In this 
account, the spider was the project leader and the web illustrated the many 
relations, internal and external in which the project leader was involved. The 
image of a spider in a web produced a quite different idea about collaboration 
than the emergent relations that Hans had described in the neurocell 
collaboration. According to the spider in the web metaphor, a collaboration 
consisted of fairly stable relations (the pattern of the web), and the project leader 
of the collaboration had a key role (sat in the middle) in controlling these 
relations. In fact, Richard suggested that in external collaborations, the spider was 
a Lundbeck project leader that had full control of relations to the other 
participants in the project. All communication would go through this project 
leader. The counter argument, promoted by myself amongst others, was that 
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Lundbeck might well miss out on potentially emergent relations and interactions 
among the other collaborators if the organization sought too much control. 
At the goal coordination meeting, the idea of the project leader as a spider in a 
web raised disconcerted questions. It was this image of a spider rather than the 
list in itself that produced a disconcerting screen. Towards the end, Hans 
interrupted Richard’s presentation. Hans suggested, “The main problem here is 
that you’re proposing a completely different organization.” Rather than reacting to 
the list, Hans reacted to the projecting screen that the spider-image had produced. 
According to this screen, strong project leaders characterized the future 
organization of Lundbeck. Hans’s objection indicated that something had to 
change radically to make this kind of project leadership possible in Lundbeck. As 
far as Hans was concerned, the project leader as spider was certainly not, as he 
said, “born out of the current Lundbeck”. As he explained, the existing structure of 
the research organization was a matrix structure. It implied three divisional lines 
(Biology, Pharmacology and Chemistry) and a number of disease areas. Today, 
initiating a research project depended on a decision in the DDMT. The DDMT 
members would discuss the relevance of a project and consider how it might be 
resourced. Although Synapse implied a new emphasis on biology and a potential 
change of the matrix structure (which it did by introducing the mentioned Biology 
Units), the existing matrix structure did not leave the main initiative of new 
research up to project leaders. 
Thus, the spider image gave rise to questions such as: What would be the 
implications for divisional directors in charge of coordinating resources and 
strategies? Would the project leader be able to ignore them to pursue his or her 
“autonomous” goals? The questioner, Hans, was extremely concerned with 
ensuring that project leaders would be able to follow their own inclinations 
without seeking careful coordination with the surrounding organization. The 
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main problem with our presentation was thus not the vast amount of skills it 
assumed necessary for project leadership in the future. Rather, our presentation 
came to work as a projecting screen that presented a future organization with 
considerable, but yet unclear, implications for project leaders. This screen was 
disconcerting because it failed to describe the connection between the existing 
organization and the projected organization. 
Another objection was that the presentation took for granted that project leaders 
in Lundbeck already had basic project leader skills. Lars wondered, “I’m not sure I 
agree with you that today project leaders in Lundbeck have basic project leader 
skills in place?” He continued, “And are they really missing these advanced 
political skills that your mention?” He added, “Is the point not that they are quite 
good at building networks but pay too little attention to basic things?” With his 
questions and examples, Lars produced a different screen that forecasted an 
alternative future in which sorting out practical basic things was in fact more 
important than building and controlling networks. By “basic” project leader skills, 
Lars referred to making plans, facilitating meetings and coordinating activities. He 
was known for his strong interest in processes. As he saw it, one of the greatest 
challenges was aligning expectations in-house, for instance, by anticipating 
specific needs in the process of research. Often, he argued, things did not move 
forward as fast as they could because project leaders were not thinking ahead. 
Thus, like Hans, Lars’ comments suggested that our future scenario was not 
sufficiently rooted in Lundbeck’s present situation. 
In these discussions, we are dealing with screens that categorize research and 
project various futures, while occluding present conditions in Lundbeck. I suggest 
that we are witness to the confluence of a set of organizational dynamics related 
to research, collaboration, and expectations about coordination. As noted, a 
strong undercurrent in the discussion is the notion of alignment. Thus, Synapse is 
 264 
 
about “pruning the tree” and aligning decisions and priorities when initiating 
research projects. We also encounter operating principles that are introduced 
with the purpose of creating a more homogenous work culture across Lundbeck’s 
divisions. Yet, these forms of screening, which project a sense of unity, are 
confronted by an alternative screen that presents research and researchers as 
unique and differentiated. 
The emergence of project leadership as a significant theme also makes explicit a 
series of screening processes. On one hand, the project leader is presented as a 
researcher capable of adapting to changing conditions. This screening emerged at 
the RMB meeting in the initial discussion of a “case-by-case” approach to project 
leadership that had been developed in the DDMT workshops on “Optimize 
External Research Collaboration”. This adaptive leader screening collides with an 
alternative projection that emerged during the project leader-working group, 
according to which the competence of the project leader is based on a number of 
predefined skills. The latter projecting screen displayed the autonomy of the 
project leader, and thus focused on what he or she does rather than how he or she 
relates to the broader organizational context. It therefore collided with the 
adapting screen that emphasized the role of the project leader in relation to other 
practices and functions in Lundbeck. 
Let us now consider how these different screens continued to develop and 
interact in the context of Synapse. During dinner on the second evening of 
meetings, I discussed my observations with Jørgen, a senior research manager 
and member of the RMB. I was curious about the apparent disagreement among 
research managers about the potential future of project leaders. Were they 
autonomous scientists or process experts? How did these different ideas relate to 
different views about the status of the current organization and the future 
implications of Synapse? But according to Jørgen these disagreements were 
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insignificant. Even if they seemed fundamental, they reflected only minor 
differences of opinion within the same overarching interpretation of research. 
“The real battlefield”, as he argued, would be the final phase of Synapse. Here 
managers from Research and Development were to work together on developing 
a new operational model for Research and Development. This collaboration was 
referred to as “Point 5.2.” I now explore how the notion of project leaders 
developed in the context of 5.2. 
 
Point 5.2 
Work stream 5.2, the final part of Synapse, focused on strengthening interactions 
between the divisions of Research and Development and was described by BCG 
and the Synapse management as “Defining updated R&D operating model”. It had 
four work streams, which were “Underlying process”, “Know-how exchange along 
the value chain”, “Behavior” and “Governance”. For each work stream, the 
Synapse management established a working group, consisting of managers from 
both the research and development divisions. The idea was to create a new 
operational model that achieved maximum buy-in from both of these divisions in 
Lundbeck by letting the model develop from a joint discussion of what was 
needed. Each working group had a senior manager from Research or 
Development as chair. 
As a member of the former project leader-working group, I was invited to become 
a member of the working group on “Behavior”. This group would discuss which 
kinds of behavior would promote collaboration across the divisions of research 
and development. Besides the members of the former project leader-working 
group, the behavior work group consisted of managers from the divisions of 
development, research and human resources. The work was structured in one-
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day meetings and shorter meetings in subgroups and took place over a period of 
two months in spring 2011. A Boston Consulting Group consultant was employed 
as facilitator. The Synapse management had developed a set of key questions for 
each working group, and the groups were tasked with answering these questions 
by developing presentations containing models and plans. 
To begin, our working group had to delineate its task, since “Behavior” was too 
broad a subject. Several participants suggested that the main problem was 
actually impossible to address, since it was constituted by the different kinds of 
behavior and work styles of the head of research and the head of development. 
However, since these behaviors were too controversial to be turned into a topic 
for conversation, the group decided to concentrate on behavior at the level of the 
management teams. This focus immediately stirred a discussion of the expected 
behaviors of board and management team members, and of people giving 
presentations to these boards. During the discussions of appropriate management 
behavior, the role of project leaders reemerged. 
The working group activities produced somewhat different screenings of project 
leaders than we saw in the research managers’ discussions. The notion of project 
leaders that had been formulated by the research managers and discussed at the 
goal coordination meeting was confronted by a completely different notion of 
management produced in this working group. To account for this discrepancy, I 
turn to a particularly disconcerting moment that illustrates how employees from 
the Development division challenged the notion of project leadership developed 
in the Research division. I take this moment to be of particular importance for 
understanding science-industry collaboration within Lundbeck and for 
accounting for the projected role of research managers in making collaboration 
across boundaries work. Not only does the situation explicate important aspects 
of different perceptions of management in Lundbeck, it also illustrates, in a quite 
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surprising manner, how research managers view the central differences between 
collaboration with in-house non-research practitioners and collaboration with 
external academic collaborators. 
 
The behavior work group 
In the behavior work group, we evaluated various existing material on project 
leaders in order to develop new material that could serve as input to the Synapse 
management. Outside of the group meetings, research managers had suggested 
that one of the collaborative challenges concerned the different views on 
management and leadership held by the Research and Development divisions. 
Research managers emphasized leadership, and they were strongly encouraged 
by Jens, and RMB, to do so. Leadership was associated with the ability to think 
independently of others, to set a direction and to think out of the box. In contrast, 
as research managers claimed, managers from Development emphasized 
management. Management was associated with the opposite of leadership. Rather 
than independent, the management was perceived (by both research managers 
and people from the development division) as teamwork, and as an activity, was 
about assisting to develop processes in a given direction. 
Research managers saw this difference between leadership and management 
emphases as a problem, and sometimes referred to it as the main reason why 
collaboration between research and development was difficult. However, as a 
problem, it was difficult to effectively address for several reasons. It was unclear 
to the research managers whether their colleagues from Development shared 
their perception that this was indeed a key difference that needed alignment. It 
was also difficult to simply ask their colleagues, because research managers 
attributed great value to the notion of leadership. It was awkward to suggest that 
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people in Development had to change their perception in order to become more 
aligned with research managers. 
In the same way that research managers saw their form of nearly academic 
research as a more desirable form of research than clinical research, they also 
saw their comparatively unrestrained form of leadership as more attractive than 
the controlled form of management. Since they associated leadership with their 
own form of research, it was difficult to discuss these differences out in the open. 
One episode, however, presented an opening in which to address and discuss just 
this difference. 
During one workshop in the behavior work group, a human resource manager, 
Hanne, presented a number of slides that described how the divisions of Research 
and Development had previously described the skills of different managers and 
leaders. These discussions had taken part separately in the respective divisions. 
But Hanne had produced a slide in which these role descriptions were combined. 
In the workshop, the slide emerged as a categorizing screen that made the 
differences between behaviors and leadership roles explicit, and thus made it 
possible to specifically address the differences between Research project leaders 
and Development project managers. 
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Illustration 9: The “As Is” slide illustrating the differences between Research leadership and 
Development management. 
Hanne had named the diagram “The ‘As is’”, referring to how this slide 
represented the way in which the two divisions presently described various roles. 
The diagram combined a number of project manager and leader roles – for 
instance, the “PM/D” referred to project managers in the development division 
and the “Project Leader/R” pointed to the project leaders in the research division. 
These roles were then combined with “essential” and “desirable” behaviors for 
each role, drawing on a framework for describing competencies, developed by a 
company. These behaviors were, for instance, “Deciding and Initiating Actions”, 
“Learning and Researching” and “Planning and Organizing”. There were 20 
behaviors listed. For each role, research and developed managers had marked 
which behaviors they found either “essential” (marked by a green dot), 
“desirable” (marked by yellow) or “not relevant” (marked by no dot). 
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Hanne did not make much out of the slide and was already preparing to move on 
when Jørgen who chaired the behavior work group, asked her to wait a minute. 
“Aha! This is interesting!” he said. This increased the attention of the working 
group members who were now staring intently at the slides. Jon, a chief scientist 
who had been occupied with his iPad, looked up and immediately said, “Isn’t it 
interesting that creating and innovating isn’t seen as essential for Development 
managers? It’s not even marked as a desirable behavior.” The group looked at the 
slide. Jørgen pointed to the slide and suggested: “This might be the problem. We 
have quite different ideas about leadership and management.” The participating 
research managers, including the BCG consultant, all seemed to be uncomfortable 
about the slide that so obviously spelled out a difference that otherwise tended to 
remain tacit. However, there was also some relief that the discussion of the 
matter, without coming to the point, seemed to have come to an end. 
Rather than showing any sign of disconcertment, Tanja, a development manager, 
responded: “No, I disagree. I don’t see that there is a problem here”. In her view 
the slide illustrated perfectly both how things were and how they should be. “I do 
not want project leaders running around and disturbing things,” she explained. 
She calmly argued that in development processes “creating and innovating” was 
in fact not appropriate behavior. She explained that she saw research and 
development as two quite different things, and the slide accurately displayed this. 
She then argued that in development processes, management was the proper 
solution, since development was about “keeping things on track” and not 
diverging in all directions. This intervention took place during the Hanne’s 
presentation. Jørgen, who had initiated a discussion about the slide, seemed to 
accept that Tanja did not see the difference as a problem. After a moment of 
quietly contemplating the slide, he suggested moving on. 
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In order to interpret this discrepancy, we may note that the slide introduces a 
screen that defines specific relations between Research and Development, and 
also between leadership and management. According to the slide, research 
project leadership is essentially about “deciding and initiating actions”, “working 
with people”, “relating and networking”, “persuading and influencing”, 
“presenting and communicating knowledge”, “planning and organizing”, and 
“entrepreneurial and commercial thinking”. In contrast, according to the slide 
development project management is essentially about “Working with people”, 
“planning and organizing”, “delivering results and meeting collaborators 
expectations”, “entrepreneurial and commercial thinking” and “adapting and 
responding to change”. Chairing research manager, Jørgen, suggests that the slide 
visualizes a problem of collaboration because research and development projects 
are not managed according to the same ideas about what management should 
involve. To him, collaboration should evolve from a more aligned form of 
management style, based on the essential qualities of project leadership in 
research. In contrast, the development manager, Tanja, sees a different screen 
that categorizes Research and Development as too quite different practices that 
require different management. She suggests that the difference that the screen 
makes visual is not a problem. In her account, the diagram as screen only displays 
that collaboration should be based on an understanding of the important 
differences between research and development. Collaboration is not a matter of 
aligning management styles but about appreciating difference. 
In Lundbeck, in the context of Synapse, ideas about collaboration and leadership 
developed from ideas about what research implies in Lundbeck, and how it 
potentially connects with other (non-research) practices. As we saw at the goal 
coordination meeting, the increasing integration and alignment that Synapse and 
the new operating principles introduced made it more crucial for research 
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managers to explicate what was distinct about research. As the direct 
collaboration between Research and Development managers in the behavior 
work group illustrated, in-house collaboration was fuelled by misalignment as 
well as alignment. Seen as illustrative of a form of science-industry collaboration, 
we might notice a difference between research managers’ collaboration with 
external academic researchers and with in-house development managers. It 
seemed that where external collaboration meant becoming academic at some 
crucial points, in-house collaboration did not imply that research managers 
became development managers at some point. 
I propose that comparing this case of collaboration with Lundbeck’s external 
collaborations shows something important about science-industry collaboration. 
In both cases, we see instances of misaligned co-production in which 
collaboration develops from ideas about being different. In external 
collaborations the need to misalign emerges from conditions in which Lundbeck 
research managers are in fact very similar to their academic collaborators. 
However, in Lundbeck misalignment develops from being part of the same 
company but nonetheless resisting that this condition implies coherence and 
sameness. Lundbeck research is consequently screened as different in both cases, 
however for quite different reasons and with different outcomes. 
Before concluding, I briefly consider the specific outcomes of Synapse in the years 
2011 to 2013. Synapse officially came to an end in 2011 and was replaced by a 
phase of implementation. This phase was referred to as “Synergy” in order to 
emphasize continued efforts to strengthen interaction between different parts of 
Lundbeck. But what were the outcomes of Synapse? And what ideas about 
integration, collaboration and research management did these outcomes reflect? I 
address these questions in the following section. 
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Synaptic outcomes 
One of the most important and tangible outcomes of Synapse Point 5.2 was an 
“R&D operating model”. The model was constituted by the individual 
recommendations that the working groups had developed, and on which the 
Synapse management had signed off. The model thus emerged directly from the 
Synapse work streams. It included a new governance model for R&D replete with 
new boards, management teams and guidelines for knowledge sharing. It also 
included guidelines for the expected behavior of board members and project 
leaders. 
In the behavior work group it became clear that defining a universal model for 
project leadership in Lundbeck was hardly possible or even relevant. Rather, the 
group’s work suggested that there were quite significant differences between 
project leadership and project management, corresponding to the different work 
tasks of the two divisions. In the Research division, project leaders were multi-
faceted scientists that had a key role in moving research projects forward. This 
involved a particular kind of reflexivity, known as “doing the right thing”, even if 
doing so went against normal practice and involved doing something unexpected. 
In the Development division, in contrast, project managers were professional 
managers that were organized in a Project Manager unit. Development projects 
were resourced with project managers from this unit, not invented by them. 
Rather than reinvent processes, development project managers were to keep 
projects “on track” by stabilizing as many factors as possible. This difference 
between leaders and managers was not coincidental, nor did it reflect a more 
advanced culture in Research. Rather, it illustrated a difference in the objectives 
these project leaders or managers were working with and towards. 
Instead of developing one general concept for managers/leaders in Lundbeck, it 
was eventually decided to accept the differences. The research managers accepted 
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that they should not aim to turn development managers into leaders by referring 
to the distinct nature of research. Focusing on the differences meant creating a 
joint understanding of the diverse processes of the value chain. In practice, a new 
project leader training program was developed and initiated. The program 
brought project leaders from Research and project managers from Development 
together in one-day meetings, during which they focused on the particular 
characteristics and aims of each part of the process. The intent was to create a 
mutual understanding based on the idea that collaboration would become much 
easier once the participants had a thorough understanding of the specific 
challenges and concerns of others. 
Synapse 5.2 was framed as an exercise that had the purpose of developing a closer 
connection between the divisions of Research and Development, and different 
ideas of collaboration were shaped in this context of joint project leader training. 
In the context of the behavior work group, some research managers proposed 
that creating a close connection would require developing similar approaches 
with an emphasis on project leadership. This similarity was not imagined to take 
the form of a “third” approach to management/leadership. Rather it implied that 
project managers from the Development division would simply adapt to the 
culture of research and leadership. The idea of adaptation was intriguing in this 
context. Research managers suggested that research was a distinct practice that 
did not easily adapt to general organizational principles. Nonetheless, some of the 
participants in the behavior work group suggested that other parts of Lundbeck 
might adapt to the culture of research. Collaboration, from the perspective of 
research managers, became equivalent to a kind of imposed alignment. In 
contrast, after Synapse, in the context of the new R&D project leader program, 
collaboration became a matter of “understanding differences” without 
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anticipating strong alignment or the merging of distinct cultures and management 
forms. 
In the context of the post-Synapse project leader program, an idea of 
collaboration as “understanding differences” emerged. Collaboration was defined 
as resulting from a process of creating increased understanding for the particular 
phases of developing a drug. Project leaders and managers were enrolled in a 
joint course in which a considerate part of the training concerned the 
pharmaceutical value chain, from drug discovery to sales and marketing. A 
divisional director from the Development division and two members of the 
project leader working group (Andreas, the chief scientists and Morten, the 
human resource manager) developed the project leader training program. It was 
based on the assumption that the more information the participants gained about 
each other’s work practices, the better they would understand each other. 
Eventually coordination would also become easier. I suggest that we might see 
this project leader training program as gradually developing a new screen for 
categorizing collaboration. Rather than merge and align different practices, the 
new screen drew on subtle classification of different work tasks and how they 
related to each other. The main concern was not to smooth out differences 
between work practices, but rather to develop mutual appreciation of those 
differences. I propose that, in this phase, different parts of Lundbeck were made 
accountable to each other while also acknowledging that collaboration did not 
require fusing work into one practice. We might consider this a form of 
intentional misaligned co-production. The project leader training program was 
based on an idea of co-production between Research and Development. But it was 
also developed from an acknowledgement of misalignment, which was different 
from the general operating principles and shared notions of 
management/leadership. In the context of the project leader training program, 
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misaligned co-production was intended and seen as a constructive approach to 
collaboration between research and development in Lundbeck. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how various activities in Lundbeck generated screenings 
with implications for research, management and collaboration. First, in the 
context of the “Optimize External Research Collaboration” workshops, we saw a 
screen that differentiated external collaboration from in-house research. Then, at 
the coordination meeting, and in particular in the discussion of adapting to 
general operating principles, we saw a screen that differentiated research from 
non-research. Subsequently, in the behavior work group, we saw a screen that 
distinguished project leaders from project managers, developing a hierarchy 
between leaders and managers by attributing more value to leaders, and to 
research. Finally, in the context of the project leader training program, activities 
produced a screen that separated drug discovery from drug development, without 
simultaneously projecting this difference as a problem for future innovation. Thus 
we saw a number of screens. Many of these screens started out as rather crude 
screens that then gradually dissolved, as they were challenged by certain things 
often related to present practices. We see strategic research developing through 
screens that categorize, occlude and project. 
This chapter also illustrated that collaboration within Lundbeck takes place as a 
form of misaligned co-production in which the research manager is seen as 
having a particular role. This role partly resembles the notion of project leaders 
seen as ‘bridge builders’, as developed in both Danish research policy and policy 
research (See Chapters 8 and 9). In policy, project leaders are expected to connect 
the diverse cultures of universities and companies, and in Lundbeck project 
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leaders are in part anticipated to play an important role in connecting the 
domains of Research and Development. But the idea of project leaders as bridge 
builders in Lundbeck also differs from the notion found in policy. As we saw, 
there are different types of leaders and managers in Lundbeck, not all of which 
are seen as connecting separate practices. Despite the Synapse projection of 
making connections, parts of Lundbeck are not seen as completely disconnected. 
There is also a sense of coherence that comes from being part of one company 
that we do not find in policy descriptions of science-industry relations. 
Misaligned co-production was particularly visible in three cases. First, in the 
situation where research managers encountered general operating principles. In 
this situation, both Synapse and the introduced operating principles described co-
production. However, the research managers challenged the idea of too strong an 
alignment, with reference to the distinct nature of research, which produced a 
misalignment within co-production. Second, in the context of the behavior work 
group, again Synapse and point 5.2 created an anticipation of collaboration and 
merging. However, the development manager resisted this idea and suggested 
misalignment by referring to the differences between Research and Development 
practices. Finally, in the context of the project leader training program, co-
production was no longer seen as a matter of merging cultures, but was from the 
start framed as misaligned. 
The finding of misaligned co-production raises questions about what the main 
challenges of science-industry collaboration are, both between academic and 
industrial researchers, and within research-based companies. ‘Bridge building’ 
might not be the best way of understanding such collaboration since the 
participants might not be separate in any stable or predictable way. Thus 
understanding these relations, and how they are managed, remains an empirical 
question. I now move to the conclusion of the thesis. 
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14. CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I first summarize some of the main findings and conclusions 
of the thesis. I also discuss what I view as the main implications for academic 
research and practitioners such as research managers and policy makers. As part 
of the conclusion, I also reflect on the concepts I have used. In particular, I return 
to the issue of what has been the purpose and value of using screens to analyze 
strategic research and science-industry collaboration. What have I accomplished 
by focusing on disconcertment? Finally, I reflect on this PhD as illustrative of 
science-industry collaboration. 
 
Main findings 
The thesis “Managing Strategic Research. An empirical analysis of science-
industry collaboration in a pharmaceutical company” has offered four main 
empirical analyses, each of which bears a different relation to the title and 
addresses different research questions. First, I have aimed to articulate what 
strategic research means in the context of science-industry collaboration. Second, 
I have attempted to characterize such forms of collaboration. Finally, I have tried 
to carefully specify some of the particular qualities and characteristics of the 
management of such research. The thesis gives answers to these questions that 
are both particular to the empirical context of Lundbeck and have more general 
implications. 
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Strategic research as an strategic-explorative activity 
The thesis has shown that research is not necessarily exclusively strategic or 
explorative. Rather, research can become strategic through an explorative 
process. As we have seen, both in policy and academic forums, distinguishing 
between exploratory (basic research) and strategic (applied research) is an 
important implicit or explicit discussion. Therefore, identifying different research 
forms that do not evolve from a separation between strategic and explorative can 
contribute to such discussions. In Lundbeck, I have thus identified a third form of 
research, which we might call strategic-explorative research. Strategic-explorative 
research is characterized by projects that anticipate solutions and end goals (such 
as a drug) but develop in a quite open process. In strategic-explorative research, 
strategic implies a direction whereas explorative involves an openness that 
potentially changes this direction. 
 
Science-industry collaboration as misaligned co-production 
The thesis has also advanced the argument that science-industry collaboration 
might be seen as misaligned co-production. Rather than presenting the worlds of 
academic and industrial research as essentially different, I have shown that in 
practice researchers from industry and academia share networks, training, 
methods, and theories. This implies that collaboration, in some situations, takes 
place based on a strong initial alignment between the participants’ research 
interests. Consequently, rather than seeking to align diverse cultures, co-
production in these situations becomes a matter of differentiating (or 
misaligning) various interests and engagements. In some situations, it is 
important to create forms of sameness (such as that all participants are scientists) 
whereas in other situations, it is important to amplify difference in order to 
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explicate the diverse purposes for being engaged. These purposes might be 
developing a drug or exploring a research area with the aim of publishing new 
findings. 
That science-industry collaboration develops through misaligned co-production 
has important implications for how such collaboration can be understood. 
Contrary to the assumptions of much policy debate and policy research, the main 
challenge of science-industry collaboration might not only be a matter of 
overcoming difference but also, at important points, of overcoming sameness. Yet, 
the idea of misaligned co-production does not only offer novel insight into the 
dynamics of science-industry collaboration between institutions. For as we have 
seen, science-industry collaboration can also be found even within companies and 
research institutions (such as Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic). Within such 
institutions, collaboration also sometimes takes the form of misaligned co-
production. Although, science and industry perspectives co-exist in the same 
institution, it can still be crucial for collaboration to articulate differences 
between them. Thus misaligned co-production is a notion that raises fundamental 
questions about what science-industry collaboration means, where it might be 
studied and how it might be supported by policies or managed practically. 
  
Research management as managing emergent relations 
The thesis also argues that managing strategic research is to a significant extent 
about the management of emergent relations. To manage emergent relations 
implies taking seriously that in strategic-explorative research, ideas and relations 
develop in a process, rather than being defined formally in advance. Thus, 
managing strategic research implies openness and timely reactions to emergent 
things. That these processes are open does not mean that they are without aim or 
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purpose. Managing emergent relations does not demand that one refrains from 
setting a direction or specifying an approach. Rather, it means that being strategic 
has to do with developing an ongoing attention to the question of how to 
demarcate focus areas by deciding what to ignore, while simultaneously allowing 
for openness, flexibility and emergence. Appendix A contains a paper which offers 
the notion of adaptive frameworks to describe an approach suitable for managing 
emergent relations. This notion of adaptive frameworks requires some further 
explanation in light of the analyses found in the thesis. 
 
Adaptive frameworks 
In an attempt to synthesize some of the main discussions and findings that 
developed in the process of this PhD project, Peter Høngaard Andersen (Senior 
Vice President at Lundbeck), Alan Irwin (Professor and Research Dean at 
Copenhagen Business School) and I, wrote a paper together (Vedel et al. 2013, see 
Appendix A). We gave ourselves the challenge of formulating ideas that had 
developed in our joint discussions for a general audience. The paper was 
eventually published by Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, a journal that suited this 
purpose as it had a pharmaceutical research audience, was open to cross-
disciplinary collaboration, and published short pieces. In the paper, we defined 
‘adaptive frameworks’ as an approach to research management that implies 
structure and direction setting but at the same time a sensitivity and 
responsiveness to what might develop in the research process. This idea, we 
thought, captured some of the main issues of managing strategic research, 
primarily for an industry and policy audience. 
Although this paper was an extension from the thesis rather than an integral part 
of the data collection it now seems to me to have further potential. ‘Adaptive 
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frameworks’ is not only a concept for practitioners but also potentially a fruitful 
way of describing the management of strategic research to a social science 
audience. It focuses attention on the basic condition of change in research while 
also insisting on the need to make strategies that attempt to give research 
activities a particular scope. Below I return to the notion of adaptive frameworks 
as I consider both implications for future academic research and for practitioners 
of the thesis. 
 
Screens 
Throughout the thesis, I have worked with an analytical framework based on the 
concept of screens. Thus I have used screens as conceptual tools for describing 
empirical socio-technical constructions of strategic research, science-industry 
collaboration and research management. In particular, I have identified three 
forms of screens and processes of screening: a projecting screen, a categorizing 
screen and an occluding screen. Using this framework, throughout the thesis I 
have identified different things as screens. 
Some of these screens have been quite obviously material. For instance, I have 
suggested that a transfer document might be understood in terms of a screen that 
categorizes research consultants and researchers as two distinct parties in a 
collaboration, although in practice these categories collapse. I have also described 
collaboration contracts as screens. I suggested that contracts present 
collaboration by categorizing the participants in a particular way. For instance, 
‘consultants collaborating with scientists’ is a categorization that addresses one 
dimension of the collaboration, while occluding others. These are just two 
examples of the material screens I have examined. 
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Other screens, however, have a more discursive form. For instance, I have 
suggested that the idea of a double payment that emerged during a somewhat 
disconcerting conversation produced a particular form of screen. Viewed as a 
screen the notion of a double payment categorizes Lundbeck and the Lundbeck 
Foundation as collapsed entities, while occluding a formal separation of the two 
institutions. This is also to say that though this screen is apparently discursive, it 
is still not merely discursive, since it also refers to formal organizational 
structures. It is material-semiotic, in the sense of Donna Haraway (1997). 
But I have also argued that more complex arrangements, events and activities 
might be analyzed in terms of screens and screenings. For example, I argued that 
a meeting arrangement could operate as a screening device. This is how I 
approached the first encounter between Lundbeck and the Mayo Clinic. In this 
setting, the conjunction of many details together produced a screen that 
categorized investors and scientists as inherently different. This meeting 
generated both discursive and material screens (though all in the end are both at 
once). For example, statements such as “this is what we got, what do you want?” 
separated investors from scientists. Likewise, the material arrangement and 
temporal organization of the meeting worked to screen and differentiate between 
investor-guests and scientist-hosts. Likewise, within Lundbeck we have seen 
arrangements such as the organization of temporary working and management 
groups that have also categorized Lundbeck employees and Lundbeck practices in 
particular ways with implications for interaction and strategy making. In this way, 
I have identified documents, talk and organization/arrangements as screens. 
It is my experience with these somewhat experimental analyses that it is 
relatively more easy to deal with obviously material things such as documents 
and contracts as screens. This is because it is easier to delimit and pinpoint just 
what it is that can be seen as a screen in these cases. Analytically, it is also 
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somewhat easier to be specific about what these objects do as screens. In addition 
to observing what these documents do in practice situations, the materiality of 
them makes it possible to take them home with you, sit with them and reflect on 
how and what they categorize, occlude or project. 
In contrast, more discursive things are relatively hard to handle analytically as 
screens. It is more difficult to be specific about their screening qualities and often 
they appear interesting only as part of a particular composition of things. Again 
the first encounter with the Mayo Clinic serves as a good example. Here, the 
screen was not a document or a single expression but rather a set of 
circumstances. The screen was comprised by a mixture of the participants’ 
attitudes, by how they were arranged in the room, and by what they said and how 
they acted. This situation is more difficult to analyze as a screen but not less 
interesting. 
In fact, I would suggest that although the notion of screens might appear to be 
somewhat stretched when it is used to look at obviously discourse focused events 
like meetings, such events are potentially what it is most interesting to study. 
Indeed, looking at meetings and encounters opens up a lot of explicit articulation 
work related not only to describing and planning research but also to defining the 
participants’ engagements and roles. 
It is particularly interesting to examine the processes whereby screens change. 
For instance, I have offered examples of how researchers in Lundbeck 
encountered specific categorizations of them as investors or industrialists. At 
certain times, these categorizations were welcomed; indeed they were important 
for making what I referred to as misaligned co-production. But at other times, 
these categorizations prevented deep engagement in new research areas. Thus, I 
have also discussed how Lundbeck researchers attempted to change categorizing 
screens by acting or talking in a way that stimulated different forms of 
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classification. Indeed, we have come across some very active forms of screen 
change such as the adoption of cultural codes, like putting on a creased shirt or 
asking technical questions when in the company of academics. This goes to show 
that screens are not always passively accepted but that people engage in activities 
to change them. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the notion of screens 
The main strength of the concept of screens is its conceptual flexibility. This has 
allowed me to conceive science-industry collaboration in a new way. Thus, 
focusing on screens has allowed me to consider the simultaneous co-production 
of sameness and difference in science-industry collaboration. In particular, 
screens offered a framework for exploring constructions of relations, without in 
advance setting up expectations of finding either sameness or difference. My 
intent was thus to avoid both the prevalent idea that science and industry are 
separate domains and the opposite, that such collaborations either presume or 
create similarity. The analytical tool of screens thus offered a flexible way of 
rethinking the dynamics of science-industry collaboration by characterizing how 
various constructions make collaboration possible. 
This flexibility made the analytical framework of screens adaptable to my 
empirical context but potentially it also makes it transferable to other contexts. 
Although I have emphasized categorizing, occluding and projecting screens, in 
other contexts different screens may be relevant, and the ones I have identified 
less so. My main point is simply that the framework of screens is itself potentially 
flexible and adaptable to diverse contexts. 
However, this flexibility is also, as I see it, the central potential weakness of this 
analytical tool. Thus it might be objected that the very flexibility of screens is a 
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consequence of not using the concept with sufficient clarity, precision and 
consistency. In future research, I therefore believe it will be both interesting and 
valuable to explore more specific aspects of screens. This might, for instance, 
entail looking at specific objects in terms of particular screens. This could be done 
by studying collaboration contracts only, and in detail, as categorizing screens. It 
might also entail studying the analytical phenomenon of intentional screen 
change, as described above. In this sense, narrowing and specifying its analytical 
and empirical areas of application may enhance the concept of screens. In this 
thesis, however, my main purpose was to develop and test the framework of 
screens and to see what new insights this might give in terms of understanding 
strategic research, science-industry collaboration and research management. 
 
Disconcertment 
Disconcertment was one of the central methodological tools with which I have 
explored strategic research in Lundbeck. Disconcertment was used as a device for 
selecting particular cases and situations for analysis. It has also worked as an 
organizing tool that has given certain events and accounts a prominent role in the 
thesis. Hence, the thesis has offered more accounts of surprising or unusual 
situations than descriptions of what researchers do when they normally do 
research in Lundbeck. 
As part of this process, I have identified different forms of disconcertment. First, 
there is the researchers’ disconcertment, which is what Verran encourages us to 
take seriously (Verran 2001). The researcher encounters surprising things in the 
field though they are not necessarily surprising to people in the field. Second, I 
have pointed to public forms of disconcertment in which the researcher and 
people in the field share a moment of disconcertment. After the event, there might 
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be different interpretations of what caused the disconcertment but this form of 
disconcertment is characterized by a shared sense that something was wrong. 
Finally, I have identified a third form of disconcertment, which took the form of 
people in the field retelling stories about past disconcerting events. This is neither 
the researcher’s disconcertment nor a shared form of disconcertment. The critical 
moment of disconcertment has passed (it might even be years ago) but it is still 
vividly recalled because it illustrated something important about what went on in 
a particular situation. 
Disconcertment is an interesting methodological tool because it addresses 
situations where things are out of order. Exploring these moments thus gives us a 
key to understanding what that order is assumed to be. For instance, in the case of 
the Mayo Clinic, I would not have been able to see that there was something 
wrong with the meeting situation unless the participants that I later interviewed 
had described their disconcertment. Indeed, it seemed perfectly reasonable to 
expect that research managers from Lundbeck would be interested in 
presentations of ongoing research at the Mayo Clinic. Yet, exploring this recalled 
disconcertment revealed that the Lundbeck research managers at this particular 
point in the collaboration did not see themselves as investors but in fact as 
researchers. To make the collaboration possible, it was crucial to change this 
perception. Thus, disconcertment works as a tool for exploring practices and 
embedded assumptions through the unusual. 
As a tool, disconcertment can be used in the three ways identified in the thesis: 
developing sensitivity to one’s own disconcertment, to public shared 
disconcertment and to informants’ reflections on past disconcerting moments. 
For future research it appears to me particularly promising to further explore the 
following question: What makes ‘a good case’ for exploring disconcertment? First, 
it seems that using disconcertment requires getting quite close to what one 
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studies. Being invited to explore situations where things are in the making, 
uncertain, or already gone wrong requires establishing some kind of trust that it 
takes time to build. In my case, being employed at Lundbeck made this easier but 
still it required engaging actively in the field over a long period of time. Second, 
there are potentially many disconcerting things to analyze. Sorting out which 
disconcerting things say something specifically important about the research 
topic requires familiarity with the field. Thus disconcertment seems to require 
longitudinal ethnographic studies. 
It seems to me that the public shared forms are highly interesting and strong 
cases of disconcertment. Again the meeting between Lundbeck and the Mayo 
Clinic researchers illustrates this. Here a large group of participants argued that 
something was wrong in this meeting. Though they gave quite different 
explanations of what was wrong the fact that they all pointed to the event as 
unusual made it seem of obvious interest. In contrast, it seemed less useful to 
explore in depth the disconcertment that a single research manager expressed 
about the Synapse process. Rather than suggesting something generally 
significant about science-industry collaboration, this disconcertment could, in 
hindsight, just as well say something particular about this research manager’s 
uncertainty about particular processes of change. Thus, I propose that studying 
disconcertment is particularly relevant when the empirical material allows 
exploring more public and collective forms of disconcertment. These public forms 
potentially reveal more important aspects of the phenomenon of strategic 
research as a collective practice than more private forms of disconcertment. 
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Implications for future academic work 
The thesis contributes to studies of science-industry collaboration, both in STS 
and in the field of research policy. Centrally, I have argued that since many 
analytical frameworks are based on the presumption that the main challenge of 
such collaboration is to overcome difference, careful analysis of what such 
difference actually consists in, is very important. The thesis has given some inputs 
to what characterizes such collaborative difference. It has shown that in many 
situations there are already overlaps and coinciding interests, so that making 
difference between the aims and roles of the participants is in fact what organizes 
and constitutes collaboration. This insight offers a further set of opportunities for 
future research. 
The thesis has drawn on a number of concepts developed in studies of scientific 
collaboration within universities among academic researchers from diverse 
disciplines (for instance, Galison 1996). These studies describe not so much 
science-industry differences as differences between disciplines and between 
scientific cultures. An interesting question for future research would 
consequently be: What might such studies of scientific collaboration learn from 
studies of science-industry collaboration? Do the participants in scientific 
collaborations also actively differentiate themselves from each other? Might we 
even find situations where disciplinary affiliation does not matter much and 
where other forms of sameness and differentiation become more important? 
The thesis also offers insight into research management. As we have seen, what 
characterizes research management is related to how research and collaboration 
are screened. If strategic research develops from emergent relations, and if 
science and industry are not clearly separate domains, the management of 
research is not mainly a matter of ‘bridge building’. Rather, managing research 
becomes a question of dealing with risk, uncertainty and unstable relationships, 
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and about making important links and differentiations. For future research, it 
would be interesting to explore the management of research in terms of such 
‘adaptive frameworks’ and their requirements (Vedel et al. 2013). Although we 
developed this term in the context of dissemination to practitioners, it might also 
be interesting for the academic study of research management, not simply, that is, 
as an administrative management practice but as a creative practice for 
integrating research content and context. 
 
Implications for practitioners 
From the outset this thesis had the ambition not only of speaking to academic 
concerns but also to those of practitioners. In this endeavor, I think of this thesis 
as a form of interventionist and “serviceable STS” (Webster 2007: 459) that aims 
at not only “deconstructing” but also “shaping” policies (ibid. 462-463). Andrew 
Webster suggests that there are several “intervention spaces” for STS research, 
among these ‘the characterization and anticipation of emerging technoscience 
fields’, ‘the exploitation of (future) technoscience’, and ‘the context of use of 
technoscience applications’ (ibid. 462). I would add to these a new intervention 
space that might be called: ‘basic assumptions about strategic research and 
science-industry collaboration’. Within this intervention space, the thesis has 
practical implications for both policy makers and research managers. 
 
Implications for research managers 
For practitioners, one of the main outcomes of this thesis is the paper 
“Externalizing research through adaptive frameworks”. The paper addresses a 
practitioner audience (readers of Nature Review Drug Discovery), it was co-
authored with a practitioner and it offers recommendations for how to work with 
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adaptive frameworks. These recommendations draw attention to what an 
adaptive framework approach implies. It implies developing more flexible ideas 
about what collaboration is (beyond “cash and carry”) and specific contractual 
frameworks based on these. 
The notion of adaptive frameworks addresses the practical challenges of 
managing strategic research and science-industry collaborations. As we have 
seen, these relate to an inbuilt tension in managing strategic research. On the one 
hand, managing strategic research implies stabilizing certain research by arguing 
for its potential relevance and value. On the other hand, it implies openness and 
allowing the research to destabilize these initial conceptions of relevance and 
value. Thus in practice managing strategic research means arguing for the value 
and potential of research one minute and allowing plans and frameworks to 
change in the next. 
In relation to developing contractual frameworks deploying an adaptive 
framework approach implies careful interrogation of what needs to be settled in 
advance and what might be left open in science-industry collaboration. For 
instance, while intellectual property rights and financial arrangements might have 
to be settled up-front, scientific content might be allowed for to develop in the 
course of the collaboration. Of course, this does not leave everything open, since 
content develops in relation to certain defined ambitions and questions. But how 
these ambitions and questions are left rather open and settled in the process. 
We also draw attention to the fact that although developing an adaptive 
framework approach might seem easy it nonetheless entails considerable 
organizational challenge. It requires that research managers have both technical 
skills and experience with research. In addition, communicating an adaptive 
framework approach to the organization might be quite hard, since it is premised 
on an in-built and productive tension between stabilizing things and keeping 
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them open. It is particularly challenging when this approach meets other 
organizational frameworks that aim at settling things. In Lundbeck, this was 
illustrated not least by the research managers’ general skepticism about “bringing 
in the lawyers” to solve collaboration problems. In any case, it would be 
interesting to develop the notion of adaptive frameworks further, especially in 
terms of generating even more specific recommendations for an audience of 
practitioners. 
 
Implications for policy makers 
Finally, let me consider the implications of my findings for policy. In recent years, 
a particular form of strategic research has emerged as increasingly important in 
Danish research policy. New strategies and an ongoing reorganization of the 
Danish research advisory and funding system have put increasing emphasis on 
treating strategic research on its own terms and developing it in terms of 
demand-driven innovation. This suggests that strategic research continues to be 
seen as separate from basic (“free”) research and based on quite specific requests 
articulated by politicians and companies. It is based on the assumption that it is 
possible to predict future societal and industrial needs for research and shape 
public research funding processes accordingly. 
This thesis has developed quite a different account of strategic research. Where 
strategic research in contemporary Danish policy debates is seen as a predictable, 
valuable, and goal-oriented form of research, this thesis has offered a description 
of strategic research in which direction and value, at least to some extent, develop 
in the process of collaboration. These findings might stimulate a more careful 
discussion about what strategic research is, what makes research strategic 
valuable, and how companies in fact identify their needs and strategies. 
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In relation to this, it is central to emphasize that the outcomes of strategic-
explorative research are not potentially less useful or less relevant than outcomes 
of a more restricted form of strategic research. Indeed, the opposite might well be 
the case, as strategic-explorative research (built on adaptive frameworks) implies 
an inbuilt alertness to potentially useful and relevant opportunities that are not 
predictable in advance. Thus we might not think of strategic-explorative research 
as potentially less capable of addressing societal or industrial problems but in fact 
as a more reflexive and relevant approach to both identifying and working with 
such problems. 
In this regard, one particular concern relates to the kind of research projects that 
might receive funding within a public policy framework of strategic research 
based on demand-driven innovation. Compared to a private corporate context, 
where research projects can be initiated and ended with flexibility there is a 
different accountability related to public research funding. There is a demand for 
receiving a coherent case for research rather than mainly elucidated 
opportunities. However, even if we take this difference into account, we might 
imagine the emphasis on demand-driven innovation would imply prioritizing 
projects that clearly address a demand, anticipate a solution and define crucial 
steps to reach this end. Consequently, we might also imagine that research 
projects that describe a direction but otherwise leave the research process more 
open will have more difficulty in receiving funding. This development of strategic 
research is problematic because it overlooks a great strategic potential in 
research in the attempt of controlling it. 
Another issue is how funded public funding agencies will manage and approach 
funded strategic research projects. To what extent are the receivers of research 
funds accountable within predefined research agendas? To stimulate discussion 
on these questions, adaptive frameworks might again be useful, also in this policy 
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context. If one considers the societal problems and the demands or needs for 
research defined by politicians and companies in terms of adaptive frameworks, a 
relevant policy approach to managing public research would need to be 
sufficiently flexible to allow strategic research projects to change direction, or 
even reconsider the overall problem or demand. 
Possibly, it is more crucial how publicly funded strategic research projects are 
managed than the overall terminology that is used to describe them, for example, 
strategic research, advanced technology or demand-driven innovation. With this 
concern in mind, the main challenge is to introduce a conception of strategic 
research that acknowledges strategic-explorative research. This is challenging 
because in a policy context that relies on crude categorizations of research this 
interpretation of strategic research might be understood as vague or even lacking 
firm policy. 
The thesis proposes a rethink of strategic research. In terms of policymaking it 
implies a request for flexibility in public research. It might eventually be relevant 
to think in terms of a re-categorization of basic and strategic research in Danish 
research policy. But in the short term it is much more important to carefully 
consider the ways in which strategic research is conceptualized and managed. 
 
Final reflections 
This research project was funded as part of the Danish scheme of industrial PhDs. 
It is thus interesting to reflexively consider this scheme of PhD as an example of 
science-industry collaboration, which is also the topic of the thesis. As a policy 
instrument, the industrial PhD was introduced to stimulate interaction between 
universities and companies and to educate researchers at the doctoral level who 
would also gain particular insight in industrial research. A recurrent criticism of 
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this scheme is that the industrial relevance necessarily comes at the expense of 
academic depth. This relates to a broader debate in Denmark in which it is often 
suggested that researchers who work with industry have a more applied 
perspective, which comes at the cost of intellectual sophistication. 
However, I would suggest that this does not necessarily have to be the case, and I 
hope the thesis proves this point. As I have shown throughout the thesis, it is 
possible for researchers employed by a company to engage in highly academic 
research. Likewise, I have not experienced my collaboration with research 
managers in Lundbeck as limiting my academic development. Though I shared 
with research managers an interest in practical questions about science-industry 
collaboration and research management, in no way was I forced to explore 
particularly practical questions in particularly applied ways. Rather different 
outcomes developed, some of which took the form of recommendations and 
practical input, and others the form of academic publications. On a personal note, 
I have found this form of science-industry collaboration extremely rewarding. 
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16. APPENDIX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acronyms Full form 
In Danish research policy 
ATV Danish Academy of Technical Sciences 
In Danish: Akademiet for de Tekniske 
Videnskaber (hence ATV) 
DASTI The Danish Agency for Science, Technology and 
Higher Education (DASTI) 
In Danish: Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation 
DCRP The Danish Council for Research Policy 
DCSD Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty 
DFF The Danish Council for Free Research 
In Danish: Det Fri Forskningsråd (hence DFF) 
DNATF The Danish National Advanced Technology 
Foundation 
In Danish: Højteknologifonden 
DNRF The Danish National Research Foundation 
DSF The Danish Council for Strategic Research 
In Danish: Det Strategiske Forskningsråd (hence 
DSF) 
RTI The Danish Council for Technology and 
Innovation  
In Danish: Rådet for Teknologi og Innovation 
(hence RTI) 
In Lundbeck 
BCG Boston Consulting Group 
CNS The central nervous system 
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DDMT The Drug Discovery Management Team 
R&DMB The Research and Development Management 
Board 
RMB The Research Management Board 
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17. APPENDIX C: LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Illustration 1: The linear organization of the Danish public research advisory and 
funding system (Regeringen 2012). ........................................................ 27 
Illustration 2: The entrance to Lundbeck headquarters and the building housing 
general management (picture taken from the North Gate, Autumn 2013). 38 
Illustration 3: The main street crossing through Lundbeck headquarters. The 
yellow building at the center of the picture houses Molecular 
Neurobiology/Drug Discovery (picture taken from the management building 
in Summer 2013). ............................................................................................ 40 
 Illustration 4: The linear organization of the Danish public research advisory and 
funding system (Regeringen 2012) ......................................................... 77 
Illustration 5: Donald Stokes’ model of Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes 1997). 81 
Illustration 6: Lundbeck’s Product concept model. ................................ 210 
Illustration 7: The tree metaphor of Lundbeck’s development. ....... 254 
Illustration 8: The cartoon illustration of corporate culture. ............. 256 
Illustration 9: The “As Is” slide illustrating the differences between Research 
leadership and Development management. ...................................... 269 
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18. APPENDIX D: LIST OF KEY PEOPLE/PSEUDONYMS 
Pseudonym Age Position 
Lundbeck 
Jens  55 Head of research/senior research manager 
Lars 50 Head of drug discovery (DK) 
Jørgen 65 Head of the behavior working group 
Hans 50 Divisional director 
Anne 45 Divisional director 
Niels 45 Divisional director 
Trine 40 Department manager 
Jesper 45 Head of section/research manager 
Thomas 45 Head of section/research manager 
Andreas 45 Chief scientist/chemist 
Morten 40 Human resource manager 
Tanja 45 Development manager 
Hanne 55 Human resource manager 
Birgitte 45 Divisional director, Development 
Richard 50 Head of drug discovery (US) 
Jonathan – Jon 45 Chief scientist/chemist (US) 
Elena 50 Human resource manager (US) 
William – Will 40 Business developer (US) 
Irene 55 Divisional director (US) 
The neurocell collaboration 
Martin 50 Researcher at a university/co-founder of 
PsychoIndex 
Søren 55 Researcher at a university 
Henrik 50 Co-founder of PsychoIndex 
 302 
 
The Mayo Clinic 
Adam 55 Department manager 
Geraldo – 
Jerry 
45 Principal investigator 
Laura 40 Principal investigator 
David - Dave 45 Principal investigator 
Nancy  50 Licensing manager  
Margaret  50 Technology development liaison officer 
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